SALT II

SALT II
Name	SALT II
Long name	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II
Date signed	June 18, 1979
Location signed	Vienna
Date effective	Not ratified by United States Senate; provisions observed informally after Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
Parties	United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Negotiators	Levon Ter-Petrosyan

SALT II The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II agreement was a 1979 strategic-arms limitation understanding negotiated between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, emerging from a sequence of diplomatic engagements seeking limits on strategic nuclear delivery systems during the détente era between Richard Nixon's and Jimmy Carter's administrations and the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev. It followed earlier rounds of negotiations and was central to Cold War diplomatic interaction among capitals such as Moscow, Washington, D.C., and Vienna. The talks intersected with broader Cold War events including the Yom Kippur War, the Vietnam War, and the Sino-Soviet split.

Background and Negotiation

Negotiations grew out of prior diplomatic efforts like the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I between delegations led by figures associated with administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, and were influenced by crises such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and strategic doctrines articulated by officials from Pentagons and ministries in Moscow. Delegations included arms-control experts, diplomats, and military officials drawn from institutions such as the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and Soviet ministries; negotiators referenced technical work of bodies like the SALT working groups and consulted allied capitals including London, Paris, and Ottawa. The negotiations unfolded through sessions in cities such as Geneva, Helsinki, and Vienna, with substantive input from scientists and strategists linked to research centers including RAND Corporation and Soviet design bureaus associated with the Ministry of Defence of the USSR.

Provisions of the Treaty

The agreement set numerical limits on categories of strategic delivery vehicles including intercontinental ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, and established ceilings intended to constrain qualitative and quantitative expansion of arsenals maintained by forces under the command structures of United States Strategic Command and Soviet counterparts. It articulated rules on multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles deployed on missiles, limits on new missile systems developed by bureaus such as Soviet design offices linked to OKB networks, and constraints on strategic bomber force structure rooted in doctrines discussed at forums like the NATO councils and the Warsaw Pact military planning bodies. The text provided verification measures, data-exchange mechanisms, and provisions for inspections and monitoring drawing on precedents set by agreements like the Antarctic Treaty and later influencing instruments modeled in filings to the United Nations.

Ratification, Implementation, and Non-Ratification by the United States

After signature in Vienna by presidential representatives from Jimmy Carter and Soviet leadership including Leonid Brezhnev, the treaty was transmitted to the United States Senate for advice and consent but was not submitted to binding ratification in light of congressional opposition and events such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Carter administration pursued a policy of provisional implementation while facing scrutiny from committees chaired by senators from Arms Control and Foreign Relations Committee-type institutions and influence from advocacy groups and Congressional caucuses representing constituencies in states like California, Texas, and New York. Subsequent administrations, including those of Ronald Reagan, treated the agreement as a reference point in bilateral discussions while citing alternative frameworks endorsed at summits such as those between Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

Impact on US–Soviet Relations and Arms Control

The agreement shaped strategic dialogue between capitals including Moscow and Washington, D.C. and influenced summit diplomacy exemplified by meetings at locations like Camp David and during exchanges at the United Nations General Assembly. It affected regional alignments in theatres involving allies such as West Germany, Japan, and South Korea and provoked debate within policy circles at institutions like the Brookings Institution, the Council on Foreign Relations, and Soviet academies. The treaty's negotiation and aftermath intersected with arms-control initiatives that later culminated in accords such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, and it framed public discourse on deterrence doctrines articulated by strategists associated with think tanks including Heritage Foundation and organizations tied to legislative staffers.

Compliance, Verification, and Violations

Verification provisions emphasized data exchanges, on-site inspections, and technical measures aimed at detecting circumventions by production facilities, testing sites, and deployment practices monitored by intelligence agencies including the Central Intelligence Agency and signals gathering by assets commissioned through programs overseen by National Reconnaissance Office and satellite platforms launched from sites like Cape Canaveral. Accusations of non-compliance were raised in policy debates in Congress and by commentators linked to publications such as The New York Times and Pravda, with disputes centered on modernization programs and new delivery systems produced by enterprises within Soviet industrial complexes. These controversies influenced subsequent verification innovations deployed in treaties negotiated in arms-control fora including panels convened at Geneva and within committees organized by the United Nations.

Legacy and Influence on Subsequent Agreements

Although not ratified by the United States Senate, the agreement informed later accords negotiated between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev and contributed technical and legal precedents used during drafting of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the START I and START II negotiations. Its verification mechanisms shaped inspection regimes in later pacts and its political lessons influenced diplomatic strategy employed in summits at sites such as Reykjavík and conferences hosted by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The treaty remains a reference in academic work produced by scholars at institutions like Harvard University, Columbia University, and Moscow State University and continues to inform policy studies in think tanks across Washington, D.C. and Moscow.

Category:Cold War treaties