START II

START II
Susan Biddle · Public domain · source
Name	START II
Date signed	3 January 1993
Location signed	Moscow
Parties	United States and Russian Federation
Date effective	not in force
Condition effective	ratification by both parties and other conditions

START II was a bilateral arms control agreement negotiated between the United States and the Russian Federation in the early 1990s to reduce strategic nuclear arsenals and limit deployment of multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles. Intended to follow the START I treaty, it emerged during the presidencies of George H. W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin amid the post‑Cold War reshaping of relations between NATO members and former Warsaw Pact states. Negotiators sought to address fears raised by strategic stability debates following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of newly independent states such as Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.

Background

In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, arms control discussions involved figures from the US Department of State, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and experts from institutions like the Brookings Institution, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the RAND Corporation. Concerns about strategic forces were shaped by events including the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the earlier INF Treaty negotiations, and the implementation of START I signed in 1991. Political leaders such as Mikhail Gorbachev, Ronald Reagan, and later Bill Clinton influenced the environment in which negotiators from teams led by James Baker and Andrei Kozyrev operated. The breakup of the Soviet Union into successor states raised issues about nuclear custody and treaties like the Lisbon Protocol and agreements mediated by the Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.

Negotiation and Signing

Formal talks took place in forums involving delegations from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, and diplomatic representatives from Washington, D.C. and Moscow. High‑level diplomacy included summits between George H. W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin, and later engagement by Bill Clinton, Vladimir Putin (as President of Russia later) and secretaries such as Warren Christopher and Madeleine Albright. The treaty text was finalized after rounds of negotiation in venues including meetings at Geneva, Vienna, and the United Nations General Assembly sessions where delegates from France, United Kingdom, and other NATO allies observed related strategic dialogues. The signature ceremony on 3 January 1993 in Moscow followed consensus on numerical ceilings and verification protocols crafted by experts from the Arms Control Association and technical teams with backgrounds in the Soviet Union Ministry of Defense and the US Department of Defense.

Key Provisions

The agreement sought to cap and reduce deployed strategic warheads and prohibited certain force structures; provisions addressed limits on Multiple Independently targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) deployment on land‑based ICBMs, conversion or elimination of silo and mobile launchers, and verification measures drawing on technologies and practices used in the Non-Proliferation Treaty context. The treaty included detailed inspection regimes involving representatives from the Soviet/Russian General Staff, the US Strategic Command, and technical inspectors trained at institutions linked to Harvard University and Moscow State Institute of International Relations. Legal and compliance mechanisms referenced precedents from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and dispute resolution approaches influenced by rulings from bodies such as the International Court of Justice.

Implementation and Ratification

Ratification processes unfolded in legislative bodies including the United States Senate and the Russian legislature, involving hearings led by committees such as the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and analogous Russian parliamentary commissions. Domestic politics in both capitals—shaped by actors like Newt Gingrich, Les Aspin, Sergei Stepashin, and later leaders like Viktor Chernomyrdin—affected timelines. Implementation encountered obstacles after the Russian Duma debated conditions tied to missile defense proposals in the United States and the fate of strategic programs. Subsequent events, including decisions related to the Moscow Treaty (2002) and bilateral discussions on missile defense with figures such as Donald Rumsfeld and Condoleezza Rice, influenced the trajectory that left the agreement never entering into force despite ratification by one or both legislatures at different times.

Impact and Legacy

Though not in force, the treaty shaped subsequent arms control practice, informing negotiations that led to accords like the New START treaty and debates over missile defense with participants from European Union capitals and NATO allies such as Germany, Poland, and Czech Republic. START II influenced strategic stability dialogues among scholars at Princeton University, Stanford University, and think tanks including the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Heritage Foundation. It also contributed to cooperative programs addressing dismantlement overseen by the Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and set precedents for verification protocols used in later agreements involving the Comprehensive Nuclear‑Test‑Ban Treaty Organization and bilateral frameworks under successive presidents. The treaty remains a significant episode in the continuum from Cold War arms control to twenty‑first century strategic arms reductions negotiated by figures such as Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev.

Category:Treaties of the United States Category:Treaties of the Russian Federation