New START Treaty
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| New START Treaty | |
|---|---|
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| Name | New START Treaty |
| Date signed | 8 April 2010 |
| Location signed | Prague |
| Condition effective | 5 February 2011 |
| Parties | United States, Russian Federation |
| Languages | English, Russian |
New START Treaty The New START Treaty is a bilateral arms reduction agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation concluded in Prague on 8 April 2010 and entered into force on 5 February 2011. It succeeded earlier agreements including the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the START I framework, establishing limits, counting rules, and an inspection regime for strategic offensive arms. Negotiations and implementation involved figures and institutions such as Barack Obama, Dmitry Medvedev, the U.S. Department of State, the Russian Ministry of Defence, and arms control experts from SIPRI, RAND Corporation, and the Brookings Institution.
Background and Negotiation
Negotiations drew on precedents like Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the START II dialogues, with diplomatic exchanges occurring in capitals including Prague, Moscow, Washington, D.C., and Geneva. Key negotiators and officials included William J. Burns, Sergei Ivanov, Rose Gottemoeller, and representatives from the United States Department of Defense and the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. Political contexts shaping talks encompassed the aftermath of the Iraq War (2003–2011), the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, and cooperative security initiatives like the Nuclear Security Summit (2010). Technical work relied on verification lessons from the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and treaty drafters with links to Sandia National Laboratories and Los Alamos National Laboratory.
Key Provisions and Verification Measures
The treaty set aggregate limits on deployed strategic nuclear warheads and deployed and non-deployed strategic delivery vehicles, reflecting counting rules applied to intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bomber forces such as the B-52 Stratofortress, Tu-160, and B-2 Spirit. Verification provisions included on-site inspections, data exchanges, notifications, and the use of national technical means exemplified by satellite imagery operations from agencies like National Reconnaissance Office and Roscosmos. Measures referenced accounting procedures developed during START I and monitoring practices informed by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Treaty's limits, declarations, and inspection schedules were overseen by joint commissions and diplomatic channels including the U.S. Senate treaty ratification process and the Federation Council.
Implementation and Compliance
Implementation required force adjustments by entities such as the United States Air Force, United States Navy, the Russian Aerospace Forces, and the Russian Navy. Conversion and elimination of delivery systems involved industrial sites and contractors linked to Boeing, Lockheed Martin, United Aircraft Corporation, and Tupolev. Compliance assessments incorporated analysis from think tanks and watchdogs like Federation of American Scientists, Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Chatham House. Disputes over alleged treaty violations drew in intelligence bodies including the Central Intelligence Agency and the FSB, while diplomatic exchanges occurred through mechanisms used during the Cold War and the Helsinki Accords era.
Impact on Strategic Stability and Arms Control
The treaty influenced strategic stability by reducing numerical inventories and reinforcing risk-reduction channels between nuclear-armed states such as the United Kingdom, France, and China, which were not parties to the agreement. It affected modernization programs for delivery systems like Trident II D5, RS-24 Yars, and platforms such as the Ohio-class submarine and Borei-class submarine. Arms control scholars at Harvard Kennedy School, Princeton University, and Yale University assessed effects on deterrence, crisis stability, and escalation control, drawing comparisons with outcomes from START I and the New START predecessors. Regional security dynamics involving NATO, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and partnerships with India and Pakistan were examined in policy literature.
Political Debates and Ratification
Ratification in the U.S. Senate occurred after hearings featuring testimony from military leaders including Robert Gates and legal advisors from the U.S. Department of Justice. Debates addressed modernization costs, verification confidence, and force posture implications for allies like Poland and Romania. In Russia, approval processes involved the State Duma and statements by political leaders including Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev. Domestic political factions, media outlets such as The New York Times and RIA Novosti, and advocacy groups like Union of Concerned Scientists and Arms Control Association contributed to public discourse.
Extensions, Renewal Attempts, and Current Status
The treaty contained a ten-year duration with an option to extend, prompting extension discussions among officials from the United States Department of State, the Kremlin Administration, and envoys with ties to Geneva and Vienna diplomatic tracks. Extension and renewal debates linked to subsequent arms control efforts including proposals involving China and trilateral frameworks discussed at forums such as the Munich Security Conference and the United Nations General Assembly. Contemporary status and future prospects have been assessed by institutions including SIPRI, the Arms Control Association, and academic centers at Georgetown University and Johns Hopkins University, while strategic planners in NATO continue contingency planning related to treaty outcomes.