Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan

Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan
Name	Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan
Formation	2008
Dissolved	2011
Type	Independent bipartisan commission
Purpose	Oversight of wartime contracting
Headquarters	Washington, D.C.
Leaders	Bob Burton; Donald Rumsfeld; Frank Anderson; Linda Springer

Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan was an independent bipartisan congress-chartered commission created to study contracting practices related to the Iraq War and the War in Afghanistan (2001–2021), assess waste and fraud, and recommend reforms. The commission produced reports that influenced legislation, oversight by the United States Congress, and practices within federal agencies including the Department of Defense, the United States Agency for International Development, and the Department of State. Its work intersected with investigations by the Government Accountability Office, the Inspector General offices, and congressional committees such as the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.

Background and Establishment

The commission was established under provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 as a response to concerns raised in the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the prolonged counterinsurgency operations in Helmand Province. Early stimuli included reporting by The Washington Post, investigations by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, and hearings before the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. High-profile episodes such as allegations surrounding Halliburton and KBR (company) contracting, the use of private security contractors like Blackwater Worldwide, and cost overruns tied to reconstruction projects in Baghdad and Kabul prompted bipartisan support for an external body. The commission drew on comparative work from inquiries into previous conflicts including post-World War II reconstruction, the Marshall Plan, and procurement lessons from the Gulf War.

Mandate, Structure, and Personnel

Statutory authority assigned the commission oversight to examine contractors engaged in contingency operations, focusing on waste, fraud, and abuse. Commissioners were nominated by congressional leadership including members from the United States Senate and the United States House of Representatives and included appointees with ties to agencies such as the Office of Management and Budget and the Government Accountability Office. Leadership featured figures from public administration and defense oversight; staff combined auditors, investigators, and policy analysts with backgrounds at the Defense Contract Audit Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the United States Army Corps of Engineers. The commission coordinated with the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, and consulted academic experts from institutions like Harvard University, Stanford University, and Princeton University.

Investigations and Findings

The commission conducted fieldwork in Baghdad, Kirkuk, Mosul, Kandahar, and Bagram Airfield, interviewed officials from CENTCOM, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and contractors including DynCorp International. Its investigations identified systemic deficiencies in contracting practices, including inadequate oversight by Defense Logistics Agency and failures in contract documentation akin to problems previously documented by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense. The commission estimated substantial cumulative losses, citing examples of phantom projects, duplicate billing, and insecure inventory that echoed patterns observed by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction and SIGIR. Reports highlighted issues with contractor accountability in incidents paralleling controversies involving Blackwater and bankruptcy proceedings of firms like MPRI-related entities. Findings underscored strained civil–military coordination involving the Coalition Provisional Authority and transition challenges similar to those in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War.

Recommendations and Legislative Impact

The commission issued recommendations aimed at strengthening statutes such as the Federal Acquisition Regulation and augmenting roles for entities like the Defense Contract Management Agency. It urged expansion of the Contractor Responsibility Act-type provisions, tighter audit requirements under Title 10 of the United States Code, and enhanced authority for inspectors general modeled on powers used by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. Legislative responses included provisions in subsequent National Defense Authorization Act cycles and reforms promoted by the Office of Management and Budget. Congress incorporated many suggestions into hearings and enacted measures to bolster suspension and debarment processes used by the General Services Administration and to improve interagency data sharing akin to initiatives by the Federal Acquisition Service.

Reception, Criticism, and Controversies

Reactions ranged from praise by oversight advocates at Transparency International-linked groups to critiques by defense and contracting industry associations such as the National Defense Industrial Association. Critics questioned the commission’s methodology, citing contested estimates and disputes with contractors represented by American Trucking Associations-type legal counsel; some argued the commission duplicated efforts of the Government Accountability Office and the various inspectors general. Political figures from the Bush administration and the Obama administration disputed certain characterizations, and media outlets including The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and Politico debated its conclusions. Legal controversies arose over access to classified materials and the commission’s reliance on redacted documents from the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Legacy and Subsequent Reforms

The commission’s legacy includes influencing procurement reforms, enhanced inspector general coordination, and the creation of policy forums within the Pentagon and the Office of Management and Budget for contingency contracting. Its reports informed training changes at the Defense Acquisition University and catalyzed scholarship at centers such as the RAND Corporation and the Brookings Institution. Subsequent statutory and administrative reforms addressed issues in contractor oversight observed during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, affecting contracting practices in later contingency operations including missions in Syria and responses to natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina. The commission remains cited in academic literature and congressional testimony on preventing waste and improving accountability in overseas contingency operations.

Category:United States federal government commissions Category:Iraq War Category:War in Afghanistan (2001–2021)