Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
Name	Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
Formed	November 27, 2002
Dissolved	August 21, 2004
Jurisdiction	United States federal government
Headquarters	Washington, D.C.
Chairman	Thomas H. Kean
Vicechair	Lee H. Hamilton
Report	The 9/11 Commission Report

Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States was an independent, bipartisan panel created to investigate the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Established by statute and public mandate, the Commission produced a comprehensive report on the causes, institutional failures, and policy responses to the attacks, issuing recommendations for reform across intelligence, aviation, and homeland security sectors.

Background and Establishment

The Commission was created amid national debate following the September 11 attacks and after inquiries such as the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 by the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the United States House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Political actors including President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Senator Bob Graham, and Representative Porter Goss shaped the negotiation that led to the statutory authorization signed by President George W. Bush and enacted by the United States Congress. Public figures such as Tom Daschle, George Mitchell, and Hillary Rodham Clinton engaged in legislative debate. The Commission’s mandate drew on precedents from inquiries like the Warren Commission and the Church Committee but was distinct in statutory authority and scope.

Membership and Structure

The Commission comprised ten commissioners appointed by congressional and executive leaders, chaired by Thomas H. Kean with vice chair Lee H. Hamilton. Other members included figures such as Richard Ben-Veniste, Max Cleland, Fred F. Fielding, Slade Gorton, Timothy J. Roemer, Bob Kerrey, John Lehman, and Reisacher? (appointments reflected partisan balance, legal expertise, and national security experience). The staff integrated investigators from backgrounds tied to Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, Department of State, National Security Agency, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Federal Aviation Administration, and academia including scholars from Harvard University, Yale University, Georgetown University, and Columbia University. Organizationally, the Commission established working groups focused on intelligence, aviation security, emergency response, and legislative reform, coordinating with entities like the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States's general counsel and staff.

Investigation and Methods

The Commission conducted public hearings, declassified document review, interviews, depositions, and coordination with grand juries and the FBI investigative teams. It subpoenaed records from institutions including the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Department of Defense, Federal Aviation Administration, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, New York Police Department, and Metropolitan Transportation Authority. The investigative team employed analysts with experience from RAND Corporation, Brookings Institution, Council on Foreign Relations, and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and consulted technical specialists from Boeing, American Airlines, United Airlines, DARPA, and MITRE Corporation. Methodologies included timeline reconstruction, signal intelligence assessment relying on data from NSA, human intelligence evaluation based on CIA materials, and comparative analysis referencing events like the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1998 United States embassy bombings, and the 2000 USS Cole bombing.

Findings and Conclusions

The Commission’s principal conclusions attributed the attacks to the Al-Qaeda network directed by Osama bin Laden, facilitated by operatives including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ramzi bin al-Shibh, exploiting failures across agencies such as the FBI, CIA, and Immigration and Naturalization Service. It identified lapses including inadequate information sharing between CIA and FBI, stovepiped analysis within the intelligence community, and weaknesses in aviation security policy overseen by Federal Aviation Administration and TSA pre-creation. The report detailed the operational planning linked to locations like Hamburg, Germany, Kuwait, and Afghanistan, and highlighted missed warning signs such as Phoenix Memo-type communications and visa processing discrepancies at U.S. consulates in cities like Jeddah and Riyadh. The Commission also assessed policy decisions by administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, including counterterrorism priorities, covert action policies, and the use of detainee authorities exemplified by Guantanamo Bay detention camp.

Recommendations and Policy Impact

The Commission recommended establishing a principal Director of National Intelligence to coordinate the intelligence community, creating actionable information-sharing mechanisms, restructuring aviation security into an agency such as the Transportation Security Administration, and enhancing border security and emergency response coordination through entities like the Department of Homeland Security. It urged legal and statutory changes affecting authorities in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, executive branch organization, and congressional oversight practices, and called for investments in passenger screening, biometrics, and intelligence analysis capacity drawing on technology from NSA, DARPA, and private contractors such as Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman. Several recommendations influenced legislation including the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and institutional changes such as the creation of the Director of National Intelligence and reorganization efforts within Department of Homeland Security.

Reception and Criticism

The Commission’s report received praise from public officials including President George W. Bush, Senator John McCain, and Representative Nancy Pelosi for clarity and recommendations, while critics such as Representative Lamar Smith and commentators in outlets like The New York Times and The Washington Post argued about omissions and declassification limits. Scholars at Harvard Kennedy School, Columbia Law School, and Yale Law School debated methodological choices, the scope of subpoena power, and the handling of classified materials. Victim advocacy groups and families from the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund engaged with the Commission’s outreach, while legal scholars invoked cases like Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and debates over USA PATRIOT Act implications to critique civil liberties trade-offs.

Subsequent Developments and Legacy

The Commission’s legacy includes institutional reforms, ongoing academic study at centers like the 9/11 Memorial & Museum, policy analysis at Brookings Institution and RAND Corporation, and its influence on inquiries into later events such as the 2004 Madrid train bombings and policy shifts after the 2005 London bombings. Its archive and oral histories have been used by historians at Library of Congress, journalists at The New Yorker and ProPublica, and courts considering declassification petitions. The report continues to inform debates in institutions including Congressional Research Service, Government Accountability Office, and international bodies like NATO on counterterrorism, intelligence sharing, and resilience planning.

Category:United States national commissions