National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
U.S. Government · Public domain · source
Name	National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
Established	2002
Dissolved	2004
Jurisdiction	United States
Chairman	Thomas H. Kean
Vicechair	Lee H. Hamilton
Report	The 9/11 Commission Report

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The Commission was an independent, bipartisan commission created to investigate the circumstances surrounding the September 11 attacks and to provide recommendations to prevent future terrorist attacks. Chaired by Thomas H. Kean with vice chair Lee H. Hamilton, the panel produced the influential The 9/11 Commission Report after conducting public hearings, interviews, and document reviews involving actors such as Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda, Hamdullah Nomani, and agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Background and Establishment

Following the September 11 attacks that targeted World Trade Center, United Airlines Flight 93, and the Pentagon, calls for an independent inquiry intensified across Congress, including members of the United States Senate, United States House of Representatives, and figures from the Bush administration. Legislative debates involved proposals by Senator Charles Schumer, Representative Porter Goss, and negotiations with officials such as President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney. Congressional committees including the Senate Intelligence Committee and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence had ongoing investigations, but bipartisan consensus led to creation of the Commission via the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and enabling legislation negotiated by leaders like Senator Bob Graham and Representative Tim Roemer.

Membership and Organization

The Commission comprised ten members drawn from public life, including former governors and lawmakers: Chairman Thomas H. Kean, Vice Chair Lee H. Hamilton, and commissioners such as Richard Ben-Veniste, Fred F. Fielding, Max Cleland, Slade Gorton, Bob Kerrey, John F. Lehman, Tim Roemer, and Alice Fisher. Staff leadership included Executive Director Philip D. Zelikow and general counsels and investigators with backgrounds in organizations like the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Defense, and academic institutions such as Harvard University and Yale University. Support came from professional staff, legal counsel, and specialist consultants with expertise related to Al-Qaeda, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, aviation security at Federal Aviation Administration, and homeland security at the newly conceptualized Department of Homeland Security.

Investigation and Hearings

The Commission conducted a public inquiry featuring televised hearings, testimony from officials such as Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, George Tenet, Richard A. Clarke, and former CIA Directors, as well as interviews of family members of victims from American Airlines Flight 11, United Airlines Flight 175, and American Airlines Flight 77. Investigations examined links to Al-Qaeda, the role of Taliban, funding networks involving individuals from Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, and operational details involving scrubbed flight plans, Federal Aviation Administration responses, and interactions among New York City Police Department, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and Northern Virginia emergency responders. The Commission subpoenaed documents from agencies including the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security Agency, and Department of Defense, and held hearings at venues such as the Hart Senate Office Building.

Findings and Conclusions

The Commission's report concluded systemic failures across intelligence, law enforcement, and aviation sectors, citing missed opportunities to disrupt Al-Qaeda cells, inadequate information sharing between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and failures in policy coordination under administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. Key conclusions addressed links to Al-Qaeda leadership including Osama bin Laden and operatives like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the effectiveness of intelligence reform proposals, and the need to reassess policies toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. The report documented chronological sequences of the September 11 attacks, identified pre-attack warnings such as the August 6, 2001 President's Daily Brief titled "Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US", and described institutional cultures at agencies like the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Central Intelligence Agency that impeded counterterrorism.

Recommendations and Implementation

Recommendations included creation of a centralized national security architecture: a Director of National Intelligence to coordinate the Intelligence Community, structural reforms in information sharing between the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation, improvements to aviation security overseen by the Federal Aviation Administration and Transportation Security Administration, and strengthened border and immigration controls involving Department of Homeland Security components such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection. The report urged legislative measures enacted via the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, establishment of the Director of National Intelligence, and expanded capabilities for agencies like the National Counterterrorism Center, reshaping relationships among institutions like the Department of Defense, State Department, and intelligence agencies. Recommendations also covered emergency response coordination for entities such as the New York City Fire Department and regional authorities.

Reception and Criticism

The Commission's work received praise from survivors, families, and figures like Senator John McCain and Representative Nancy Pelosi for creating a comprehensive public record, but also drew criticism from parties including former officials like George Tenet and commentators in media linked to The New York Times, The Washington Post, and Fox News over perceived omissions and reliance on staff synthesis by Philip D. Zelikow. Critics raised issues regarding access to classified material, potential conflicts of interest involving advisors tied to administration officials, and assertions by scholars at institutions such as Harvard University and Columbia University about methodological limitations. Congressional oversight debates continued in venues such as the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and House Committee on Homeland Security about implementation of reforms. The report nonetheless influenced subsequent policy, debate, and institutional restructuring across national security institutions including the Intelligence Community, Department of Homeland Security, and aviation regulators.

Category:United States commissions Category:September 11 attacks