START II

START II
Susan Biddle · Public domain · source
Name	START II
Long name	Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
Type	Bilateral arms control
Date drafted	June 1992
Date signed	3 January 1993
Location signed	Moscow, Russia
Date effective	Never entered into force
Condition effective	Exchange of instruments of ratification
Signatories	United States, Russia
Parties	United States, Russia
Depositor	United Nations Secretary-General
Languages	English, Russian

START II. The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, commonly known as START II, was a landmark bilateral arms control agreement signed by President George H. W. Bush and President Boris Yeltsin in early 1993. It aimed to dramatically reduce the deployed strategic nuclear arsenals of both nations, building upon the foundation laid by its predecessor, START I. Although signed and ratified, the treaty ultimately never entered into force, superseded by changing geopolitical realities and subsequent agreements like the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT).

Background and negotiation

The negotiation of the treaty was a direct consequence of the geopolitical upheaval following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991. With the Cold War declared over, leaders in Washington, D.C. and the new Russian Federation sought to capitalize on improved relations and make deep, stabilizing cuts in their massive nuclear stockpiles. The framework had been established by the successful ratification of START I in 1991, which mandated significant reductions but left both sides with thousands of warheads. Talks accelerated following the 1992 United States presidential election, with outgoing President George H. W. Bush and President Boris Yeltsin reaching a preliminary agreement at the 1992 Washington Summit. The final treaty text was signed at a ceremony in Moscow on January 3, 1993, just weeks before the inauguration of President Bill Clinton.

Key provisions

The central obligation of the agreement was to reduce the total number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads for each party to between 3,000 and 3,500 by the year 2003. A more radical and contentious provision was the complete elimination of all intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), including the entire Russian force of heavy SS-18 Satan missiles. This banned a core component of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces and required the United States to de-MIRV its LGM-118 Peacekeeper missiles. The treaty also prohibited the deployment of MIRVed warheads on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), though it allowed for the retention of single-warhead land-based missiles like the American LGM-30 Minuteman and the Russian RT-2PM2 Topol-M.

Ratification process

The ratification process proved lengthy and politically fraught in both nations. The United States Senate provided its advice and consent to ratification in January 1996, but with conditions linking further implementation to Russian adherence to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. In Russia, ratification was delayed for years due to intense opposition from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and factions within the Russian military who opposed the elimination of MIRVed ICBMs. The State Duma finally ratified the treaty in April 2000, but attached its own conditions, including non-compliance if the United States proceeded with national missile defense deployments. These reciprocal conditions created a legal deadlock.

Implementation and verification

Although the treaty never formally entered into force, its verification regime was designed to build upon the extensive inspection and monitoring procedures established under START I. These included detailed data exchanges, notifications of missile movements, and on-site inspections using national technical means like reconnaissance satellites. Some of the treaty's envisioned reductions began unilaterally or through parallel political commitments, such as the retirement of the American LGM-118 Peacekeeper and the downloading of warheads from other systems. However, the lack of a binding legal framework meant these actions were not subject to the treaty's formal verification protocols.

Impact and legacy

The ultimate failure of the treaty to enter into force highlighted the limits of post-Cold War arms control amid rising tensions over NATO expansion and American missile defense plans. Its most significant legacy was establishing the ambitious goal of deep cuts below START I levels, a target that would later be pursued through the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) in 2002 and the New START treaty in 2010. The treaty's attempt to ban an entire class of weapons, MIRVed ICBMs, influenced subsequent strategic thinking, though Russia later developed new MIRVed systems like the RS-24 Yars. The diplomatic experience underscored the enduring complexity of nuclear negotiations even after the end of the Soviet Union.

Category:Arms control treaties Category:Treaties of the United States Category:Treaties of the Russian Federation Category:1993 in the United States Category:1993 in Russia