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New START

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Article Genealogy
Parent: United States Senate Hop 3
Expansion Funnel Raw 56 → Dedup 21 → NER 11 → Enqueued 10
1. Extracted56
2. After dedup21 (None)
3. After NER11 (None)
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New START
NameTreaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
TypeBilateral arms control
Date signed8 April 2010
Location signedPrague Castle, Prague, Czech Republic
Date effective5 February 2011
Condition effectiveExchange of instruments of ratification
Date expiration4 February 2026 (extended)
SignatoriesUnited States, Russia
PartiesUnited States, Russia
LanguagesEnglish, Russian

New START. The Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms is a pivotal arms control agreement between the world's two largest nuclear powers. It succeeded the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty and is considered the final major bilateral arms pact of the post-Cold War era. The treaty establishes verifiable limits on the deployed strategic nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the Russian Federation, continuing a legacy of agreements like the SALT I and START I.

Overview

The agreement is a cornerstone of the modern nuclear arms control architecture, directly linking the strategic forces of Washington, D.C. and Moscow. It was signed during a period of attempted "reset" in Russia–United States relations under the administrations of Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev. The treaty's primary objective is to enhance mutual security by imposing equal, verifiable ceilings on the most dangerous categories of nuclear weapons, thereby providing predictability and stability. Its negotiation and implementation were overseen by key diplomatic and military bodies, including the United States Department of State and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Russia).

Key provisions

The central limits of the treaty cap each party's deployed strategic warheads at 1,550, a significant reduction from previous ceilings set by the Moscow Treaty. It also restricts deployed intercontinental ballistic missile launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments to 700. An additional aggregate limit of 800 is placed on both deployed and non-deployed launchers and bombers. The treaty counts each deployed B-52 Stratofortress or Tu-160 as carrying one warhead for accountability purposes, regardless of its actual capacity. These provisions apply to systems based across the United States Strategic Command and the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces.

Negotiation and signing

Formal negotiations commenced in Geneva during 2009, building upon discussions that began after the expiration of START I. The principal negotiators were Rose Gottemoeller for the United States and Anatoly Antonov for Russia. The signing ceremony was a major diplomatic event held at Prague Castle, with Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev formally endorsing the document. The treaty was subsequently submitted for legislative approval, facing significant debate in the United States Senate before securing the necessary two-thirds majority vote. The Russian Federal Assembly provided its consent through its State Duma and Federation Council (Russia).

Implementation and verification

A robust verification regime, drawing from the legacy of START I, is a critical component. This includes up to 18 short-notice on-site inspections per year at facilities like Malmstrom Air Force Base or the Kozelsk missile base. The treaty also mandates extensive data exchanges on the status and movements of strategic systems and utilizes National technical means of verification, such as reconnaissance satellites. The Bilateral Consultative Commission meets regularly in Geneva to resolve implementation questions and address compliance concerns. This framework provides both parties with high confidence in treaty adherence.

Extension and future prospects

In January 2021, shortly before the treaty's initial expiration, the Biden administration and the Government of Russia agreed to a five-year extension until 2026, as permitted by the treaty's terms. This decision was made amidst increasing tensions over issues like the War in Donbas, Russian interference in United States elections, and the development of novel strategic weapons such as the Avangard (hypersonic glide vehicle). The future of arms control beyond this extension remains uncertain, complicated by the dissolution of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the inclusion of China's growing nuclear arsenal in discussions, and the broader deterioration of relations following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Category:Arms control treaties Category:Treaties of the United States Category:Treaties of the Russian Federation Category:2010 in international relations