START I

START I
Susan Biddle · Public domain · source
Name	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
Long name	Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
Type	Bilateral arms control
Date drafted	29 June 1982
Date signed	31 July 1991
Location signed	Moscow, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
Date effective	5 December 1994
Condition effective	Exchange of instruments of ratification
Date expiration	5 December 2009
Signatories	United States, Soviet Union
Parties	United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine
Depositor	United Nations Secretary-General
Languages	English, Russian

START I was a landmark bilateral arms control agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. Signed in the final months of the Soviet Union, it mandated significant, verifiable reductions in their strategic nuclear arsenals. The treaty's complex implementation continued through the dissolution of the Soviet Union, with its provisions inherited by several Post-Soviet states. It remained in force for fifteen years, establishing a new framework for strategic stability and paving the way for future agreements.

Background and Negotiations

The origins of the treaty lie in the late Cold War period of renewed tension, often called the "Second Cold War." Following the failure of the SALT II treaty to gain U.S. Senate ratification, President Ronald Reagan proposed a new approach focused on deep reductions rather than mere limits, naming the initiative the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in 1982. Early negotiations in Geneva were stalled by major disagreements, including disputes over Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative and Soviet SS-20 Saber intermediate-range missiles in Europe. The political landscape shifted dramatically with the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev and his policies of glasnost and perestroika, which fostered a more cooperative atmosphere. This led to the breakthrough Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987, creating momentum that carried into the START negotiations. Final talks accelerated after the Revolutions of 1989 and the Malta Summit, with the treaty text finalized and signed in Moscow by Presidents George H. W. Bush and Gorbachev.

Treaty Provisions and Structure

The treaty established complex, equal aggregate limits on strategic delivery vehicles and warheads. Central limits included a cap of 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, such as ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, for each side. A separate limit of 6,000 accountable warheads was imposed, with sub-limits for ICBM and SLBM warheads (4,900) and warheads on MIRVed ICBMs (1,540). The agreement introduced detailed counting rules; for example, each deployed Trident or SS-N-23 submarine-launched ballistic missile counted as one warhead, while each heavy bomber was counted as carrying only one weapon regardless of its actual capacity. A rigorous verification regime was created, involving extensive data exchanges, notifications, and on-site inspections by teams from the On-Site Inspection Agency and their Soviet counterparts. The treaty also banned the encryption of telemetry data during missile tests to aid verification.

Ratification and Implementation

The ratification process was overtaken by the August Coup and the subsequent Belavezha Accords, which dissolved the Soviet Union in December 1991. This raised the unprecedented issue of a signed treaty with a non-existent party. To resolve this, the Lisbon Protocol was signed in May 1992, making Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine the legal successors to the Soviet Union's obligations. All four post-Soviet states agreed to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapons states, with Ukraine's ratification being a particularly lengthy and contentious process. The United States Senate ultimately provided its advice and consent, and the treaty entered into force on 5 December 1994. Implementation involved the verified elimination of thousands of delivery systems, including the dismantlement of SS-18 Satan missiles in Kazakhstan and the deactivation of B-52 Stratofortress bombers in the United States.

Strategic and Political Impact

The treaty's primary impact was the substantial, verifiable drawdown of the world's two largest nuclear arsenals, removing over 9,000 warheads from deployment. It fundamentally altered the strategic balance by eliminating the Soviet advantage in heavy, land-based ICBMs, a core concern for the Pentagon and NATO. Politically, it cemented a new era of cooperative security between the former adversaries and provided stability during the chaotic transition of the post-Soviet space. The treaty's intrusive verification measures built unprecedented transparency and military-to-military contacts between the U.S. Strategic Command and the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces. It also served as a critical non-proliferation instrument, ensuring the transfer of nuclear weapons from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to Russia.

Legacy and Subsequent Treaties

START I created the enduring template for modern strategic arms control, with its detailed counting rules, verification protocols, and focus on deployed strategic systems. Its expiration in 2009 was followed by the signing of the New START treaty in 2010, which built directly upon its predecessor's framework. The principles and mechanisms established were also influential in the negotiation of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) in 2002. The treaty's implementation demonstrated that large-scale, cooperative nuclear reductions were feasible, setting a benchmark for future diplomacy. Its successful conclusion is often cited as a high point of post-Cold War cooperation between Washington, D.C. and Moscow.

Category:Arms control treaties Category:Cold War treaties Category:Treaties of the Soviet Union Category:Treaties of the United States Category:1991 in the Soviet Union Category:1991 in the United States