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| Transitional Government of National Unity (South Sudan) | |
|---|---|
| Name | Transitional Government of National Unity (South Sudan) |
| Formation | 2018–2020 peace process |
| Preceding | Government of South Sudan (pre-transitional) |
| Jurisdiction | South Sudan |
| Headquarters | Juba |
| Chief1 name | Salva Kiir |
| Chief1 position | President |
| Chief2 name | Riek Machar |
| Chief2 position | First Vice President (reconstituted roles) |
Transitional Government of National Unity (South Sudan) is the power-sharing executive formed to implement the 2018–2023 peace accords intended to end the South Sudanese Civil War and stabilize South Sudan. It brought together rival signatories including the SPLM, the SPLM-IO, and various South Sudan Opposition Alliance signatories under negotiated arrangements mediated by regional and international actors such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the African Union, and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan. The arrangement aimed to reconstitute national institutions, oversee security sector reforms, and prepare for national elections.
The Transitional Government arose from the aftermath of the December 2013 conflict between forces loyal to Salva Kiir and those aligned with Riek Machar, escalating into a wider conflict with factions such as the National Salvation Front (South Sudan) and splinter groups. Diplomatic efforts included talks in Addis Ababa, Khartoum, and Rome, with key instruments like the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan negotiated in 2018. Regional actors including Uganda, Sudan, Kenya, and Ethiopia played crucial roles, while international partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, the European Union, and the World Bank influenced implementation finance and sanctions policy.
The Transitional Government combined leadership roles redistributed among primary signatories: the President, First Vice President, multiple Vice Presidents, and a Council of Ministers drawn from the SPLM, SPLM-IO, the South Sudan Opposition Alliance, and Other Political Parties. Prominent officeholders included Salva Kiir as President and Riek Machar occupying a reconstituted First Vice Presidential role at intervals defined by the agreement. Key ministries were held by figures from South Sudan Opposition Alliance components and independent technocrats acceptable to mediators such as the Troika (the United States, United Kingdom, and Norway). Legislative representation was negotiated for the Transitional National Legislative Assembly and subnational state governments reflecting power-sharing among Greater Upper Nile and Greater Equatoria proponents.
The Transitional Government vested executive authority in the President and collegial executive organs including a Council of Ministers and special committees tasked with security sector reform, decentralization, and economic recovery. Institutions such as the South Sudan Police Service, the South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics, and the South Sudan Revenue Authority were subject to transitional oversight and restructuring. The Transitional National Legislative Assembly functioned alongside a revitalised constitutional framework drawing on provisions from prior accords and customary arrangements involving traditional chiefs and local governance mechanisms in counties like Bor County and Aweil.
Central to the Transitional Government was the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), supplemented by protocols on security arrangements, permanent constitution-making, and transitional justice. Legal instruments included negotiated provisions for power sharing, asset distribution, and timelines for forming institutions such as the Constitutional Drafting Committee and the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission. International legal actors, including experts from the African Union Commission and advisors connected to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, contributed to drafting transitional enactments.
Implementation required sequencing of cantonment, integration of forces, and formation of unified ministries, but faced obstacles from localized clashes around Bentiu, Malakal, and Yei, and from factional disputes within the SPLM-IO and other signatory groups. Corruption, constrained fiscal revenues tied to oil fields in Unity State and Upper Nile, and bureaucratic capacity limitations hindered service delivery. Efforts to operationalize the Constitutional Drafting Committee were complicated by divergent views among negotiators and by logistical constraints compounded by limited donor coordination among actors like the United Nations Development Programme and the African Development Bank.
Ceasefire monitoring under the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission and verification by the United Nations Mission in South Sudan sought to oversee cantonment and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs. Security arrangements envisaged integration into a unified national force drawing from the South Sudan People's Defence Forces and opposition components, with oversight from regional guarantors such as IGAD and bilateral arrangements involving Uganda People's Defence Force and Sudanese Armed Forces in support roles. Persistent violations, delayed salary payments, and inadequate cantonment conditions impeded full DDR progress.
Politically, the Transitional Government reduced large-scale nationwide warfare and created space for humanitarian access coordinated by UNICEF, World Food Programme, and International Committee of the Red Cross partners, although localized violence and protection-of-civilians sites remained. Humanitarian indicators—displacement in Internal Displacement camps, food insecurity classified by Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, and public health challenges including cholera outbreaks—continued to strain capacity. Transitional arrangements affected civil society actors such as South Sudan Council of Churches and media outlets based in Juba in negotiating humanitarian corridors and civic participation.
Mediation and support involved a constellation of regional bodies and international states: Intergovernmental Authority on Development mediators, the African Union, the United Nations Security Council, and bilateral partners including China and India engaged diplomatically and economically. Sanctions and incentives from the United States Department of the Treasury (Office of Foreign Assets Control), the European Union External Action Service, and targeted travel restrictions influenced elite behavior. Donor coordination platforms led by the United Nations and the World Bank sought to align peace dividends, while special envoys from Norway, United Kingdom, and United States sustained negotiation momentum.
Category:Politics of South Sudan