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| Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-Nasir | |
|---|---|
| Name | Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-Nasir |
| Founded | 1991 |
| Leader | Riek Machar |
| Split from | Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army |
| Area | Southern Sudan, Upper Nile, Bahr el Ghazal |
| Ideology | Factionalism, Ethnic federalism (claimed) |
| Opponents | Sudanese government, SPLA-Torit, National Islamic Front |
Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-Nasir
The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-Nasir was a 1991 factional split from the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army that reshaped the course of the Second Sudanese Civil War and influenced the political trajectory of South Sudan through the 1990s and 2000s. The faction emerged amid leadership disputes involving figures associated with the SPLA high command, and its activities intersected with events such as the Khartoum Peace Agreement, Nile River regional rivalries, and multiple local insurgencies. The split had ramifications for negotiations involving the Government of Sudan, regional powers like Uganda and Ethiopia, and international actors including the United Nations and Intergovernmental Authority on Development.
The faction formed when senior commanders contested the leadership of John Garang within the SPLA, following tensions exacerbated by the fall of the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime in Ethiopia and shifting support networks in Uganda and Kenya. The 1991 breakaway was led by politicians and commanders from Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal provinces, aligning alongside personalities who had grievances tied to the Anya-Nya era and pre-1983 mobilizations. The split coincided with changing regional dynamics after the Taif Agreement and international mediation efforts tied to the Khartoum negotiations, and it overlapped temporally with the Sudanese Liberation Army phenomena and other factional realignments in Darfur and Blue Nile.
Leadership was associated with figures drawn from the Dinka and Nuer constituencies, notably a senior commander who later became a central political leader in South Sudan; other senior names included exiled officers and militia leaders from Unity State and Jonglei State. The faction organized a political wing and an armed wing, maintaining headquarters in contested areas near the Sobat River and bases influenced by neighboring capitals such as Khartoum and Addis Ababa. Command structures mirrored conventional guerrilla hierarchies found in the region, with fronts and battalions deployed across Upper Nile and Warrap. External patrons and liaison officers facilitated coordination with the National Islamic Front adversaries of the main SPLA and with diaspora organizations in Nairobi and London.
The declared objectives included contesting leadership succession within the SPLA, advocating alternative governance models for Southern provinces, and negotiating different arrangements with the Government of Sudan than those proposed by the SPLA-Torit leadership. Rhetorical motifs drew on ethnic identities tied to the Nuer people, Dinka people, and other Southern groups, invoking historical grievances traced to colonial-era borders administered from Khartoum and Juba. The faction articulated positions on autonomy and decentralization that intersected with proposals discussed at forums like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and during talks influenced by mediators from Uganda, Ethiopia, and Egypt.
The faction participated in numerous engagements across Upper Nile, Bahr el Ghazal, and Jonglei, clashing with SPLA-Torit forces in battles near river towns and strategic crossings along the White Nile and Sobat River. It engaged in both conventional assaults and localized raids, sometimes coordinating with militia groups active in the Nuba Mountains and elements tied to the Sudanese Armed Forces. Key confrontations included fighting for control of supply routes linking Wau and Malakal, skirmishes around Bentiu and Renk, and operations affecting humanitarian corridors used by agencies such as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Médecins Sans Frontières. Cross-border implications involved incursions and support channels through Ethiopia and Uganda.
Politically, the faction engaged in negotiations with the Government of Sudan and entered into ad hoc arrangements with regional powers and rival Southern groups, participating intermittently in processes like the Khartoum Peace Agreement and consultations mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. It forged tactical alliances with militia leaders and sometimes coordinated with transnational networks in Nairobi and the United Kingdom diasporas, while also contesting SPLA dominance in forums convened in Addis Ababa and Khartoum. The faction's political maneuvers influenced later agreements culminating in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and subsequent power-sharing frameworks that shaped the path to South Sudanese independence.
Human rights organizations reported incidents of civilian displacement, targeted violence, and recruitment controversies in areas affected by the faction’s operations, including allegations documented by observers operating in Upper Nile and Warrap. Accusations involved clashes with pastoral communities, intercommunal reprisals in Jonglei and Unity State, and episodes that humanitarian agencies linked to disruptions of relief operations coordinated by UNMIS and UNMISS precursors. These controversies became focal points in international advocacy by groups operating out of Geneva and New York and were cited in discussions at the African Union and United Nations Security Council.
The faction’s legacy includes shaping factional politics that persisted into the post-2005 era, influencing leadership competitions within Sudan People's Liberation Movement successor institutions, and affecting alignments during the 2013–2018 internal crisis in South Sudan. Its leaders later participated in national politics, holding offices in transitional arrangements in Juba and influencing negotiations around oil revenue sharing in Unity and Upper Nile regions. The split contributed to patterns of militarized politics, regional patronage networks tied to capitals like Khartoum and Addis Ababa, and the entrenchment of ethnicity in political mobilization, impacting state-building trajectories discussed in analyses by scholars linked to Oxford University, Harvard University, and regional think tanks in Nairobi and Addis Ababa.
Category:Politics of South Sudan Category:Rebel groups in Sudan