Quadrennial Defense Review

Quadrennial Defense Review
Name	Quadrennial Defense Review
Formed	1997
Dissolved	2018
Jurisdiction	United States
Headquarters	The Pentagon
Parent agency	United States Department of Defense

Contents

Quadrennial Defense Review

The Quadrennial Defense Review was a periodic strategic assessment conducted by the United States Department of Defense that analyzed threats, capabilities, and force posture to guide defense planning, budgeting, and procurement. It informed relationships among the United States Congress, United States Armed Forces, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and civilian leadership such as the Secretary of Defense, while intersecting with laws like the National Defense Authorization Act and institutions including the Office of Management and Budget, Congressional Research Service, and Government Accountability Office.

Background and Purpose

The review originated in the context of post‑Cold War restructuring following events such as the Gulf War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and policy debates involving actors like the Clinton administration, Defense Secretary William Perry, and advisors from think tanks such as the Brookings Institution, RAND Corporation, Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Heritage Foundation. It sought to align strategic guidance from documents such as the National Military Strategy, National Security Strategy, and treaties including the North Atlantic Treaty with force development, acquisition programs managed by agencies like the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. Stakeholders included services like the United States Army, United States Navy, United States Air Force, United States Marine Corps, and entities such as the Defense Intelligence Agency and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

The first formal edition emerged in 1997 under the Clinton administration and was followed by reviews in 2001, 2006, 2010, and 2014, shaped by events such as the September 11 attacks, the Iraq War, and the War in Afghanistan (2001–2021). Each edition reflected inputs from leaders including William Cohen, Donald Rumsfeld, Robert Gates, Leon Panetta, and Ash Carter, and was debated in hearings before committees such as the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services and the United States House Committee on Armed Services. The document informed programs like the F-35 Lightning II, Virginia-class submarine, Ballistic Missile Defense System, and initiatives in cyberspace tied to agencies like United States Cyber Command and the National Security Agency.

Methodology combined strategic assessments, force structure analysis, threat projections referencing actors like People's Republic of China, Russian Federation, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and state sponsors such as Iran, with resources planning influenced by the Fiscal Year budget process, Budget Control Act of 2011, and appropriations managed through interactions with Congressional Budget Office. It integrated modeling from institutions such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, wargaming at facilities like the National Defense University and Naval War College, and acquisition reviews involving contractors such as Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, Boeing, and Northrop Grumman. Scope included conventional and nuclear forces informed by doctrines like AirLand Battle, arms-control agreements such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, and emerging domains including cyberwarfare and space warfare with organizations like United States Space Force later implicated.

Typical findings highlighted risk assessments toward competitors including China–United States relations, Russia–United States relations, and regional challenges in theaters like the Indo-Pacific region, Middle East, and Eastern Europe. Recommendations addressed force posture adjustments, modernization priorities for systems such as the Zumwalt-class destroyer and Virginia-class submarine, investments in ISR platforms like MQ-9 Reaper, and sustainment of nuclear deterrent elements including the Columbia-class submarine and the B61 nuclear bomb. The reviews also recommended reforms to acquisition overseen by offices like the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, improvements to logistics chains tied to Defense Logistics Agency, and advances in personnel policy interacting with the Uniform Code of Military Justice and veterans' affairs via the Department of Veterans Affairs.

Implementation was mediated through the National Defense Strategy and budget decisions in annual Appropriations Act cycles with oversight by committees such as the Senate Armed Services Committee and analysts in the Congressional Research Service. The review influenced procurement trajectories for companies like Raytheon Technologies and BAE Systems, basing decisions on intelligence from the Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency. Its impact extended to allied planning with partners including North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Japan Self-Defense Forces, Republic of Korea Armed Forces, and multilateral initiatives like Coalition forces coordination in operations such as Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Critics from outlets like The New York Times, The Washington Post, and policy centers such as the Cato Institute argued the review often reflected institutional biases of the Department of Defense and service cultures from the United States Navy or United States Army, leading to contested priorities in programs including the Zumwalt-class destroyer and F-35 Lightning II. Legal scholars and representatives, including those from American Civil Liberties Union and defense oversight bodies like the Project on Government Oversight, raised concerns about transparency and the interplay with classified assessments from agencies such as the National Reconnaissance Office. Others, including analysts at Center for a New American Security and International Institute for Strategic Studies, debated assumptions about peer competition, irregular warfare, and budget constraints imposed by statutes like the Budget Control Act of 2011.

Category:United States defense policy