Generated by GPT-5-mini| Project 75(I) | |
|---|---|
| Name | Project 75(I) |
| Type | Conventional diesel-electric submarine programme |
| Builder | Various Indian shipyards and foreign partners |
| Status | Ongoing |
Project 75(I) Project 75(I) is an Indian naval submarine procurement programme to acquire advanced conventional submarines fitted with air-independent propulsion and modern combat systems for the Indian Navy. The programme follows earlier indigenous and collaborative efforts such as Project 75 and links to strategic initiatives like Make in India and the Atmanirbhar Bharat policy. It intersects with regional maritime dynamics involving actors such as People's Liberation Army Navy, United States Navy, Royal Navy, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, and French Navy.
Project 75(I) emerged from procurement cycles after Project 75 and the commissioning of INS Kalvari (S21), INS Khanderi (S22), INS Karanj (S23), and INS Vela (S24). The requirement was shaped by lessons from cooperation with Naval Group (France), Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kockums (Sweden), and HDW (Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft). Strategic reviews influenced by the Indian Ocean Region security environment, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the Malabar Exercise, and the Sino-Indian border dispute fed into technical requirements and acquisition strategy. Statements from the Defence Research and Development Organisation and the Ministry of Defence (India) framed the industrial participation model, invoking procurement rules such as the Defence Procurement Procedure and the Defence Acquisition Council process.
Design goals include incorporation of air-independent propulsion (AIP), enhanced stealth signatures informed by studies of German Type 214, Scorpène-class submarine, and Korean KSS-III designs, and integration of combat systems from suppliers like Thales Group, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon Technologies, MBDA, and Bharat Electronics Limited. Hull design drew on hydrodynamic research from institutions such as the Indian Institute of Science, Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, and foreign naval architecture firms including Fincantieri and Navantia. Sensor suites considered for the class involve sonar arrays by Kongsberg, electronic warfare systems by Elbit Systems, and optronics akin to Sagem. Propulsion considerations balanced diesel-electric architectures used by HDW, AIP modules similar to Stirling engine installations, and battery technologies influenced by advances from Tesla, Inc. style developments and research at Defence Research and Development Organisation. Weapon fit envisaged incorporation of wire-guided torpedoes such as Black Shark, anti-ship missiles in the league of Exocet, and potential compatibility with cruise missiles similar to BrahMos concepts.
Procurement architecture called for competitive bids with industrial partnerships between domestic shipyards like Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited, Cochin Shipyard Limited, Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers, and foreign OEMs such as Navantia, Naval Group (France), Damen Shipyards Group, Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering (KSOE), and Saab Group. The process referenced earlier cooperative models from Project 75 and licensing arrangements similar to those used by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering. Financing scenarios examined export-credit models used by Agence Française de Développement and Japan International Cooperation Agency, while offset obligations mirrored frameworks under the Make in India programme and Defence Offset Guidelines. Workforce development plans cited training cooperation with institutions like the National Defence Academy (India) and exchanges modeled on practices with the Royal Australian Navy and United States Naval Academy.
Intended roles include littoral operations in the Indian Ocean Region, blue-water deterrence against adversaries such as the People's Liberation Army Navy and Pakistan Navy, and protection of sea lines associated with the String of Pearls discourse. Capabilities emphasized anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance tasks with links to platforms like P-8I Neptune and Arihant-class submarine strategic posture. Interoperability aims included combined exercises like Malabar Exercise and integration with assets such as INS Vikramaditya and INS Vikrant (2013). Sustainability measures referenced logistics practices from Mazagon Dock and standards aligned with NATO frameworks for maintenance and lifecycle support.
Project 75(I) has implications for India’s strategic posture vis-à-vis China, Pakistan, and regional powers including Australia, Japan, France, and the United States. The programme feeds into maritime strategies articulated in documents such as the Indian Maritime Doctrine and contributes to concepts like sea denial and maritime domain awareness in coordination with initiatives such as Information Fusion Centre (IFC) and the India-IOA partnership. Defense industrialization ambitions connect to multilateral ties exemplified by BRICS and bilateral dialogues like the India–France Strategic Partnership and India–US 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue.
The programme has faced debates over timeline slippages reminiscent of earlier delays in INS Vikramaditya refurbishment and cost overruns paralleling controversies around Arjun tank and Tejas (aircraft). Criticism from political actors in the Parliament of India and analyses by think tanks such as Observer Research Foundation and Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses focused on procurement opacity, industrial capacity constraints at builders like Mazagon Dock, and technology transfer complexities with foreign partners such as Naval Group (France) and Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering (KSOE). Strategic analysts referenced risks from budget reallocations tied to broader fiscal policy managed by the Ministry of Finance (India) and debates in media outlets including The Hindu, The Indian Express, and Times of India.