Generated by GPT-5-mini| Project 75 | |
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![]() Indian Navy · CC BY 2.5 in · source | |
| Name | Project 75 |
| Type | Naval submarine procurement |
| Country | India |
| Status | Completed / Ongoing |
| Operator | Indian Navy |
| Initiator | Indian Ministry of Defence |
| Contractors | Mazagon Dock Limited, ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems, Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers |
| Displacement | 2,000–6,000 tonnes (varies by variant) |
| Propulsion | Diesel-electric; air-independent propulsion (AIP) in some variants |
| Armament | Torpedoes, anti-ship missiles, cruise missiles (variant-dependent) |
| First project announced | 1999 |
| First delivery | 2017 (first boat commissioned) |
Project 75
Project 75 is an Indian submarine acquisition and construction programme initiated to expand and modernize Indian Navy under procurement plans of the Indian Ministry of Defence. The programme links indigenous shipyards, foreign technology partners, and strategic shipbuilding policy in a multi-boat series with phased contracts and follow-on variants. It has influenced industrial policy debates involving state-owned yards, private firms, and international defence suppliers.
The programme arose from capability gaps identified after reviews involving Indian Navy chiefs, assessments by Defence Research and Development Organisation, and white papers from the Indian Ministry of Defence. Early planning referenced precedents like procurement negotiations with Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft and collaboration models seen in the French Navy agreements for the Scorpène-class submarine and the transfer frameworks used by Navantia with Royal Australian Navy. Strategic imperatives cited reports tied to deployments in the Indian Ocean Region, concerns raised during incidents near the Maldives and diplomatic signals involving People's Republic of China naval deployments.
The stated objectives included increasing indigenous manufacturing capacity at shipyards such as Mazagon Dock Limited and Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers, achieving technology transfer with firms like ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems and complying with procurement policies influenced by Make in India and defence procurement procedures set by the Defence Acquisition Council. Scope encompassed construction of multiple diesel-electric attack submarines with possible air-independent propulsion modules, integration of weapons systems from vendors such as MBDA and Raytheon Technologies, and meeting operational requirements defined by chiefs of staff and planners in the Integrated Defence Staff.
Design work involved naval architecture standards comparable to Scorpène-class submarine designs and concepts from Type 209 and Type 214 classes, with hull forms adapted to littoral and blue-water operations. Specifications across batches included displacement ranges similar to Kilo-class submarine and snorkel/AIP arrangements akin to German Type 212 submarine developments. Sensor suites drew on sonars from suppliers like Thales Group and combat management systems comparable to offerings from Lockheed Martin and SAAB. Weapon compatibility covered heavyweight torpedoes from Whitehead Alenia Sistemi Subacquei-type manufacturers and anti-ship cruise missiles in the manner of Exocet and Harpoon families.
Construction strategy blended licensed manufacture with local content targets administered by the Defence Procurement Policy and monitored by offices such as the Controller General of Defence Accounts. Contracts combined shipyard workshare across Mazagon Dock Limited and Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers with technology partners like ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems and consultants from Navantia and Rosoboronexport as comparative bidders in earlier tenders. Implementation faced schedule management issues familiar from projects involving INS Arihant and INS Vikramaditya refits, supply-chain interactions with firms including Bharat Electronics Limited and specialist suppliers such as Hindustan Aeronautics Limited for certain subsystems.
Boats commissioned under the programme entered service with squadrons of the Indian Navy and participated in exercises like MILAN (exercise), bilateral drills with French Navy and United States Navy task groups, and patrols in the Indian Ocean Region. Deployments included intelligence, surveillance, and sea-denial missions aligned with maritime doctrine discussed at forums such as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium and strategic briefings by the National Security Council Secretariat.
Critics pointed to cost overruns and timetable slips reminiscent of debates around the Bofors scandal era procurement scrutiny and later controversies like the Scorpène deal investigations, raising questions about transparency, offset implementation, and indigenisation rates. Parliamentary committees including the Standing Committee on Defence examined aspects such as vendor selection, sustainment logistics tied to Indian Navy readiness, and whether procurement rules under the Defence Procurement Procedure were optimally applied. Industry commentators compared outcomes to international programmes such as Astute-class submarine and Virginia-class submarine schedules to highlight performance shortfalls.
The programme influenced subsequent initiatives and evolved into follow-on projects that aimed to incorporate lessons on lifecycle support, indigenous design capability via institutions like the Indian Institute of Technology research partnerships, and export ambitions articulated during talks with countries such as Mauritius and Seychelles. Its legacy includes impacts on shipbuilding workforce skills at Mazagon Dock Limited, procurement reform discussions in the Defence Acquisition Council, and doctrinal adjustments reflected in Indian Navy strategic documents.
Category:Naval shipbuilding projects of India