Presidential Commission on the September 11th Terrorist Attacks

Presidential Commission on the September 11th Terrorist Attacks
Name	Presidential Commission on the September 11th Terrorist Attacks
Formed	November 27, 2002
Dissolved	August 21, 2004
Jurisdiction	United States
Headquarters	Washington, D.C.
Chair	Thomas H. Kean
Vicechair	Lee H. Hamilton
Employees	100+
Website	N/A

Presidential Commission on the September 11th Terrorist Attacks was an independent, bipartisan panel created to investigate the circumstances surrounding the September 11 attacks and to provide recommendations to prevent future terrorist attacks. Chaired by Thomas H. Kean with vice chair Lee H. Hamilton, the commission analyzed actions by agencies including the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security Agency, and Department of Defense, and produced the 9/11 Commission Report after public hearings and extensive document review. Its work influenced legislation, institutional reforms, and international discussions involving Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and counterterrorism policy among NATO members and allied states.

Background and Establishment

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, calls for an independent investigation grew from survivors, families of victims, and members of the United States Congress, including figures such as Senator Bob Graham and Representative Porter Goss. Initial inquiries, such as internal reviews by the Federal Aviation Administration and after-action analyses by the Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency, left unresolved questions about intelligence sharing, FBI counterterrorism priorities, and aviation security procedures. Political debate between the George W. Bush administration and congressional leaders culminated in the creation of the commission by congressional legislation signed into law by President George W. Bush on November 27, 2002, establishing a mandate comparable in approach to historical inquiries like the Warren Commission and the 9/11 Public Discourse surrounding national trauma.

Mandate and Membership

The commission’s charter directed it to investigate facts and circumstances relating to the attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001; to identify lessons learned; and to offer recommendations to safeguard against future attacks. Members included bipartisan public figures and experts from fields such as intelligence, law, and public policy: chair Thomas H. Kean, vice-chair Lee H. Hamilton, and commissioners like Richard Ben-Veniste, Max Cleland, Slade Gorton, Jamie Gorelick, Bob Kerrey, John F. Lehman Jr., and Tim Roemer. Staff comprised former officials and investigators with backgrounds at agencies including the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Defense, and legal experts with ties to institutions such as Harvard University and Georgetown University.

Investigative Process and Methods

The commission conducted public hearings in venues such as the Ronald Reagan Building and took sworn testimony from officials including former National Security Advisers and cabinet members from the Bush administration. It issued subpoenas for records from the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of State, Department of Defense, National Counterterrorism Center, and private entities like airlines and financial institutions. Investigators reviewed flight records, intelligence cables, NSA intercepts, and detainee interrogations, and coordinated with foreign partners including United Kingdom, Germany, and Pakistan intelligence services. The staff produced a staff statement appendix and employed forensic timelines and mapping techniques reminiscent of inquiries such as the 9/11 Commission Report’s predecessors in investigative practice.

Findings and Conclusions

The commission concluded that failures in intelligence collection, analysis, and interagency communication allowed Al-Qaeda to plan and execute the attacks, highlighting missed opportunities involving surveillance of individuals linked to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and other operatives. It criticized policies such as the so-called “wall” between intelligence and law enforcement, practices at the FBI and CIA, and deficiencies in aviation security at the Federal Aviation Administration and airline operators like American Airlines and United Airlines. The report assessed warnings from foreign services, including Israeli and Saudi Arabian intelligence, and examined links to funding networks in United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. It also addressed emergency response performance by first responders in New York City, Arlington County, Virginia, and at the Pentagon, comparing coordination challenges to previous crises such as Hurricane Katrina.

Recommendations and Implementation

Major recommendations included creation of a statutory National Intelligence Director and reorganization of the United States Intelligence Community, improved information sharing between the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation, strengthened aviation security standards at the Federal Aviation Administration, and enhancements to emergency preparedness for cities like New York City and jurisdictions such as Arlington County, Virginia. Many recommendations influenced legislation such as reforms to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and institutional changes including establishment of the Director of National Intelligence and expansion of the Transportation Security Administration’s authority. Implementation involved cooperation from the United States Congress, administrations including George W. Bush and successors, and reviews by nongovernmental organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union and professional associations in emergency management.

Public Reception and Impact

The commission’s work produced widespread media coverage in outlets including The New York Times, The Washington Post, and CNN, and elicited reactions from victims’ families, advocacy groups, and elected officials like Senator Hillary Clinton and Senator John McCain. While praised for its comprehensive narrative and policy prescriptions, the report faced criticism from commentators associated with Progressive politics and conservative voices over perceived omissions and the redaction of classified material. Internationally, the report shaped counterterrorism cooperation among NATO allies and influenced debates in parliaments of countries such as United Kingdom and Canada. Its legacy endures in institutional reforms, legal changes, and continuing scholarship at institutions like Columbia University and Stanford University studying terrorism, intelligence, and emergency response.

Category:September 11 attacks Category:United States commissions and inquiries