Presidential Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism

Presidential Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism
Name	Presidential Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism
Established	1990
Dissolved	1991
Jurisdiction	United States
Chairman	Alfred C. Kahn
Headquarters	Washington, D.C.

Presidential Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism

The Presidential Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism was an ad hoc investigatory body created to examine vulnerabilities highlighted by high-profile Pan Am Flight 103 and other aviation incidents, assess counterterrorism measures following attacks such as the Air India Flight 182 bombing and the Lockerbie bombing, and recommend reforms for agencies including the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Transportation. Chaired by Alfred E. Kahn and drawing expertise from figures associated with National Transportation Safety Board, Department of Justice, and academia such as John J. Hamre and Paul K. Davis, the commission produced findings that influenced subsequent legislation and operational changes affecting carriers like Pan Am and Trans World Airlines.

Background and Establishment

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a string of incidents including Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, Air India Flight 182 off the coast of Ireland and attacks on flights linked to Israel and Iran prompted calls from members of the United States Congress, the Presidency of George H. W. Bush, and the United States Secret Service for a comprehensive review of aviation security. Lawmakers such as Senator Howard Metzenbaum and Representative Amo Houghton pressed the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation to examine coordination among agencies like the Federal Aviation Administration, Customs Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The commission was established by presidential directive to bring together officials from Department of State, Department of Defense, and independent experts associated with RAND Corporation and universities such as Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Membership and Leadership

The body was led by Alfred E. Kahn, an economist known for regulatory reform, and included senior figures from the National Transportation Safety Board, the Federal Aviation Administration, and former officials from Department of Justice and Central Intelligence Agency analytic cadres. Members had prior links to institutions such as Harvard Kennedy School, Columbia University, Brookings Institution, and private sector entities like Pan Am's legal counsel and aviation insurers tied to Lloyd's of London. The commission drew on testimony from airline executives at Trans World Airlines, security providers like Securicor affiliates, and international experts from bodies including the International Civil Aviation Organization and the European Civil Aviation Conference.

Mandate and Scope of Investigation

The commission's mandate covered assessment of baggage screening procedures at hubs including John F. Kennedy International Airport, Los Angeles International Airport, Washington Dulles International Airport, and Heathrow Airport; evaluation of cargo security on routes linking North America to Europe and Asia; and interrogation of interagency information sharing among Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and Customs Service. It examined regulatory frameworks such as statutes overseen by the Department of Transportation and enforcement mechanisms used by the Federal Aviation Administration. The scope included analysis of terrorist methodologies highlighted by groups associated with incidents involving Libya, Sikh separatists, and Khalistan movement sympathizers, and recommendations for cooperation with foreign entities like the United Kingdom's Metropolitan Police Service and Scotland Yard investigators in Lockerbie.

Findings and Recommendations

The commission identified deficiencies in passenger and baggage screening, inconsistent standards across airports such as O'Hare International Airport and San Francisco International Airport, and inadequate intelligence sharing between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Central Intelligence Agency. It recommended strengthened coordination modeled on practices advocated by analysts at RAND Corporation and reforms echoing proposals from the 9/11 Commission era, including centralized threat assessment, mandatory standards enforced by the Federal Aviation Administration, and enhanced background checks drawn from criminal records held by entities like FBI CJIS Division. The commission urged revisions to international conventions administered by the International Civil Aviation Organization and bilateral security pacts similar to accords between the United States and United Kingdom. Recommendations included investments in technology tested by corporations such as Rapiscan Systems, expanded air marshal programs analogous to Federal Air Marshal Service concepts, and legislative changes to statutes within the purview of the United States Congress.

Implementation and Impact

Following the report, several recommendations influenced policy shifts within the Federal Aviation Administration and prompted congressional hearings in the United States Senate and the United States House of Representatives committees overseeing transportation and intelligence. Airlines including Pan Am and Trans World Airlines adjusted operations and screening contracts with private security firms; airports upgraded screening equipment at terminals like Terminal 4 (JFK) and Tom Bradley International Terminal. Internationally, the commission's emphasis on ICAO standards contributed to revisions in cooperative frameworks among European Union member states and Canada's Transport Canada initiatives. The report served as a reference point for later inquiries and legislative packages influenced by the International Civil Aviation Organization guidelines and policy debates involving figures such as Rudolph Giuliani and William J. Clinton administration appointees.

Criticism and Controversies

Critics from American Civil Liberties Union, some members of United States Congress oversight panels, and investigative journalists in publications like The New York Times argued that the commission underestimated civil liberties risks associated with expanded screening and surveillance and over-relied on private security contractors linked to international firms headquartered in United Kingdom and Germany. Others contended that recommendations failed to address root causes raised by analysts at RAND Corporation and scholars at Georgetown University and Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs. Debates persisted over the sufficiency of coordination with foreign investigative authorities such as Scotland Yard and the Royal Ulster Constabulary, and whether reforms adequately learned lessons from incidents involving state actors like Libya and non-state groups implicated in the Lockerbie bombing and the Air India tragedy.

Category:United States commissions