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| Operation Regenbogen (1939) | |
|---|---|
| Name | Operation Regenbogen (1939) |
| Partof | Invasion of Poland (1939) |
| Caption | Panzer IIIs entering Polish territory, September 1939 |
| Date | 1–6 September 1939 |
| Place | Western Poland, Pomerania, Baltic Sea coast |
| Result | German operational success; Polish defeat and occupation |
| Combatant1 | Wehrmacht |
| Combatant2 | Polish Army |
| Commander1 | Heinz Guderian, Erwin Rommel, Walther von Brauchitsch |
| Commander2 | Edward Rydz-Śmigły, Tadeusz Kutrzeba, Władysław Sikorski |
| Strength1 | Elements of Heer panzergruppen, Luftwaffe support, Kriegsmarine coastal units |
| Strength2 | Armia Pomorze, Armia Poznań, limited Polish Air Force and Polish Navy |
Operation Regenbogen (1939) Operation Regenbogen (1939) was a German operational plan executed during the initial days of the Invasion of Poland (1939), involving coordinated actions by elements of the Heer, Luftwaffe, and Kriegsmarine to seize the Polish Corridor and secure Baltic approaches. The plan intersected with directives from the Oberkommando des Heeres and orders issued by Adolf Hitler, and it influenced engagements around Gdynia, Hel Peninsula, and the corridor towns near Toruń and Brodnica.
In the months preceding September 1939 the German strategic posture was shaped by the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, the ambitions articulated in Mein Kampf, and rearmament initiatives overseen by the Reich Ministry of War. Diplomatic clashes involving British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, representatives of the French Third Republic, and German envoys culminated in crises such as the Anschluss and the Munich Agreement, which informed German expectations about Western responses to aggression. The geographical challenge of the Polish Corridor and access to the Baltic Sea brought the Free City of Danzig and ports like Gdynia into strategic focus for the High Command of the Wehrmacht and naval planners in the Kriegsmarine. German intelligence from the Abwehr and signals from Enigma intercepts contributed to planning assumptions, while Polish defensive deployments under commanders including Edward Rydz-Śmigły and Tadeusz Kutrzeba were constrained by mobilization timetables and directives from the Second Polish Republic leadership.
Planning for Operation Regenbogen emerged within the framework of Fall Weiss and was coordinated between the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht and theater leaders such as Walther von Brauchitsch and armored proponents like Heinz Guderian. Objectives included rapid seizure of corridor rail and road nodes linking East Prussia to the rest of the Reich, capture of the Hel Peninsula and Gdynia naval facilities to deny Polish access to the Baltic Sea, and the encirclement of forces in Pomerelia. Planners drew on armored doctrine developed by thinkers like Erwin Rommel and lessons from mechanized experiments in the Spanish Civil War, incorporating air support doctrines tested by the Luftwaffe during exercises at Reichstag-era maneuver grounds. Coordination required liaison with Kriegsmarine commanders concerned with mines, coastal batteries, and blockade operations near Kashubia.
Operation Regenbogen commenced with synchronized moves on 1 September 1939 as spearheads of panzer units pushed from the German–Polish border into corridor towns, supported by tactical air missions from Luftflotte 1 and interdiction sorties against Polish Air Force bases. The Wehrmacht advance featured rapid crossings at points near Tczew and thrusts aimed at Brodnica and Grudziądz, while naval elements imposed blockades and bombardments along the Baltic coast near Gdynia and Hel Peninsula. During the first 72 hours engagements involved counterattacks by elements of Armia Pomorze and mobile forces under Tadeusz Kutrzeba, with local riverine actions on the Vistula and skirmishes around rail hubs. By 4–6 September German forces had achieved operational encirclements, culminating in the fall of key positions and the isolation of northern Polish forces, while Luftwaffe interdiction degraded Polish resupply and reinforcement.
German forces allocated to the operation included components of panzergruppen organized under commanders like Heinz Guderian, infantry divisions of the Heer, corps-level support formations, elements of the Kriegsmarine including coastal artillery and small craft, and air assets from Luftflotte 1 and Luftwaffe bomber and fighter wings. Key German units were supported by logistical formations from the Heeresgruppe Nord and headquarters staff from the Oberkommando des Heeres. Opposing Polish forces included units grouped into Armia Pomorze and Armia Poznań, cavalry brigades, infantry divisions, coastal garrison units on the Hel Peninsula, and assets of the Polish Navy operating from bases at Gdynia and Puck. Command relationships reflected prewar staff work conducted by the Polish General Staff, with field commanders such as Władysław Sikorski and Tadeusz Kutrzeba directing tactical withdrawals and local counterattacks.
Operationally, Operation Regenbogen contributed to the rapid German conquest of corridor areas, enabling consolidation of Reich access to East Prussia and denying Polish maritime sorties from Gdynia. The fall of northern strongpoints facilitated subsequent operations during the broader campaign, influenced diplomatic reactions in London and Paris, and affected the Polish capacity to sustain coordinated resistance, which later factored into the establishment of the Polish government-in-exile in France and then United Kingdom. Naval and air interdiction during the operation presaged later uses of combined arms in the Blitzkrieg concept, shaping doctrinal debates in the Heer and Luftwaffe while prompting analyses in French General Staff and British Admiralty circles about contingency planning and alliance coordination.
Historians debate the distinctiveness of Operation Regenbogen within the larger Fall Weiss framework, with scholars referencing archival material from the Bundesarchiv, memoirs of officers in the Oberkommando des Heeres, and polish-language studies derived from the Central Military Archives in Warsaw. Controversies center on attribution of initiative among commanders such as Heinz Guderian and theater leaders like Walther von Brauchitsch, the extent of prewar intentions versus opportunistic exploitation, and the role of intelligence from the Abwehr and OKW in shaping tactical choices. Interpretations vary among analysts citing works by historians connected to institutions like Institute of National Remembrance (Poland), German Historical Institute, and university departments at University of Warsaw and Humboldt University of Berlin, with some emphasizing operational innovation and others underscoring continuity with earlier German planning motifs exemplified by interwar manuals and exercises.