This article was accepted into the corpus but its outbound wikilinks were never NER-processed — typical at the deepest BFS hop or when the run's entity cap was reached. No expansion funnel to show.
| OKW/OKH | |
|---|---|
| Unit name | Oberkommando der Wehrmacht/Oberkommando des Heeres |
| Active | 1935–1945 |
| Country | Nazi Germany |
| Branch | Wehrmacht; Heer |
| Type | High command |
| Garrison | Kriegsmarine headquarters, Berlin; Führerbunker (late) |
| Notable commanders | Wilhelm Keitel, Walther von Brauchitsch, Ferdinand Schörner |
OKW/OKH
The pair of high commands designated the supreme direction of armed forces and the army for Nazi Germany during the World War II era. Operating amid figures such as Adolf Hitler, Heinrich Himmler, Hermann Göring, and Joseph Goebbels, they shaped campaigns from the Invasion of Poland through the Battle of Berlin. Their structures intersected with institutions like the Abwehr, Auswärtiges Amt, and Reichswehr, affecting policy across fronts such as the Eastern Front, Western Front, and North African Campaign.
Established alongside institutions including the Reichsheer reforms and the Nazi Party consolidation, the two commands played distinct but overlapping roles within the Third Reich. The senior high command headquartered interacted directly with the Führer, Reich Chancellery, and agencies such as the SS and Gestapo. Throughout crises like the Battle of Stalingrad, the commands responded to rivalries involving commanders like Erwin Rommel, Heinz Guderian, Gerd von Rundstedt, and Erich von Manstein. Their evolution reflected tensions among military professionals, political leaders, and intelligence services including the Sicherheitsdienst and Abwehr.
The hierarchy incorporated offices comparable to the General Staff, with departments linking to commands such as Heeresgruppe Nord, Heeresgruppe Mitte, and Heeresgruppe Süd. Senior posts were filled by officers drawn from the Reichswehr tradition and newer appointees like Wilhelm Keitel and Walther von Brauchitsch. Liaison existed with naval and air counterparts including the Kriegsmarine leadership under Erich Raeder and Luftwaffe leader Hermann Göring. Subordinate departments coordinated logistics with entities like Reich Ministry of Aviation and industrial partners including Krupp and Friedrich Flick. The command apparatus extended to forward headquarters in regions such as Normandy, Sicily, and the Crimea.
They were responsible for planning operations alongside figures such as Alfred Jodl and Franz Halder, issuing directives that affected generals like Walther Model and Fedor von Bock. Responsibilities included strategic planning for theaters like the Balkans Campaign and the Operation Barbarossa offensive, allocation of forces in theaters such as Tunisia and safeguarding lines related to the Atlantic Wall. Coordination with diplomatic organs like the Auswärtiges Amt and economic ministries tied them to occupation policies in territories including France, Poland, and the Soviet Union. They supervised staff branches concerned with intelligence, signals, and operations that interacted with units such as the Waffen-SS divisions.
Operationally, the commands shaped major campaigns including Fall Gelb, Operation Barbarossa, and defenses during Operation Overlord. Command influence is visible in decisions affecting leaders Erwin Rommel during the North African Campaign and Heinz Guderian during the Battle of France. Strategic choices intersected with supply problems linked to Rail transport in Germany, industrial output from firms like IG Farben, and partisan warfare in areas like Yugoslavia involving collaborators and resistance such as Josip Broz Tito. Conflicts with theater commanders occurred during operations in Russia, Ukraine, and the Caucasus Campaign, where strategic objectives like securing Suez Canal access and oilfields were contested.
Their authority derived from proximity to Adolf Hitler and institutional rivalries with Heinrich Himmler, Joseph Goebbels, and the Prussian State. Personal relationships shaped promotions affecting officers such as Ferdinand Schörner and Günther von Kluge; political interference came from ministers like Albert Speer and industrialists such as Friedrich Flick. Interactions with the Reichstag were mediated through the Chancellery and legal frameworks like emergency decrees implemented after events including the Night of the Long Knives. The commands also negotiated jurisdictional disputes with formations like the Waffen-SS and security organs of the SS.
Decisions and directives connected the commands to policies of occupation, reprisals, and anti-partisan operations linked to incidents such as mass shootings perpetrated by units associated with the Einsatzgruppen and security forces under Heinrich Himmler. Command responsibility implicated leaders in events like the sieges of Leningrad and the Warsaw Uprising, and in enforcement of measures tied to the Final Solution administered by agencies including the Reich Security Main Office. Trials after the war addressed culpability of personnel like Wilhelm Keitel at Nuremberg Trials, involving prosecutors such as Robert H. Jackson and judges from tribunals under the International Military Tribunal. Documentation from captured archives and testimonies by figures such as Albert Kesselring informed postwar judgments.
Historians including Ian Kershaw, Richard J. Evans, Omer Bartov, and Hans-Ulrich Wehler have debated institutional agency versus individual responsibility, analyzing the commands’ role through sources like operational orders and diaries of officers such as Franz Halder. Assessments weigh effectiveness in campaigns like Blitzkrieg and failures in logistics during the Soviet counteroffensives. The legacy influenced postwar military reform in West Germany and reflections within institutions such as the Bundeswehr, shaping debates in archives accessed by researchers like Christopher Browning and Alexis Herr. The commands remain central to scholarship on leadership, legal accountability, and the conduct of war in twentieth-century Europe.
Category:Military units and formations of Nazi Germany