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| National Reconciliation and Peace Centre | |
|---|---|
| Name | National Reconciliation and Peace Centre |
| Formation | 2016 |
| Dissolution | 2019 |
| Type | Non-ministerial advisory body |
| Headquarters | Yangon |
| Region served | Myanmar |
| Leader title | Director |
| Leader name | Aung San Suu Kyi |
| Parent organization | President of Myanmar |
National Reconciliation and Peace Centre The National Reconciliation and Peace Centre served as a focal institution in Myanmar for coordinating dialogues among stakeholders including representatives from United Nations, European Union, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, International Committee of the Red Cross, and regional actors. It operated amid complex interactions involving former State Law and Order Restoration Council, Tatmadaw, Arakan Independence Party, Kachin Independence Organization, and civil society figures such as Aung San Suu Kyi, Min Aung Hlaing, and Tin Oo. The centre engaged with international envoys like Kofi Annan, Ban Ki-moon, and Antonio Guterres and drew on comparative models from Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South Africa), Good Friday Agreement, and Camp David Accords.
The centre was established following accords influenced by outcomes of the 2015 Myanmar general election and recommendations emerging from panels chaired by Kofi Annan and consultations involving Thein Sein, Htin Kyaw, and delegations from China, India, Japan, United States, United Kingdom, and Australia. Its creation echoed precedents set by institutions like Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Canada), Truth Commission (Peru), and National Unity Government (Myanmar) initiatives. Throughout its brief operation the centre convened talks with delegations from Karen National Union, Shan State Army, United Wa State Army, Mon National Party, and representatives associated with the Panglong Conference. Key events referenced included the 2016 Panglong Conference, the 2017 Rohingya crisis, and bilateral meetings influenced by the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement processes.
The mandate emphasized facilitation of peace negotiations among signatories to the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, confidence-building measures addressing legacies of the 2008 Constitution (Myanmar), transitional mechanisms resembling Special Tribunal for Lebanon and reparative frameworks akin to Argentine National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons. Objectives included mediating between armed groups such as the Kachin Independence Army and Ta'ang National Liberation Army, supporting monitoring arrangements like those of the Myanmar Peace Monitor and assisting implementation of provisions similar to those negotiated under the Addis Ababa Agreement. The centre sought to align with standards advocated by International Criminal Court, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and guidelines from International Center for Transitional Justice.
Leadership comprised appointees drawn from offices connected to President's Office (Myanmar), former diplomats with postings to United Nations, ASEAN Secretariat, and advisors from NGOs including Médecins Sans Frontières, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International. The directorate coordinated with working groups modeled after structures in Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Sierra Leone), incorporating liaison officers from the Ministry of Home Affairs (Myanmar), representatives of ethnic armies such as New Mon State Party, and observers from International Crisis Group. Specialist units addressed disarmament, demobilization and reintegration referencing doctrines from United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Standards, transitional justice drawing on International Center for Transitional Justice, and community reconciliation using approaches tested in Liberia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Programs included multi-party dialogues mirroring the format of the Panglong Conferences, community truth-telling comparable to Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South Africa), capacity-building workshops with curricula influenced by Geneva Conventions training, and pilot peace monitoring projects similar to missions by European Union Monitoring Mission and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Activities engaged ethnic political parties like the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, non-state armed groups including the Kokang forces, faith-based mediators from Buddhist and Christian institutions, and civil society networks such as 1Thing. The centre hosted delegations from China–Myanmar relations envoys, facilitated donor coordination with World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and convened academic partners from University of Yangon, Columbia University, and Harvard Kennedy School.
Funding streams combined allocations linked to the Union Budget of Myanmar, multilateral contributions from Asian Development Bank, United Nations Development Programme, bilateral assistance from Japan International Cooperation Agency, UK Department for International Development, and philanthropic support from entities like Open Society Foundations and Ford Foundation. Partnerships included memoranda with Geneva Centre for Security Policy, exchanges with Carter Center, technical cooperation with International Organization for Migration, and observer arrangements with ASEAN Regional Forum. The centre coordinated donor reporting to agencies such as United States Agency for International Development and engaged research partners including International Crisis Group and Transnational Institute.
Critics referenced perceived proximity to the President's Office (Myanmar) and tensions involving Tatmadaw commanders like Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, alleging insufficient independence compared to models like Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South Africa). Human rights advocates including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International criticized the centre's response to the 2017 Rohingya crisis and interactions with security actors implicated in reports by UN Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar. Debates invoked comparative scrutiny with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Kenya) and concerns over accountability similar to controversies around the De-Nazification processes. Some ethnic parties and organizations including United Wa State Army delegates questioned transparency and resource allocation relative to commitments made at the Panglong Conference.
Although dissolved and superseded by subsequent formations connected to National Unity Government (Myanmar) and alternative mediation platforms, the centre influenced practices in ceasefire facilitation similar to protocols adopted in Colombia and procedural innovations paralleling elements of the Good Friday Agreement. Its convening role informed policy papers by International Crisis Group, transitional justice proposals circulated through Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and academic studies from University of Oxford and Australian National University. The centre's archives and meeting records were later referenced in evaluations by World Bank and reports compiled by United Nations Development Programme assessing peace dividends and reconstruction needs in post-conflict settings.
Category:Peace and reconciliation