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| National Defense Plan | |
|---|---|
| Name | National Defense Plan |
| Type | Strategic plan |
| Country | United States, United Kingdom, France |
| Created | 21st century |
| Authors | Department of Defense (United States), Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom), Ministry of the Armed Forces (France) |
| Purpose | Coordinated national security and defense posture |
National Defense Plan
The National Defense Plan is a comprehensive strategic framework guiding a state's response to external and internal threats, integrating doctrine, forces, industry, and alliances. It synthesizes guidance from instruments such as the NATO Defense Planning Process, the National Security Strategy (United States), the Integrated Review (United Kingdom), and the Livre Blanc (France), aligning military posture with diplomatic and economic policy. The plan typically coordinates inputs from bodies like the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom), and the Élysée Palace to produce executable directives for contingency operations.
The Overview situates the plan within historical and institutional contexts, referencing precedents such as the National Security Act of 1947, the Goldwater–Nichols Act, the Weimar Republic rearmament debates, and post-Cold War reviews like the Quadrennial Defense Review. It summarizes end states drawn from documents tied to Washington Naval Treaty-era force limits and lessons from the Falklands War, the Gulf War, and the Russo-Ukrainian War to frame readiness, deterrence, and resilience priorities. Stakeholders named include the White House, the Cabinet, the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and multinational entities like European Union bodies.
Strategic objectives articulate deterrence, defense, and expeditionary goals informed by doctrines such as AirLand Battle, the Revolution in Military Affairs, and concepts developed after the 9/11 attacks. Objectives map to alliances including NATO, partnerships like the Quad, and security arrangements exemplified by the US–Japan Security Treaty. Priorities often mirror commitments under treaties such as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and policies from the UN Security Council while aligning with industrial strategies seen in plans by Lockheed Martin, BAE Systems, and Thales Groupe.
Threat assessment integrates intelligence from services like the Central Intelligence Agency, MI6, and the DGSE along with open-source indicators from think tanks such as the RAND Corporation and International Institute for Strategic Studies. Scenarios draw on case studies from the Yom Kippur War, the Korean War, and the Syrian Civil War to model state and non-state actor behavior, cyber operations influenced by incidents like NotPetya, and space competition highlighted by the Chinese National Space Administration and the Space Force (United States). Risk matrices reference catastrophic risks exemplified by the Chernobyl disaster and pandemics like COVID-19 pandemic for civil-military support planning.
Force structure defines roles for services such as the United States Army, the Royal Navy, and the French Air and Space Force and integrates capabilities from platforms like the F-35 Lightning II, the HMS Queen Elizabeth (R08), and the Leclerc tank. It addresses modernization paths informed by programs like the Future Combat Systems initiative, the AUKUS arrangement, and procurement frameworks used by the North Atlantic Council. Capabilities planning references domains including cyber via entities like Cyber Command (United States), space via the European Space Agency, and nuclear deterrence exemplified by the Trident (UK) and the Force de frappe posture.
Mobilization covers reserve activation modeled on Selective Service System practices, industrial surge guided by lessons from War Production Board efforts, and logistics chains using contractors such as KBR and Maersk. Resource allocation aligns budgets set by legislatures including the United States Congress, the French National Assembly, and the House of Commons with procurement cycles seen in Programmes Militaires and multiyear contracts like those for Aegis Combat System. Civil support mechanisms draw on statutes such as the Stafford Act and cooperative frameworks like the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.
Implementation assigns responsibilities across authorities such as the Secretary of Defense (United States), the Chief of the Defence Staff (United Kingdom), and the Minister for the Armed Forces (France), and uses joint command arrangements seen in Combined Joint Task Force operations. Governance mechanisms incorporate oversight from bodies like the Government Accountability Office, parliamentary select committees exemplified by the House of Commons Defence Committee, and international inspection regimes including the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Legal frameworks reference statutes such as the War Powers Resolution and judgments from courts like the International Court of Justice when applicable.
Evaluation employs metrics drawn from exercises like Exercise Trident Juncture, after-action reviews akin to analyses following the Iraq War, and wargames used by the NATO Defence College. Reviews occur on cycles influenced by practices from the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Comprehensive Spending Review, with revision triggered by events comparable to the Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation or shifts in technology such as breakthroughs at DARPA. Continuous improvement engages academia and industry stakeholders including Harvard Kennedy School, King’s College London, and firms like Booz Allen Hamilton to adapt doctrine, capability, and policy.