National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission)

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission)
Name	National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
Formed	November 27, 2002
Dissolved	August 21, 2004
Jurisdiction	United States
Headquarters	Washington, D.C.
Members	10
Chair	Thomas H. Kean
Vicechair	Lee H. Hamilton

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) was an independent, bipartisan commission created to investigate the circumstances surrounding the September 11 attacks and provide recommendations to prevent future terrorism against the United States. The commission conducted a public investigation, held hearings, and issued a comprehensive report that influenced reforms in intelligence community organization and homeland security policy.

Background and Establishment

Congress established the commission amid scrutiny of the responses to September 11, 2001 and debates involving the Presidential Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, and disputes among the White House and Congress over disclosure. Legislative impetus followed advocacy by families of 9/11 victims, public pressure after the Iraq War debates, and calls from figures such as Senator Charles Grassley and Representative Tim Roemer. The commission was authorized by the United States Congress and signed into law by President George W. Bush.

Composition and Leadership

The commission consisted of ten commissioners appointed by congressional and presidential leaders with bipartisan selection rules intended to balance Republican Party and Democratic Party representation. The commission’s chair was Thomas H. Kean, former Governor of New Jersey, and vice chair was Lee H. Hamilton, former U.S. Representative from Indiana. Other commissioners included former officials and academics drawn from institutions such as Harvard University, Columbia University, Johns Hopkins University, and former executive branch figures from administrations of Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Bill Clinton. Staff leadership featured executive director Philip D. Zelikow, counsel John F. Lehman III, and investigative teams composed of former FBI agents, CIA analysts, and legal advisers.

Investigation and Public Hearings

The commission conducted a multi-year investigation that reviewed evidence from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Department of State, and international partners including Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The investigative process included interviews with senior officials—such as Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld, George Tenet, and Richard Clarke—and testimony by family members of victims and first responders from New York City Fire Department, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and emergency medical services. Public hearings featured detailed testimony about al-Qaeda planning, covert financing, aviation security failures involving American Airlines and United Airlines, and the roles of airports such as Logan International Airport and Dulles International Airport.

Findings and The 9/11 Commission Report

The commission’s report, formally titled The 9/11 Commission Report, presented findings on the origins and execution of the September 11 attacks, tracing links to al-Qaeda leadership including Osama bin Laden and operational planners in Kandahar and Hamburg. It documented intelligence failures regarding information flow between the FBI and CIA, inadequate aviation security overseen by the Federal Aviation Administration, and missed opportunities to disrupt hijacking plots. The report described failures in policy and organization across administrations and highlighted systemic problems in threat assessment, counterterrorism strategy, and interagency coordination among entities like the National Security Council and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Recommendations and Implementation

The commission issued a series of recommendations including creation of a centralized Director of National Intelligence to coordinate the intelligence community, reforms to aviation security and the Transportation Security Administration, improved information-sharing protocols between the FBI and CIA, and enhancements to border security and counterterrorism financing oversight involving the Department of the Treasury and Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. Many recommendations influenced legislation such as the reorganization that established the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and prompted institutional changes within the Department of Homeland Security, National Counterterrorism Center, and airport security procedures that affected carriers like Delta Air Lines and regulatory oversight by the Transportation Security Administration.

Criticisms and Controversies

Critics challenged aspects of the commission’s mandate, scope, and access to classified materials, citing delays in the release of testimony and limitations imposed by executive branch assertions of state secrets. Commentators and officials—ranging from Noam Chomsky sympathizers to former intelligence officers—disputed conclusions about links between Saudi Arabia and 9/11 funding, the degree of culpability attributed to particular officials such as Condoleezza Rice and George W. Bush, and the commission’s reliance on selected interviews overseen by staff like Philip D. Zelikow. Some family advocacy groups, including the 9/11 Families United, criticized perceived compromises and redactions resulting from negotiations with the White House, Department of Justice, and Department of Defense.

Legacy and Impact on Policy

The commission’s report shaped debates on intelligence reform, leading to structural changes such as the appointment of the first Director of National Intelligence, reforms within the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s counterterrorism divisions, and expanded authorities for agencies like the Transportation Security Administration and Customs and Border Protection. It influenced public narratives about al-Qaeda, counterterrorism strategy, and emergency preparedness in municipalities including New York City and Arlington County, Virginia. The report remains a reference point in congressional oversight by committees such as the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and in academic studies at institutions including Georgetown University and the University of Chicago.

Category:Commissions Category:September 11 attacks