National Commission on Terrorism

National Commission on Terrorism
Name	National Commission on Terrorism
Formed	1999
Dissolved	2000
Jurisdiction	United States
Headquarters	Washington, D.C.
Chair	Henry S. Rowen
Vicechair	L. Paul Bremer III
Members	See Membership and Organizational Structure

National Commission on Terrorism The National Commission on Terrorism was an independent United States commission created to examine terrorism threats and counterterrorism policy after the 1990s bombings and kidnappings linked to transnational groups. The commission operated in the context of high-profile incidents involving Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, Libya, Iraq, and Iran, producing a report that influenced debates in the Clinton administration, the House of Representatives, and the Senate on intelligence, law enforcement, and diplomatic measures.

Background and Establishment

Congress established the commission amid concerns following attacks such as the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1998 United States embassy bombings, and the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing. Discussions in the United States Congress drew on hearings by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and testimony from officials in the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The commission’s charter reflected recommendations from reports by the Aspen Institute, the National Research Council, and independent reviewers who had studied incidents like the USS Cole bombing and the Achille Lauro hijacking.

Membership and Organizational Structure

The commission’s leadership included prominent figures from policy and business such as Henry S. Rowen and L. Paul Bremer III, supported by commissioners with backgrounds linked to institutions like RAND Corporation, Brookings Institution, Heritage Foundation, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Staff drew on analysts from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence legacy agencies, retired officers from the United States Army, United States Navy, and United States Air Force, legal scholars from Harvard Law School and Yale Law School, and former diplomats from the Department of State and ambassadors to countries including Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt. The commission conducted briefings with officials from the National Security Council, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Customs Service, and municipal officials from cities such as New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles.

Mandate, Objectives, and Reports

The mandate called for an assessment of international and domestic threats posed by groups linked to incidents like those involving Hizballah and Shining Path, examining policy gaps across agencies including the Federal Aviation Administration, the Transportation Security Administration precursor entities, and the Treasury Department’s financial intelligence functions. The commission released a major report offering findings and recommendations on areas including intelligence sharing between the FBI and the CIA, diplomatic pressure coordinated with the United Nations, sanctions tied to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank mechanisms, and law enforcement measures aligned with statutes like the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the Patriot Act debates.

Key Findings and Recommendations

Key findings emphasized links between state sponsors such as Iran and Sudan and non-state actors like Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, noting failures in intelligence integration among agencies including the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office. Recommendations called for statutory changes to strengthen the FBI’s counterterrorism role, increased funding for the Drug Enforcement Administration’s international efforts against money laundering, enhanced visa controls coordinated with INTERPOL and the U.S. Customs Service, and diplomatic measures involving the European Union and NATO. The commission urged asset freezes using tools like Executive Order 13224 precedents, multilateral efforts through the UN Security Council, and expanded counterterrorism training with partners such as Israel, Jordan, and Egypt.

Government Response and Implementation

The report influenced actions in the Clinton administration and subsequent policy debates in the George W. Bush transition, informing legislation considered by the House Judiciary Committee and the Senate Judiciary Committee. Elements of its recommendations were reflected in budget requests to the Office of Management and Budget, interagency reforms involving the National Security Council, and changes to operational practices at the FBI and CIA following later incidents like the September 11 attacks. Several proposals spurred cooperation with foreign ministries in United Kingdom, France, Germany, and regional partners in South Asia and the Middle East on intelligence sharing and counter-financing initiatives supported by the Financial Action Task Force.

Criticisms and Controversies

Critics from think tanks such as the American Civil Liberties Union and commentators in outlets like The New York Times and The Washington Post argued the commission overstated links between terrorism and specific states including Iraq and Libya, and that recommendations risked expanding authorities of agencies like the FBI and INS at the expense of civil liberties protected under the Fourth Amendment and overseen by the Supreme Court of the United States. Others in academia at institutions such as Princeton University, Columbia University, and Stanford University questioned evidence cited regarding operational ties between groups like Al-Qaeda and state actors; debates echoed in congressional hearings featuring witnesses from the Department of Justice, former officials from the CIA, and journalists from The Wall Street Journal.

Category:United States commissions