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| Kripke's Wittgenstein | |
|---|---|
| Name | Kripke's Wittgenstein |
| Subject | Philosophy |
| Notable figures | Saul Kripke; Ludwig Wittgenstein; G. E. Moore; Gottlob Frege; Bertrand Russell; J. L. Austin; John Rawls; P. F. Strawson; A. J. Ayer; Wilfrid Sellars; Donald Davidson; Hilary Putnam; Stanley Cavell; Michael Dummett; Duncan Pritchard; Crispin Wright; Saul Kripke; Peter Hacker; Norwood Russell Hanson; Isaiah Berlin; Hannah Arendt; Jacques Derrida; John Searle; J. L. Mackie |
| Notable works | Philosophical Investigations; Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language; Philosophical Investigations; On Certainty; Naming and Necessity; The Concept of Mind; Rules and Representations |
| Era | 20th century philosophy; analytic philosophy |
| Language | English; German |
| Region | Europe; North America |
Kripke's Wittgenstein Kripke's Wittgenstein refers to the reading advanced by Saul Kripke of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later work, especially the argument about rule-following in Philosophical Investigations, reconstructing it as a skeptical paradox about meaning and interpretation. This interpretation sparked debates across analytic philosophy, engaging figures associated with Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, J. L. Austin and later commentators like Donald Davidson and Hilary Putnam. It generated responses from scholars connected to Oxford University, Harvard University, Princeton University and research traditions influenced by Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Language and Philosophy of Mind.
Wittgenstein's own text, Philosophical Investigations, explores rule-following, meaning, and private language in remarks that respond to issues raised by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell concerning sense and reference, and by Saul Kripke's later interlocutors. Wittgenstein invokes examples that involve ordinary practices critiqued by A. J. Ayer and John Searle to argue that understanding is exhibited in communal practices, a move anticipated in debates involving J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson. His method dialogues with thinkers such as Wilfrid Sellars and Michael Dummett on interpretation, and resonates with concerns pursued by C. D. Broad and Norwood Russell Hanson about rule-governed activity. Wittgenstein's remarks were interpreted in relation to historical texts like works by Immanuel Kant and responses to Ludwig Wittgenstein's own earlier Tractatus, drawing attention from scholars situated at institutions such as University of Cambridge and University of Vienna.
Kripke presents a skeptical paradox modeled on Saul Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein: any finite history of behavior under a rule is compatible with multiple extensions, so no fact about an individual's past can fix meaning. Kripke frames the paradox in the idiom of Skepticism familiar from René Descartes and retools ideas similar to puzzles discussed by G. E. Moore and John Locke. He uses analogies invoking ordinary language issues treated by Donald Davidson and technical points echoing debates involving Hilary Putnam and Donnellan's causal theory. Kripke contrasts the skeptic with potential responses drawn from Wittgensteinan appeals to practice, aiming to force defenders of meanings to account for normativity in the face of underdetermination of rule application, a challenge also salient for readers influenced by Saul Kripke's work on paradox and logical necessity.
Responding to Kripke, commentators offered two broad families: normative readings that appeal to standards or intentions associated with figures like G. E. Moore and John Rawls, and community-centered responses that emphasize shared practices akin to arguments by P. F. Strawson and J. L. Austin. Defenders draw on resources from Donald Davidson's theory of interpretation, Hilary Putnam's semantic externalism, and work by Stanley Cavell and Crispin Wright to argue that norms are embedded in practices at institutions such as University of Oxford and New York University. Some invoke historical precedents from debates involving Thomas Kuhn and Ludwig Wittgenstein to show how communal criteria, like those examined in On Certainty and texts by Gottlob Frege, constrain permissible rule-following. Others appeal to methodological stances shaped by debates at Harvard University and Princeton University to preserve objectivity against skeptical readings.
Kripke's reconstruction touches issues central to analytic philosophy: the nature of meaning, the metaphysics of rule-following, the foundations of normativity, and connections to philosophy of mind discussions by John Searle and Gilbert Ryle. It engages epistemological concerns reminiscent of René Descartes and David Hume about skepticism and certainty, and raises methodological questions echoed in the work of Wilfrid Sellars and Michael Dummett. Debates involve distinctions used by Saul Kripke in modal logic and by Donald Davidson in triangulation, and intersect with semantic issues addressed by Hilary Putnam and W. V. O. Quine. The paradox also provoked reflection on pedagogy and legal interpretation debated at Cambridge and Oxford, affecting how philosophers reconceive rule-following in ethics discussed by John Rawls and Hannah Arendt.
Critics such as Peter Hacker, Crispin Wright, Stanley Cavell, and Gordon Baker argued alternative reconstructions that deny Kripke's skeptical framing, stressing ordinary language readings and therapeutic aims aligned with J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson. Others turned to historical scholarship on Ludwig Wittgenstein's manuscripts at Trinity College, Cambridge and archival work engaging Gottlob Frege's notebooks to argue for different emphases. Philosophers like Donald Davidson and Hilary Putnam proposed theories of interpretation and semantic externalism that undercut the skeptic, while figures such as Duncan Pritchard and Crispin Wright offered refined epistemological models. Continental-influenced thinkers referencing Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault produced skeptical or genealogical readings that, while less common in analytic circles, broadened debate in venues including University of Paris and Columbia University.
Kripke's reading influenced later work on rule-following, philosophy of language, and cognitive science, informing discussions by Donald Davidson, Jerry Fodor, Daniel Dennett, Saul Kripke (modal metaphysics), Hilary Putnam, Nicholas Rescher, Crispin Wright, Derek Parfit, Timothy Williamson, David Lewis, Frank Jackson, Tyler Burge, Michael Dummett, Stanley Cavell, Peter Hacker, John McDowell, Simon Blackburn, Richard Rorty, Paul Boghossian, Noam Chomsky, Jerry Fodor, Daniel Dennett, and scholars in cognitive psychology at institutions like Massachusetts Institute of Technology and University College London. The debate continues to shape work on semantic normativity, the metaphysics of rules, and interdisciplinary research spanning philosophy, linguistics, and neuroscience in centers including Princeton University and University of California, Berkeley.