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On Certainty

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On Certainty
NameOn Certainty
AuthorLudwig Wittgenstein
Original titleÜber Gewissheit
LanguageGerman
Published1969
GenrePhilosophy
SubjectEpistemology

On Certainty is a posthumously compiled collection of notes by Ludwig Wittgenstein that examines the foundations of knowledge, doubt, and certainty. It addresses problems arising from skepticism, following Wittgenstein's later philosophy, and interacts with thinkers, texts, and events that shaped twentieth-century analytic philosophy. The work engages with historical debates and figures across European intellectual life, reflecting on the limits of doubt and the role of language in grounding belief.

Background and Context

Wittgenstein wrote the notes during the early 1940s and 1950s against the backdrop of World War II, drawing on conversations and exchanges with figures such as G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, and members of the Vienna Circle. The manuscript was compiled after Wittgenstein's death and published in contexts involving editors and institutions associated with Cambridge, Trinity College, and publishers active in London and Vienna. Intellectual interlocutors referenced include John Austin, J. L. Austin, Frank Ramsey, Gilbert Ryle, and P. F. Strawson, while the milieu extended to Continental contacts including Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The notes intersect with events like World War I, World War II, the Nuremberg Trials, and the broader cultural shifts in twentieth-century Europe, resonating with collections and archives held at institutions such as the British Museum, the Bodleian Library, and Trinity College Library.

Themes and Arguments

Central themes in the book include the critique of Cartesian doubt, the function of ordinary language in sustaining epistemic practices, and the notion of hinge propositions that stand beyond evidential justification. Wittgenstein contrasts methods associated with figures like René Descartes, David Hume, and Immanuel Kant, while engaging analytic traditions traced through Russell, Moore, and the Logical Positivists of the Vienna Circle. He articulates an account related to foundational claims that relate to testimony practices exemplified by institutions such as the Royal Society and universities like Oxford and Cambridge. The work also dialogues with philosophers of language and mind including Saul Kripke, Donald Davidson, Hilary Putnam, and John Searle, and connects to psychological and anthropological figures such as Sigmund Freud, Jean Piaget, and Claude Lévi-Strauss in exploring how certainties function in human life.

Philosophical Analysis and Criticism

Analytic treatments of the text often situate Wittgenstein's approach in relation to epistemologists such as Edmund Gettier, Thomas Kuhn, and Alvin Plantinga, contrasting hinge epistemology with reliabilist, foundationalist, and coherentist accounts found in journals and conferences at institutions like Harvard, Princeton, and the University of Chicago. Critics and defenders engage with methodological parallels to Karl Popper, Isaiah Berlin, and Michael Dummett; continental critics reference figures like Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas. Philosophers of language and mind including Jerry Fodor, Noam Chomsky, and Patricia Churchland have debated implications for meaning, modularity, and naturalistic accounts. Contemporary scholarship invokes scholars such as Timothy Williamson, Duncan Pritchard, and Crispin Wright in developing epistemic modal analyses, while others trace influence on ordinary language philosophy propagated through Cambridge circles and the Oxford Socratic tradition.

Historical Influence and Reception

The reception spans academic communities across Europe and North America, shaping debates at conferences sponsored by institutions such as the American Philosophical Association and appearing in journals associated with Yale, Columbia, and the University of California. The text influenced later work in epistemology, philosophy of language, and cognitive science, informing projects by philosophers at Stanford, MIT, and the London School of Economics. It has been discussed alongside canonical works including Wittgenstein's own Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations, as well as Moore's Proof of an External World and Russell's The Problems of Philosophy. The book's influence extended into interdisciplinary dialogues involving historians like E. H. Carr, sociologists such as Pierre Bourdieu, and legal theorists engaging with precedent and testimony in courts like the International Court of Justice and national supreme courts.

Interpretations and Key Passages

Scholarly interpretation emphasizes pivotal passages where Wittgenstein identifies bedrock propositions—sometimes called hinge propositions—that are immune to ordinary doubt. Commentators compare these passages to Moore's famous gesture in his rebuttal to skepticism, to Russell's epistemic projects, and to passages in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Key aphoristic remarks have been analyzed in relation to linguistic frameworks developed by Frege, Gottlob Frege, and the analytic tradition through figures like Rudolf Carnap and A. J. Ayer. Interpretive debates involve hermeneutic readings drawing on Gadamer and Ricoeur, as well as analytic reconstructions by scholars associated with institutions such as Columbia University, King’s College London, and the University of Oxford, producing commentaries, lectures, and critical editions that continue to appear in monographs and collected essays.

Category:Works by Ludwig Wittgenstein