Free and Open Indo-Pacific

Free and Open Indo-Pacific
Eric Gaba (Sting - fr:Sting) Annotated on 4 November 2020 by (DiplomatTesterMan) · CC BY-SA 4.0 · source
Name	Free and Open Indo-Pacific
Formation	2017
Founders	Shinzo Abe, Donald Trump
Region	Indo-Pacific
Type	Strategic framework

Free and Open Indo-Pacific is a geopolitical strategy promoting maritime security, economic connectivity, and rule-based order across the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. Announced in 2017, it builds on precedents in regional diplomacy and strategic thought associated with leaders such as Shinzo Abe and Donald Trump, and institutions including the United States Department of State and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan). The concept intersects with existing architectures like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and forums such as the Quad and the East Asia Summit.

Background and Origins

The idea emerged from diplomatic initiatives linking Japan's policy under Shinzo Abe with subsequent articulations by the United States Department of State during the Trump administration. Intellectual antecedents include strategic debates in the Lowy Institute, Council on Foreign Relations, and Brookings Institution, as well as policy proposals from the Japan Institute of International Affairs. Historical precedents encompass doctrines associated with the Monroe Doctrine, Rebalance to Asia, and post-World War II arrangements involving the United Nations and the Bretton Woods system. Regional events that shaped discourse included the 2014 India-Africa Forum Summit, the Indian Ocean Rim Association meetings, and disputes adjudicated at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (The Hague).

Strategic Objectives and Principles

The framework emphasizes principles adopted by actors such as the United States, Japan, Australia, and India: freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, a rules-based order informed by rulings like the 2016 South China Sea arbitration, and enhanced connectivity paralleling initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative but framed through alternative mechanisms associated with the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank. Other principles are reflected in instruments like the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and dialogues such as the ASEAN Regional Forum. Strategic objectives resonate with defense white papers from the Department of Defense (United States), the Ministry of Defence (India), and the Australian Defence Force.

Key Participants and Partnerships

Principal state actors tied to the concept include United States, Japan, Australia, India, Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, South Korea, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives, Timor-Leste, Papua New Guinea, and Fiji. Multilateral and bilateral partners include the Quad, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Indian Ocean Rim Association, the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus, and financial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Non-state participants in projects and dialogues include think tanks like Chatham House, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Center for Strategic and International Studies, and universities such as National University of Singapore and Jawaharlal Nehru University.

Economic Initiatives and Connectivity Projects

Economic dimensions draw on infrastructure and finance instruments provided by actors such as Japan International Cooperation Agency, the United States International Development Finance Corporation, and the Asian Development Bank. Projects sometimes contrast with the Belt and Road Initiative led by China. Examples linked to the strategy include port development dialogues touching Hambantota Port, Chittagong Port, Port of Colombo, Gwadar Port (contextualized through Pakistan), and proposed rail and digital corridors connecting hubs like Mumbai, Chennai, Jakarta, Manila, and Singapore. Trade frameworks and standards intersect with agreements such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Energy security projects reference pipelines and LNG terminals involving India LNG initiatives, partners such as TotalEnergies, ExxonMobil, and regional suppliers like QatarEnergy and Shell.

Security and Military Cooperation

Security cooperation under the rubric involves exercises and arrangements among forces including the United States Navy, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, the Royal Australian Navy, the Indian Navy, and the Republic of Korea Navy. Multilateral exercises referenced include Malabar (naval exercise), RIMPAC, and trilateral drills among Japan, India, and Australia. Port calls and logistics involve bases and facilities like Diego Garcia, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Okinawa, and civilian-military arrangements under host-nation support models seen in agreements like the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Cooperation also touches law-enforcement actors such as Interpol and maritime agencies including Coast Guard (India) and the United States Coast Guard.

Regional Responses and Criticisms

Responses vary: some governments including India and Japan have endorsed the framework, while actors such as China and Pakistan have criticized it as containment, drawing responses from diplomatic organs like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (People's Republic of China). Analysts from International Crisis Group, RAND Corporation, Council on Foreign Relations, and Asia Society have debated implications for sovereignty, debt diplomacy, and strategic competition involving the Belt and Road Initiative and forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Civil society and environmental groups such as Greenpeace and World Wide Fund for Nature have raised concerns about ecological impacts of infrastructure projects at sites like the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Mekong River basin.

Implementation and Outcomes

Implementation involves a mix of diplomatic statements, funding pledges from entities like the United States Agency for International Development and Japan Bank for International Cooperation, and concrete projects coordinated through mechanisms such as the India–Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership and bilateral accords with countries including Vietnam, Philippines, and Sri Lanka. Outcomes include enhanced interoperability demonstrated in exercises like Malabar (naval exercise), new funding channels through the United States International Development Finance Corporation, and increased diplomatic engagement via summits including the G7 and the East Asia Summit. Critics point to uneven delivery, competition with China-led projects, and challenges involving domestic politics in states such as Pakistan, Myanmar, and Thailand.

Category:Geopolitics