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| FM 6-0 | |
|---|---|
| Name | FM 6-0 |
| Type | Field Manual |
| Published | 2014 |
| Publisher | Department of the Army |
| Pages | 256 |
| Series | FM/FM 6-0 |
FM 6-0
FM 6-0 is the United States Army field manual that codifies staff organization, command relationships, and decision-making processes for brigade, division, and corps staffs. It connects doctrine used by the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, aligns with doctrines from Joint Chiefs of Staff publications, and interfaces with historical practices traced to manuals from the War Department and reforms following the Vietnam War and Persian Gulf War. The manual influences operational planning across headquarters engaged in campaigns such as the Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.
FM 6-0 outlines the roles and responsibilities of commanders and staffs at echelonal headquarters including brigade, division, corps, and theater commands such as U.S. Army Central and U.S. Army Europe. It prescribes staff sections similar to those in NATO force structures and cross-references procedures from the Joint Publication 5-0 and Joint Publication 3-0. The manual emphasizes mission command principles associated with leaders like General Ulysses S. Grant in practice and doctrinal evolution influenced by ideas from Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery and studies of Battle of Normandy command challenges. FM 6-0 incorporates best practices from organizational analyses by institutions such as the RAND Corporation and National Defense University.
The lineage of FM 6-0 traces to early twentieth-century publications from the War Department and interwar reforms influenced by the Treaty of Versailles aftermath and lessons from the Battle of the Bulge. Post‑Vietnam revisions paralleled initiatives by the Chief of Staff of the Army and were affected by after-action reports from Operation Desert Storm and doctrinal reviews following Operation Just Cause. The 2006 and 2014 updates reflected changes advocated by leaders like General Martin Dempsey and commissions such as the Army Science Board, incorporating lessons from counterinsurgency campaigns led by commanders such as General David Petraeus and General Stanley McChrystal. Subsequent supplements aligned FM 6-0 with doctrine from the U.S. Special Operations Command and interoperability standards used by United States European Command.
FM 6-0 defines staff organizations—S‑1 through S‑6 at brigade and division levels—and command relationships that interface with joint structures such as United States Central Command and multinational formations like NATO Allied Command Operations. It codifies authorities for commanders whose decisions mirror historical precedents set in campaigns led by figures like General Dwight D. Eisenhower and frameworks used in the Marshall Plan era. The manual stresses centralized intent and decentralized execution, a tension evident in debates involving leaders from the Korean War and planning approaches used during the Gulf War. It also addresses liaison with civil institutions including coordination seen during Hurricane Katrina relief operations directed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
The manual prescribes a decision-making process that assigns responsibilities to staff officers—roles comparable to those occupied by notable staff leaders during the Normandy Campaign and Operation Torch—and integrates techniques from analytical frameworks developed by the Brookings Institution and Center for Strategic and International Studies. FM 6-0 outlines planning boards, running estimates, and staff estimates that echo processes used by planners in Pentagon meetings and by officers serving under commanders like Admiral William H. McRaven. It formalizes coordination mechanisms seen in joint operations with the Marine Corps and air component relationships exemplified by Air Force Combat Command practices.
FM 6-0 details the Military Decision Making Process and orders production, linking to formats used in Joint Publication 3-0 and historical model orders from the Civil War era adapted over time. The manual lays out the development of operation orders, fragmentary orders, and warning orders used in campaigns such as Operation Desert Shield and humanitarian missions like Operation Sea Angel. It prescribes staff products, timelines, and synchronization techniques comparable to planning cycles employed by headquarters during the Tet Offensive aftermath and coordination frameworks used in the Balkans peacekeeping operations overseen by United Nations commands.
Implementation of FM 6-0 occurs through institutional training at centers such as the United States Army Command and General Staff College, the National Training Center, and the Joint Readiness Training Center. The manual shapes professional military education curricula influenced by studies from the Army War College and doctrine taught during exercises with partners like British Army and Canadian Army. Units validate staff procedures in rotations simulating scenarios from Operation Anaconda and multinational exercises such as Exercise Saber Strike to ensure interoperability with forces from Germany, France, Japan, and Australia.
Analysts from organizations like the Heritage Foundation and think tanks including the Center for a New American Security have critiqued FM 6-0 for complexity and implementation challenges noted in after-action reports from Iraq War campaigns. Critics compare it to legacy doctrines used in the Cold War and argue about balance between rigid staff processes and the agility exemplified by commanders like Colin Powell and H. R. McMaster. Supporters point to its codification of best practices promoted by the Institute for Defense Analyses and its role in professionalizing staff functions across U.S. Army Forces Command and allied headquarters.