Joint Publication 3-0

Joint Publication 3-0
Name	Joint Publication 3-0
Caption	United States Department of Defense joint doctrine manual
Date	2017 (current major revision)
Country	United States of America
Subject	Joint operations doctrine
Publisher	United States Department of Defense
Pages	176

Contents

Joint Publication 3-0

Joint Publication 3-0 is the principal United States doctrinal manual for planning and conducting joint operations, intended to guide commanders and staffs across the United States Armed Forces in integrated campaigns and major operations. It synthesizes concepts from historical campaigns and contemporary strategic guidance to align forces from the United States Army, United States Navy, United States Air Force, United States Marine Corps, and United States Space Force with policy issued by the Secretary of Defense and guidance from the President of the United States. The manual frames joint operations in the context of alliance obligations, interoperability with partners such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization, United Nations, European Union, and regional organizations like Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Overview

Joint Publication 3-0 defines how joint force commanders integrate capabilities across domains to achieve strategic objectives derived from directives by the National Security Council, Secretary of Defense, and combatant commanders such as the United States European Command, United States Central Command, United States Indo-Pacific Command, United States Southern Command, United States Africa Command, and United States Northern Command. It addresses campaign design, operational art, joint functions, and the relationship among components including the Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders, and the Service Chiefs. The publication references historical campaigns like the Normandy landings, Operation Desert Storm, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom to illustrate principles applicable to crises involving actors such as Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, and non-state entities like Al-Qaeda and ISIS.

The development of the manual traces to doctrinal evolutions influenced by post-World War II events including the Berlin Airlift, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War, and doctrinal syntheses following the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Key doctrinal milestones incorporated lessons from the Gulf War, the Balkans conflict, and the counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. Revision processes involved organizations such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, United States Cyber Command, and academic institutions like Naval War College, United States Army War College, and Air University. International partners and alliances including NATO and coalition participants from United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada, Australia, and Japan influenced interoperability provisions.

The manual articulates operational art concepts derived from theorists and practitioners connected to events like the Battle of Britain, the Tet Offensive, and the Battle of Fallujah, and draws on writings associated with figures such as Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Alfred Thayer Mahan, John Boyd, and Antoine-Henri Jomini. It codifies principles such as tempo, synchronization, mass, and maneuver as applied across domains including maritime engagements around South China Sea, air campaigns over Operation Allied Force, and land operations exemplified by Operation Torch. Concepts integrate capabilities from institutions like Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security Agency, and partner militaries in multinational operations such as Operation Unified Protector.

The publication delineates responsibilities among organizational actors such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, component commanders from the United States Army Pacific, United States Army Europe, Naval Forces Europe, and theater logistics organizations including United States Transportation Command. It defines staff roles within a joint force headquarters, referencing directorates like J1 through J9, and interactions with agencies such as the Department of State, United States Agency for International Development, and alliances like Five Eyes. Legal and policy contours involve the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the War Powers Resolution, and advice from the Judge Advocate General's Corps.

JP 3-0 prescribes campaign planning processes consonant with national strategic guidance from the National Defense Strategy, National Security Strategy, and contingency plans maintained by combatant commands and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. It integrates intelligence preparation from the Defense Intelligence Agency, targeting processes coordinated with United States Strategic Command, and joint logistics supported by Defense Logistics Agency and Military Sealift Command. Execution mechanisms encompass phased operations influenced by operations like Operation Neptune Spear and Operation Tomodachi, and command relationships—combatant command (COCOM), operational control (OPCON), and tactical control (TACON)—used in coalition frameworks including Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines and Operation Inherent Resolve.

The manual has shaped doctrine in allied militaries and institutions including NATO Allied Command Operations, the Australian Defence Force, the Canadian Armed Forces, and the Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom), informing joint training at centers such as the National Defense University, Joint Forces Staff College, and exercises like RIMPAC, Bright Star, Cobra Gold, and Operation Atlantic Resolve. It influences capability development programs involving contractors like Lockheed Martin, Raytheon Technologies, and international initiatives such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Case studies in doctrine education reference legal frameworks like the Geneva Conventions, operational lessons from Hurricane Katrina, and integration challenges evident during crises such as the Kosovo War and the Syrian Civil War.

Category:United States Department of Defense doctrine