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FM 3-96

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FM 3-96
NameFM 3-96
CaptionUnited States Army field manual
Date2009 (original)
PublisherDepartment of the Army
SubjectJoint and Combined Arms Operations

FM 3-96 FM 3-96 is a United States Army field manual addressing brigade combat team and company-level operations within combined arms maneuver and stability tasks. The manual integrates doctrine from United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, aligns with guidance from Department of Defense, and reflects lessons from operations in Iraq War, War in Afghanistan (2001–2021), and multinational exercises with NATO partners. It served as doctrinal authority for brigade commanders, influenced publications such as manuals from U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, and informed operational concepts discussed at venues like Center for Strategic and International Studies and Brookings Institution.

History and Development

FM 3-96 emerged from doctrinal evolution following post‑Cold War engagements including Operation Desert Storm, Operation Restore Hope, and stabilization missions during the Balkans conflict. Development drew on analysis by U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command analysts, input from combatant commands such as U.S. Central Command, and after-action reports from brigade combat teams in Iraq War and War in Afghanistan (2001–2021). The manual synthesized concepts from prior publications like earlier editions of FM 3-0 and doctrine from Joint Publication 3-0 while coordinating with institutions such as the United States Military Academy and think tanks like RAND Corporation.

Purpose and Scope

FM 3-96 defines doctrine for brigade and below operations to support campaigns envisioned by Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance and Department of Defense strategies. It addresses combined arms maneuver, mission command as articulated by General Martin Dempsey-era discussions, and stability tasks relevant to theaters overseen by U.S. European Command and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. The scope covers interplay among units such as infantry battalion (United States), armor brigade combat team, and enablers from United States Army Aviation and Field Artillery formations.

Organization and Structure

The manual is structured into chapters that mirror operational functions used by formations that include Brigade Combat Team (United States), Stryker Brigade Combat Team, and Army National Guard units. It lays out staff responsibilities aligned with G-1 (staff), G-2 (military intelligence), G-3 (operations), and G-4 (logistics) constructs, and integrates supports from agencies such as U.S. Army Military Intelligence Corps, U.S. Army Medical Command, and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Annexes reference liaison with partners including United States Marine Corps, United States Air Force, and coalition partners from United Kingdom and Australia.

Key Concepts and Doctrine

FM 3-96 codifies concepts such as combined arms maneuver derived from historical campaigns like the Battle of 73 Easting and doctrinal constructs echoed in AirLand Battle doctrine. It emphasizes mission command in the tradition of leaders like General Ulysses S. Grant and modern proponents such as General David Petraeus and discusses integration of effects from close air support provided by A-10 Thunderbolt II and ISR platforms like MQ-9 Reaper. The manual situates brigade operations within operational art frameworks discussed at National Defense University and complements joint doctrine in Joint Publication 3-0.

Tactical Techniques and Procedures

Tactical procedures in FM 3-96 include techniques for offensive operations illustrated by maneuvers similar to those in the Invasion of Kuwait, defensive operations reflective of lessons from Battle of Ramadi, and stability tasks akin to operations in Kandahar Province. It prescribes use of combined assets including M1 Abrams, M2 Bradley, and engineer assets from United States Army Corps of Engineers for breaching, as well as coordination centers modeled on Tactical Operations Center (TOC) practice. Procedures cover reconnaissance methods used by Long Range Surveillance (United States) and close coordination with Naval Gunfire Support and Joint Terminal Attack Controller deployments.

Training and Implementation

Implementation of FM 3-96 occurs through professional military education at institutions like United States Army War College, Command and General Staff College, and through combat training centers such as the National Training Center (Fort Irwin), Joint Readiness Training Center, and Grafenwoehr Training Area. Exercises with partners including NATO and multinational brigades reinforce doctrine through scenarios drawn from Operation Atlantic Resolve and rotational deployments to regions overseen by U.S. Africa Command. Wargaming and simulations using platforms from RAND Corporation studies and training aids developed by United States Army Combined Arms Center support doctrine assimilation.

Criticism and Revisions

Critiques of FM 3-96 have arisen in analyses by scholars at Council on Foreign Relations, Brookings Institution, and Center for Strategic and International Studies who question adaptability for irregular warfare and urban operations like those in Fallujah and Mosul. Reviews prompted revisions to integrate counterinsurgency lessons associated with FM 3-24 doctrine and to harmonize with joint guidance from Joint Publication 3-24. Subsequent updates reflected after‑action reports from commanders in Iraq War and policy guidance from leaders such as Secretary of Defense and influenced later doctrinal work within Army Futures Command.

Category:United States Army doctrine