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| 2018 National Military Strategy | |
|---|---|
| Title | 2018 National Military Strategy |
| Author | James Mattis |
| Year | 2018 |
| Publisher | United States Department of Defense |
| Country | United States |
| Language | English |
2018 National Military Strategy The 2018 National Military Strategy is a strategic guidance document issued by James Mattis as part of the United States Department of Defense's periodic strategic articulations. It translated national directives from the National Security Strategy (2017) and directives from the United States Congress into prioritized operational approaches for the United States Armed Forces, emphasizing competition with revisionist powers and preparations for widescale contingency operations. The document influenced planning across services including the United States Army, United States Navy, United States Marine Corps, United States Air Force, and United States Space Force precursors, and informed collaboration with allies such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Japan, and Australia.
The strategy emerged following publication of the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and amid debates in the Presidential transition of 2016–2017 between proponents represented by figures like Rex Tillerson, H.R. McMaster, and advocates around Steve Bannon and Donald Trump. It sought to operationalize priorities set by the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense and was shaped by inputs from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commands including United States Indo-Pacific Command, United States European Command, United States Central Command, United States Africa Command, and United States Northern Command. Analysts from institutions such as the Rand Corporation, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, and Brookings Institution contributed through wargames and studies, while congressional committees including the House Armed Services Committee and Senate Armed Services Committee held oversight hearings. Historical influences cited included lessons from the Cold War, Gulf War, Iraq War, and the War in Afghanistan (2001–2021), as well as doctrinal traditions from the Goldwater-Nichols Act era and writings of strategists like Alfred Thayer Mahan, Carl von Clausewitz, and Douhet.
Framed within competition against states identified alongside historical cases such as Soviet Union and contemporary references to People's Republic of China and Russian Federation, the strategy prioritized pacing threats drawn from hybrid campaigns observed in the Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and coercive economic and maritime practices in the South China Sea arbitration context. Objectives aligned with protecting vital interests expressed in the National Security Strategy (2017), deterring aggression described in NATO communiqués like the Wales Summit 2014, and ensuring strategic access exemplified by operations in the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and Taiwan Strait. It emphasized integrated approaches to counterterrorism as seen in campaigns against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and stability tasks in reconstruction efforts like those after the Iraq War (2003–2011).
The document foregrounded concepts including high-end competition, deterrence, and integrated deterrence reminiscent of Cold War doctrines from Mutual Assured Destruction debates, while also incorporating multi-domain operations influenced by exercises such as RIMPAC and wargames like those conducted at RAND and Center for Naval Analyses. It stressed readiness akin to lessons from Operation Desert Storm and emphasized modernization themes tied to programs like the F-35 Lightning II, Columbia-class submarine, Zumwalt-class destroyer, and investments paralleling the priorities of the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental and private sector partners like Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Northrop Grumman. Cyber and space considerations referenced events such as the NotPetya attack and the establishment of the United States Space Command and later United States Space Force.
Guidance directed force posture adjustments including rotational deployments to theaters like Europe and Indo-Pacific regions, forward basing concepts in Guam and Diego Garcia, and force posture reviews reflective of historical precedents in NATO enlargement debates and the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. Readiness metrics echoed concerns raised after Operation Enduring Freedom and budget cycles debated in Budget Control Act of 2011 forums. It recommended advances in joint training institutions such as the Joint Forces Command lineage, renewed emphasis on prepositioning similar to Operation Iraqi Freedom logistics, and surge capacity planning informed by Hurricane Katrina and humanitarian responses like Operation Tomodachi.
Implementation required procurement choices that affected major acquisition programs under oversight by the Defense Acquisition University and congressional appropriations via annual National Defense Authorization Acts. Fiscal implications intersected with budget debates involving the Office of Management and Budget, sequestration history tied to the Budget Control Act of 2011, and expense pressures similar to post-9/11 supplemental appropriations for Operation Enduring Freedom. Resource trade-offs involved readiness accounts, modernization procurement, and personnel end-strength decisions that echoed reforms from the Goldwater-Nichols Act era and compensation debates before the Defense Health Agency transformations.
The strategy called for whole-of-government approaches involving coordination with the Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, Central Intelligence Agency, and multilateral organizations such as United Nations bodies and regional groupings like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Allied coordination emphasized interoperability with partners including United Kingdom, France, Germany, Poland, South Korea, Israel, and multilateral mechanisms such as NORAD and Five Eyes. Exercises and partnerships referenced long-standing initiatives like Bright Star, BALTOPS, and trilateral dialogues exemplified by the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.
Reception varied across policy communities: proponents in Heritage Foundation and American Enterprise Institute praised the focus on great power competition, while critics from Human Rights Watch and scholars at Harvard University, Yale University, and Princeton University questioned risk assessments and resource allocations. Editorial responses in outlets like the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post debated civil-military relations referencing precedents such as discussions around The Pentagon Papers and critiques from figures like Noam Chomsky and Max Boot. International reactions included commentary from leaders in Beijing, Moscow, and capitals of European Union members concerned about NATO burden-sharing debates.
The strategy shaped subsequent doctrines including updates to the National Defense Strategy and influenced service doctrines such as the Army Operating Concept and AirSea Battle successors. It informed procurement trajectories for platforms like the F-35 Lightning II and submarine programs, and contributed to institutional reforms that culminated in the formal establishment of the United States Space Force and reestablished priorities in NATO deterring posture. Its legacy is visible in later strategic documents and debates within think tanks such as Center for Strategic and International Studies, Brookings Institution, and policy forums in Congress where concepts of integrated deterrence and great power competition continue to shape U.S. defense planning.
Category:United States defense policy