eliminative materialism

eliminative materialism
Name	eliminative materialism
School	Analytic philosophy, Philosophy of mind
Influences	Wilfrid Sellars, W.V. Quine, Paul Feyerabend, Richard Rorty
Influenced	Cognitive science, Neuroscience

eliminative materialism is a radical thesis in the philosophy of mind which argues that our common-sense understanding of mental states, often called folk psychology, is fundamentally flawed and will be replaced, not reduced, by a mature neuroscience. Proponents assert that categories like belief, desire, and intention are part of a prescientific theory that fails to map onto the causal structure of the brain, much like outdated theories such as phlogiston or vitalism. Consequently, these mental state terms are destined for elimination from our scientific ontology, rather than being identified with neural states.

Overview and basic tenets

The central claim is that folk psychology constitutes a deeply inadequate theory of human cognition and behavior. Unlike identity theory or functionalism, which seek to reconcile mental talk with physical facts, eliminative materialists argue for its outright rejection. Key tenets include the proposition that the explanations and predictions offered by folk psychology are severely limited, failing to account for phenomena like mental illness, sleep, or creativity. It posits that the future progress of cognitive science and neuroscience will not vindicate but rather supersede our everyday psychological framework, revealing the brain's operations in entirely new conceptual terms.

Historical background and influences

The roots of eliminative materialism can be traced to the rigorous scientific realism of mid-20th century American philosophy. Major influences include Wilfrid Sellars and his critique of the "Myth of the Given" in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, which challenged direct, non-theoretical access to mental contents. The naturalized epistemology of W.V. Quine encouraged treating all knowledge, including about the mind, as within the purview of science. Furthermore, the work of Paul Feyerabend on theory incommensurability and the historical elimination of outdated concepts provided a model. Early formulations appeared in the writings of Richard Rorty, particularly in his paper "Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories".

Major arguments and proponents

The primary argument is that folk psychology is a stagnant research program, showing little theoretical progress since the time of Homer or Thucydides, and exhibits explanatory failures. Leading proponents, Paul Churchland and Patricia Churchland, have vigorously defended this view. Paul Churchland, in works like "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes", argues that the propositional structure of beliefs and desires is ill-suited for describing the brain's vector coding and parallel distributed processing. Patricia Churchland, in "Neurophilosophy", emphasizes the co-evolution of neuroscience and philosophy, predicting the elimination of folk categories. Other notable figures include Stephen Stich, who has critiqued the semantic coherence of belief attribution.

Criticisms and responses

A powerful objection, often called the "self-refutation argument", claims that the eliminativist's own statement of the thesis presupposes the reality of beliefs and intentions. Critics like Jerry Fodor in "The Language of Thought" and John Searle argue that the causal efficacy and intuitive obviousness of mental states render their elimination absurd. Another line of criticism, from philosophers such as Daniel Dennett, suggests that folk psychology is not a theory but an instrumentalist "intentional stance" that is pragmatically indispensable. Eliminativists respond by denying the necessity of folk-psychological concepts for meaningful discourse, comparing it to discussing Newtonian physics after the advent of Albert Einstein's theory of relativity.

Relation to other philosophies of mind

Eliminative materialism stands in sharp contrast to reductive physicalism theories like type identity theory associated with J.J.C. Smart and David Armstrong, which seek neural correlates for mental types. It also opposes non-reductive physicalism such as Donald Davidson's anomalous monism and property dualism. It shares a physicalist commitment with Daniel Dennett's heterophenomenology but diverges on the fate of folk psychology. Its stance is more radical than biological naturalism as proposed by John Searle. It finds some methodological alignment with certain strands of cognitive science that emphasize sub-personal computational models over propositional attitudes.

Implications and applications

If correct, eliminative materialism would precipitate a profound revolution in how we understand ourselves, impacting fields from ethics and law to artificial intelligence. Concepts central to jurisprudence like mens rea (guilty mind) or moral responsibility grounded in intentions would require radical reconceptualization. In AI research, it suggests that replicating human intelligence may not involve replicating belief-desire psychology. The development of advanced neuroprosthetics and brain-computer interfaces at institutions like the BrainGate consortium may provide practical tests for theories that bypass folk-psychological explanations. Its influence is evident in some approaches within cognitive neuroscience that seek neural explanations for behavior without recourse to personal-level mental states.

Category:Philosophy of mind Category:Materialism Category:Metaphysical theories