anomalous monism

anomalous monism is a theory in the philosophy of mind developed by the American philosopher Donald Davidson. It proposes that mental events are identical to physical events, but denies that strict psychophysical laws can explain this relationship. The theory is a form of non-reductive physicalism that attempts to reconcile the reality of the mental with a scientific worldview, while preserving the autonomy of psychological explanation.

Overview

The central thesis, articulated in Davidson's seminal 1970 essay "Mental Events", posits that while every individual mental event is a physical event, mental and physical descriptions are not reducible via strict laws. This position combines ontological monism with conceptual dualism, asserting a single substance—the physical—described in two incommensurable vocabularies. It directly engages with the traditional mind–body problem, offering an alternative to both Cartesian dualism and type identity theory. The theory's name derives from the "anomalism" of the mental, meaning it is not governed by strict deterministic laws when described in psychological terms.

Philosophical background

Davidson's work emerged from debates within analytic philosophy in the mid-20th century, particularly responding to the limitations of logical behaviorism and the early identity theory of Ullin Place and J. J. C. Smart. He was deeply influenced by W. V. O. Quine's holism and skepticism about meaning, as well as the interpretivist approach to understanding other minds. The theory also critically engages with Descartes' legacy of substance dualism and the challenge of mental causation. Key historical interlocutors include Wilfrid Sellars and his critique of the "Myth of the Given", which shaped Davidson's views on the relationship between belief and evidence.

The argument for anomalous monism

Davidson's argument rests on three seemingly inconsistent principles which he claims are jointly true and necessitate his conclusion. The first is the Principle of Causal Interaction, which states that at least some mental events causally interact with physical events. The second is the Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality, asserting that events related as cause and effect fall under strict deterministic laws. The third is the Principle of the Anomalism of the Mental, which holds that there are no strict psychophysical or psychological laws. Davidson argues that the only way to reconcile these principles is to accept that mental events are physical events (satisfying the first two principles) but that their mental descriptions are not lawfully connected to their physical descriptions (satisfying the third). This leads to the doctrine of "token identity" rather than type identity.

Criticisms and responses

A major criticism, termed the "problem of mental causation" or "exclusion argument", was advanced by philosophers like Jaegwon Kim. They argue that if mental properties are not lawfully connected to physical properties, they become causally inert "epiphenomena", threatening the reality of mental causation. Another line of attack questions the coherence of the three principles, with critics like Ted Honderich challenging the nomological character of causality. Davidson and his defenders, such as Ernest Lepore, responded by elaborating on the role of causal explanation versus causal relation, and by appealing to a holistic constitutive ideal of rationality that governs the mental realm. Further debates concern the theory's compatibility with functionalism and its handling of qualia.

Relation to other theories

Anomalous monism is a foundational position within non-reductive physicalism, contrasting sharply with eliminative materialism advocated by Paul Churchland and reductive physicalism found in some versions of functionalism. It shares a commitment to physical ontology with biological naturalism but diverges in its explanatory claims. The theory influenced subsequent developments like John McDowell's work in Mind and World and Daniel Dennett's intentional stance, while also serving as a critical target for proponents of property dualism like David Chalmers. Its approach to interpretation connects it to broader projects in the philosophy of language and action theory.