Generated by DeepSeek V3.2| Taft–Hartley Act | |
|---|---|
| Shorttitle | Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 |
| Othershorttitles | Taft–Hartley Act |
| Enacted by | 80th |
| Effective date | June 23, 1947 |
| Cite public law | 80-101 |
| Acts amended | National Labor Relations Act |
| Title amended | 29 |
| Introducedin | House |
| Introducedby | Fred A. Hartley Jr. (R–NJ) |
| Committees | House Education and Labor |
| Passedbody1 | House |
| Passeddate1 | April 17, 1947 |
| Passedvote1 | 308–107 |
| Passedbody2 | Senate |
| Passeddate2 | May 13, 1947 |
| Passedvote2 | 68–24 |
| Passedbody6 | House |
| Passeddate6 | June 4, 1947 |
| Passedvote6 | 320–79 |
| Passedbody7 | Senate |
| Passeddate7 | June 6, 1947 |
| Passedvote7 | 54–17 |
| Vetoedpresident | Harry S. Truman |
| Vetoeddate | June 20, 1947 |
| Overriddenbody1 | House |
| Overriddendate1 | June 20, 1947 |
| Overriddenvote1 | 331–83 |
| Overriddenbody2 | Senate |
| Overriddendate2 | June 23, 1947 |
| Overriddenvote2 | 68–25 |
Taft–Hartley Act, formally the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, is a major United States federal law that significantly amended the pro-union Wagner Act of 1935. Enacted over the veto of President Harry S. Truman, it was designed to rebalance the legal relationship between employers, labor unions, and individual workers following a wave of post-World War II strikes. The legislation introduced new restrictions on union activities, expanded employer rights, and established mechanisms for government intervention in labor disputes, marking a pivotal shift in American labor policy.
The immediate catalyst for the legislation was the unprecedented strike wave of 1945–1946, which involved over five million workers in key industries like steel, automobile manufacturing, and rail transport. Major work stoppages, such as those led by the United Steelworkers and the United Automobile Workers, created public anxiety and fueled political arguments that the Wagner Act had given unions excessive power. The Republican Party, which gained control of both chambers of the United States Congress in the 1946 elections, made labor law reform a top priority. The bill was crafted by Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio and Representative Fred A. Hartley Jr. of New Jersey, passing both the United States Senate and the United States House of Representatives with substantial bipartisan support despite strong opposition from the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations.
The act created a series of "unfair labor practices" for unions, mirroring those previously applied only to employers under the Wagner Act. It prohibited jurisdictional strikes, secondary boycotts, and "featherbedding" (demanding pay for unneeded work). It also outlawed the closed shop, while permitting union shop agreements only if a majority of employees voted for them. The law empowered the President of the United States to seek an 80-day injunction to cool off strikes deemed to imperil national health or safety, a provision first invoked by President Truman during the 1952 steel strike. Furthermore, it required union officers to file non-communist affidavits with the National Labor Relations Board and allowed states to pass right-to-work laws under Section 14(b).
The new restrictions curtailed several effective union tactics for leveraging negotiations, particularly the secondary boycott, which had been used to pressure companies doing business with a primary employer. The requirement for union leaders to sign anti-communist affidavits triggered internal purges within many unions, notably affecting the leadership of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union and the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America. The authorization for right-to-work laws, first adopted by states like Florida and Texas, led to lower union density in those regions by allowing employees in unionized workplaces to opt out of paying dues. Overall, the act institutionalized a more adversarial and legally complex framework for collective bargaining.
President Truman denounced it as a "slave-labor bill" and vetoed it, but Congress overrode his veto with the support of many members of the Democratic Party from the Southern United States. Organized labor, led by figures like Walter Reuther of the UAW and Philip Murray of the United Steelworkers, launched an aggressive but unsuccessful campaign for its repeal, making it a central issue in the 1948 United States presidential election. The Supreme Court of the United States upheld the law's core provisions in cases like American Communications Ass'n v. Douds (1950). The act fundamentally realigned the political landscape, cementing labor's alliance with the Democratic Party while galvanizing business support for the Republicans.
The act has been amended several times, most significantly by the Landrum–Griffin Act of 1959, which further regulated internal union affairs and closed loopholes related to secondary boycotts. Its emergency dispute provisions have been invoked over three dozen times by presidents from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Joe Biden. The law's legacy is deeply contested; proponents argue it restored balance to labor relations and protected individual worker rights, while critics contend it began the long-term decline of the American labor movement by hampering organizing and collective power. Its framework continues to govern most private-sector labor relations in the United States.
Category:United States federal labor legislation Category:1947 in American law Category:80th United States Congress