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Sherbert v. Verner

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Sherbert v. Verner
LitigantsSherbert v. Verner
ArgueDateApril 24
ArgueYear1963
DecideDateJune 17
DecideYear1963
FullNameAdell H. Sherbert, Appellant v. Verner et al., Members of South Carolina Employment Security Commission, et al.
Citations374 U.S. 398
PriorAppeal from the Supreme Court of South Carolina
HoldingThe denial of unemployment benefits to a Seventh-day Adventist for refusing to work on her Sabbath violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
SCOTUS1962-1965
MajorityBrennan
JoinMajorityWarren, Black, Clark, Goldberg
ConcurrenceDouglas
Concurrence2Stewart
DissentHarlan
JoinDissentWhite
LawsAppliedU.S. Const. amend. I; South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act

Sherbert v. Verner was a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that significantly expanded protections for religious liberty under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The case centered on Adell Sherbert, a Seventh-day Adventist who was denied unemployment benefits by the South Carolina Employment Security Commission after she refused to accept work requiring labor on her Sabbath. In a 7–2 ruling, the Court established a stringent legal test, requiring the government to demonstrate a "compelling state interest" for any law that substantially burdens the free exercise of religion.

Background and facts

Adell Sherbert, a textile mill worker in South Carolina, was discharged when her employer adopted a six-day workweek that included Saturday. As a devout member of the Seventh-day Adventist faith, her religious convictions forbade work from sunset on Friday to sunset on Saturday. She sought unemployment compensation under the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act, but her claim was denied by the South Carolina Employment Security Commission. The Commission ruled she had failed, without good cause, to accept "suitable work" offered to her, a decision upheld by the South Carolina Supreme Court. Sherbert appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, arguing the denial violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Supreme Court decision

The Court reversed the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court in a 7–2 decision issued on June 17, 1963. The majority held that the state's denial of benefits imposed a significant burden on Sherbert's ability to freely exercise her religion. The ruling established that a government may only enforce a law that incidentally burdens religious practice if it can show the law is justified by a "compelling state interest" and is the least restrictive means of achieving that interest. This decision marked a departure from earlier precedent, such as Braunfeld v. Brown, and applied a much stricter standard of review to free exercise claims.

Majority opinion

Justice William J. Brennan Jr. delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justices Hugo Black, Tom C. Clark, and Arthur Goldberg. Brennan wrote that forcing Sherbert to choose between following her religious tenets and forfeiting state benefits, or abandoning her faith to accept work, placed "the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship." The opinion found no compelling state interest advanced by denying her benefits, as granting them would not create an "administrative problem of such magnitude" or open the door to "fraudulent claims." The state's interest in maintaining the financial stability of its unemployment compensation fund was insufficient to override a fundamental constitutional right.

Dissenting opinions

Justice John Marshall Harlan II, joined by Justice Byron White, authored the primary dissent. Harlan argued that the Court's decision effectively required South Carolina to single out religious reasons for refusing work for favorable treatment, thereby violating the Establishment Clause by advancing religion. He contended the state's law was religion-neutral and the burden on Sherbert was an indirect consequence of a valid, secular regulatory program. The dissent warned that the "compelling interest" test would lead the judiciary into "an area of constitutionally unmanageable problems," essentially requiring courts to weigh the significance of all religious claims against state interests.

Impact and legacy

The decision in this case established the "Sherbert Test," a rigorous standard that dominated Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence for nearly three decades. It was a foundational precedent for subsequent rulings protecting religious conduct, including Wisconsin v. Yoder, which exempted Old Order Amish children from compulsory school attendance laws. The "compelling interest" standard was significantly curtailed by the Court in Employment Division v. Smith (1990), which held that neutral laws of general applicability need not satisfy the test. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 was a direct congressional response to *Smith*, seeking to statutorily reinstate the *Sherbert* test for federal actions, a move later upheld in cases like Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal. The case remains a pivotal reference point in ongoing legal debates over religious accommodation, civil liberties, and the balance between government authority and individual conscience. Category:United States Free Exercise Clause case law Category:United States Supreme Court cases Category:1963 in United States case law