Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.

Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.
Litigants	Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.
ArgueDate	April 1–2
DecideDate	June 17, 1968
FullName	Joseph Lee Jones and Barbara Jo Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.
Citations	392 U.S. 409 (1968)
Holding	42 U.S.C. § 1982, derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, prohibits all racial discrimination, private or public, in the sale or rental of property.
SCOTUS	1967–1969
Majority	Stewart
JoinMajority	Warren, Douglas, Brennan, White, Marshall
Concurrence	Douglas
Concurrence2	Harlan
LawsApplied	42 U.S.C. § 1982; Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. was a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that expansively interpreted federal power to combat private racial discrimination in housing. The ruling held that a Reconstruction-era statute, originally the Civil Rights Act of 1866, barred racial discrimination in all real estate transactions, whether conducted by private individuals or state actors. This 7–2 decision, authored by Justice Potter Stewart, revitalized a century-old law and provided a powerful legal tool against housing segregation just weeks after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.

Background and legal context

The legal foundation of the case was the post-American Civil War effort by the Radical Republicans in the United States Congress to secure the rights of newly freed African Americans. This effort produced the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which was subsequently re-codified as Section 1982 of Title 42 of the United States Code. For decades, following decisions like the Civil Rights Cases of 1883, the prevailing judicial interpretation held that the Fourteenth Amendment and its enabling statutes only prohibited discrimination by state governments, not private parties. This "state action" doctrine had severely limited the reach of federal civil rights law, leaving private acts of discrimination largely unaddressed until the mid-20th century.

Facts of the case

In 1965, Joseph Lee Jones and his wife, Barbara Jo Jones, an African American couple, attempted to purchase a home in the Paddock Woods subdivision of St. Louis County, Missouri. The developer, the Alfred H. Mayer Company, refused to sell them a lot solely on the basis of Mr. Jones's race. The Joneses filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1982. The District Court dismissed the complaint, and its decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, both courts adhering to the traditional view that the statute did not apply to purely private discrimination.

Supreme Court decision

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to reconsider the scope of the Reconstruction-era statute. In a decisive ruling, the Court reversed the lower courts, holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 was a valid exercise of congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment to eliminate the "badges and incidents of slavery." The Court concluded that the statute therefore barred **all** racial discrimination in property sales, explicitly overruling its prior narrower interpretations and rejecting the requirement for state action in this context.

Majority opinion

Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion for the seven-justice majority. Stewart's opinion engaged in a detailed historical analysis of the 39th Congress and the intent behind the Civil Rights Act of 1866. He argued that Congress, empowered by the Thirteenth Amendment, had the authority to pass laws eradicating all tangible forms of racial inequality associated with the institution of slavery. The Court found that the right to "inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property" free from racial discrimination was a fundamental aspect of the freedom guaranteed by the amendment, and that Congress had clearly intended the 1866 Act to protect that right from both public and private interference.

Concurring and dissenting opinions

Justice William O. Douglas filed a concurring opinion, emphasizing his view that the Thirteenth Amendment was a direct and plenary grant of power to Congress to eliminate all remnants of slavery. Justice John M. Harlan II, joined by Justice White, dissented. Harlan argued that the majority's interpretation was anachronistic and legislated from the bench, contending that the 1866 statute was never intended to cover private conduct and that such a significant expansion of law should be left to the modern United States Congress, which was, coincidentally, in the process of debating the Fair Housing Act.

Impact and legacy

The decision in *Jones* had an immediate and profound impact on American civil rights law. It provided a robust federal cause of action against private housing discrimination just two months after the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. and the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (the Fair Housing Act). The ruling breathed new life into the Civil Rights Act of 1866, paving the way for its subsequent use in other contexts, such as employment discrimination in *Runyon v. McCrary* (1976). By anchoring the prohibition in the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court established a constitutional basis for Congress to regulate private conduct to eradicate racial discrimination, a principle that continues to influence civil rights jurisprudence.

Category:United States Supreme Court cases Category:United States civil rights case law Category:1968 in United States case law Category:Housing in the United States