Felix Frankfurter

Felix Frankfurter
Harris & Ewing, photographer · Public domain · source
Name	Felix Frankfurter
Caption	Frankfurter c. 1939
Office	Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
Nominator	Franklin D. Roosevelt
Term start	January 30, 1939
Term end	August 28, 1962
Predecessor	Benjamin N. Cardozo
Successor	Arthur Goldberg
Birth date	15 November 1882
Birth place	Vienna, Austria-Hungary
Death date	22 February 1965
Death place	Washington, D.C., U.S.
Education	City College of New York (BA), Harvard Law School (LLB)
Spouse	Marion Denman, 1919, 1965

Felix Frankfurter. Felix Frankfurter was an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States from 1939 to 1962, appointed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. A key figure in 20th-century American law, his jurisprudence, rooted in judicial restraint and a deep respect for established legal procedure, significantly shaped the Court's approach during the nascent stages of the modern Civil Rights Movement. His complex legacy in civil rights reflects a profound belief in incremental legal change and deference to legislative and executive authority, often placing him at odds with more activist justices on the Court.

Early Life and Education

Felix Frankfurter was born in 1882 in Vienna, then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and immigrated to the United States with his family at age twelve. He grew up in New York City and attended the City College of New York, graduating in 1902. He then attended Harvard Law School, where he excelled and became deeply influenced by the scholarly rigor and emphasis on common law tradition. His academic performance caught the attention of professors like John Henry Wigmore and Samuel Williston, and he graduated at the top of his class in 1906. This formative education instilled in him a lifelong reverence for the Anglo-American legal system and the institutional role of the courts.

Legal Career and Academic Influence

After law school, Frankfurter worked briefly at a prestigious New York City law firm before serving as an assistant to Henry L. Stimson, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York. He followed Stimson to Washington, D.C., serving in the Taft administration and developing expertise in administrative law. In 1914, he joined the faculty of Harvard Law School, where he became a renowned professor and influential mentor to a generation of lawyers and future public servants. During the New Deal era, he was a close advisor to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, though he declined a formal position, preferring his academic perch. He was also a co-founder of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and was involved in high-profile cases like the defense of Sacco and Vanzetti, showcasing an early commitment to civil liberties.

Appointment to the Supreme Court

President Franklin D. Roosevelt nominated Frankfurter to the Supreme Court in 1939 to fill the seat vacated by the death of Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo. His nomination was supported by many liberals who saw him as a stalwart defender of New Deal legislation. He was confirmed by the United States Senate with little opposition and took his judicial oath in January 1939. His appointment was expected to solidify a progressive bloc on the Court, but his judicial philosophy would soon reveal a more complex and restrained approach to constitutional interpretation.

Jurisprudence and Civil Rights Stances

Justice Frankfurter's jurisprudence was defined by a philosophy of judicial restraint, federalism, and a strict adherence to legal procedure. He believed the Court should defer to the political branches—the Congress and the President—and to state governments, except in the clearest cases of constitutional violation. On civil rights, this often translated to caution. While he personally abhorred racial discrimination, he frequently argued that the Court should not lead social change, believing such progress must come from the democratic process. He was skeptical of using the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to incorporate the Bill of Rights against the states, a view that placed him in dissent during the expansion of federal protections for individual rights.

Key Opinions on Civil Liberties

Frankfurter authored several significant opinions that reflected his restrained philosophy. In Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940), he wrote the majority opinion upholding mandatory flag salutes in public schools, a decision later overturned in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943), where he authored a passionate dissent defending legislative authority. In Colegrove v. Green (1946), his plurality opinion deemed legislative apportionment a "political thicket" unsuitable for judicial intervention, a stance later rejected in Baker v. Carr (1962). However, he joined the unanimous Court in Brown v. Board of Education (1954), which declared public school segregation unconstitutional. He urged Chief Justice Earl Warren to proceed with caution and emphasize gradual implementation, influencing the "all deliberate speed" decree.

Relationship with the Civil Rights Movement

Frankfurter's relationship with the burgeoning Civil Rights Movement was characterized by intellectual support but judicial caution. He mentored key legal figures like Thurgood Marshall and supported the litigation strategy of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. However, on the bench, he often favored procedural grounds over broad constitutional pronouncements. He concurred in results that advanced civil rights, such as in Shelley v. Kraemer (1948) which struck down racially restrictive covenants, but typically on narrower legal reasoning. His insistence on deference to state authority sometimes put him at odds with colleagues like Hugo Black and William O. Douglas, who advocated for a more active judicial role in protecting equality and free speech.

Later Years and Legacy

Felix Frankfurter served on the Supreme Court for 23 years until a stroke in 1962 forced his retirement. He was succeeded by Justice Arthur Goldberg. He died in Washington, D.C. in 1965. His legacy is that of a brilliant legal mind who championed judicial modesty and institutional stability. While some critics argue his restraint delayed full judicial protection for civil rights, his emphasis on process, federalism, and the limits of judicial power remains a powerful and enduring conservative influence in American constitutional law. His extensive papers and teachings continue to be studied for their deep insight into mid-20th-century legal thought and the internal dynamics of the Warren Court.