Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee

Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee
Litigants	Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee
ArgueDate	March 2, 2021
DecideDate	July 1, 2021
FullName	Mark Brnovich, Attorney General of Arizona, et al. v. Democratic National Committee, et al.
Citations	594 U.S. ___ (2021)
Prior	Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2020); cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 973 (2021).
Holding	The challenged Arizona voting provisions did not violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The Court articulated a totality-of-the-circumstances test that gives substantial deference to state interests in election administration.
SCOTUS	2020
Majority	Alito
JoinMajority	Roberts, Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett
Dissent	Breyer
JoinDissent	Sotomayor, Kagan
LawsApplied	Voting Rights Act of 1965; U.S. Constitution

Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee was a landmark 2021 decision of the Supreme Court of the United States concerning the interpretation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The case centered on the legality of two Arizona election policies: a prohibition on ballot collection by third parties and a requirement to discard ballots cast in the wrong precinct. The Court's ruling, which upheld the state laws, significantly reshaped the legal landscape for voting rights claims, emphasizing state sovereignty in election administration and marking a pivotal moment in the ongoing national debate over election integrity and access.

Background and legal context

The legal dispute originated from challenges filed by the Democratic National Committee and other groups against two specific provisions of Arizona election law. The first provision, often referred to as the "ballot collection" or "ballot harvesting" law, made it a felony for anyone other than a family member, caregiver, or postal worker to collect and deliver another person's completed early ballot. The second provision required election officials to wholly discard, or "throw out," ballots cast in-person at a precinct other than the one to which the voter was assigned. These laws were passed by the Republican-controlled Arizona Legislature and signed by then-Governor Jan Brewer.

The plaintiffs argued that these laws disproportionately burdened minority voters, including Native American, Hispanic, and African American voters, in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Section 2 prohibits any voting practice that results in a denial or abridgement of the right to vote on account of race or color. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals initially agreed, finding that the laws had a discriminatory impact and were enacted with discriminatory intent, linking them to a history of racial discrimination in the state. Arizona Attorney General Mark Brnovich appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court proceedings

The case, consolidated with a related case, *Arizona Republican Party v. Democratic National Committee*, was argued before the Supreme Court on March 2, 2021. The central question presented was whether Arizona's ballot-collection restriction and out-of-precinct policy violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The Biden administration, through the Solicitor General, filed a brief urging the Court to reverse the Ninth Circuit's ruling. The proceedings occurred in the shadow of the contentious 2020 presidential election and intense national focus on election rules.

Majority opinion and reasoning

In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Samuel Alito, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and upheld the Arizona provisions. The majority articulated a new, restrictive framework for evaluating Section 2 claims involving "usual burdens of voting." Justice Alito's opinion established five "guideposts" for courts to consider in a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis: (1) the size of the burden imposed, (2) the degree to which a voting rule departs from standard practice when it was adopted, (3) the size of any racial disparities in impact, (4) the opportunities provided by a state's entire election system, and (5) the state's interests served by the challenged rule.

The Court gave significant weight to Arizona's stated interests in preventing voter fraud and promoting confidence in election results. It found the burden imposed by the out-of-precinct policy minimal, as the state offered other ways to vote, including early voting and mail-in ballots. On ballot collection, the Court deferred to the state legislature's judgment that the practice could lead to coercion or fraud. The opinion also noted that the mere existence of some racial disparity in effect does not alone establish a Section 2 violation, requiring a searching analysis of all circumstances.

Dissenting opinions

Justice Stephen Breyer authored the principal dissent, joined by Justices Elena Kagan and Sonia Sotomayor. The dissent argued that the majority's new test "undermines Section 2 and the right it provides" by weakening the law's core protections against discriminatory results. The dissenters contended that the Arizona laws imposed substantial burdens on minority voters, citing evidence that Native American voters often lacked reliable mail service and transportation, making ballot collection a practical necessity. They also highlighted that voters in minority communities were more frequently assigned to incorrect precincts due to frequent redistricting.

Justice Kagan filed a separate, forceful dissent, criticizing the majority for "yet again" rewriting the Voting Rights Act of 1965, a law she described as "the Nation's premier civil rights statute." She argued the decision ignored Congress's intent to eradicate voting discrimination and would greenlight a new generation of restrictive voting laws. The dissenting opinions framed the ruling as a major setback for the Civil Rights Movement's legacy of securing equal access to the ballot.

Impact on voting rights and the Civil Rights Movement

The *Brnovich* decision had an immediate and profound impact on voting rights litigation and the legal strategy of the Civil Rights Movement. By establishing a more deferential standard for evaluating state election laws, the ruling made it significantly more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in challenging laws under Section 2. The decision empowered state legislatures, particularly those controlled by the Republican Party, to enact new voting restrictions with greater legal confidence. It marked a judicial shift from the Warren Court era's expansive view of voting rights toward a framework prioritizing state autonomy and a narrow construction of federal anti-discrimination statutes. Civil rights organizations like the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the American Civil Liberties Union warned that the ruling gutted a key tool for combating modern-day barriers to voting.

Subsequent legal and political developments

In the wake of *Brnovich*, numerous states passed or proposed laws imposing new restrictions on voting methods, including stricter voter identification requirements, limitations on mail-in and early voting, and further bans on ballot collection. The decision directly influenced the legal defense of these laws in subsequent cases. For instance, its reasoning was cited in challenges to uphold Georgia's 2021 election law. The ruling also shifted the focus of voting rights advocates toward Congress, leading to renewed but ultimately unsuccessful efforts to pass the John R. Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act, which sought to restore and strengthen parts of the Voting Rights Act.

The *Brnovich* framework continues to govern Section 2 litigation. Lower courts have applied its "guideposts," often finding that plaintiffs cannot meet the high bar it set for proving a discriminatory result. The decision stands as a cornerstone of the current Supreme Court's jurisprudence on federalism and election law, representing a significant judicial endorsement of the principle that states have broad constitutional authority to regulate the "times, places, and manner" of elections under Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution.