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| "Europe First" strategy | |
|---|---|
| Name | "Europe First" strategy |
| Date | 1941–1945 |
| Place | Europe, Atlantic, Mediterranean, North Africa, Pacific |
| Result | Allied victory in Europe; continued Pacific campaigns |
"Europe First" strategy
The "Europe First" strategy was the grand strategy adopted by the principal Allied leaders including Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin during the Second World War to prioritize the defeat of Nazi Germany and the Axis Powers in Europe before concentrating maximum resources on the Empire of Japan. Formulated after the Entry of the United States into World War II and debated at high-level conferences such as Casablanca Conference, Tehran Conference, and the Yalta Conference, it shaped operations across the European Theater, the Mediterranean Theater, and the Atlantic Ocean while influencing strategy in the Pacific War.
The origins trace to prewar planning by staff such as the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Soviet General Staff amid crises like the Fall of France and the Battle of Britain. After the Attack on Pearl Harbor, leaders including Harry S. Truman's predecessor Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill coordinated with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and representatives like George C. Marshall and Alan Brooke to settle priorities at meetings including Arcadia Conference and Casablanca Conference. Strategic influences included lessons from World War I campaigns such as the Battle of the Somme and interwar doctrines advocated by theorists like J.F.C. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart.
Planners argued that defeating Adolf Hitler's regime and eliminating the Wehrmacht would prevent German consolidation of continental resources and protect supply lines across the Atlantic Ocean. Objectives included opening a Western front via amphibious operations, relieving pressure on the Red Army, and securing maritime routes threatened by German U-boat campaigns and the Battle of the Atlantic. Political aims involved restoring liberated states such as France, Belgium, and Netherlands and preparing for postwar settlements affecting institutions like the United Nations and agreements forged at the Yalta Conference and Potsdam Conference.
Implementation required coordination among commands such as Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, Allied Expeditionary Force (Mediterranean), United States European Command, and Soviet theater commands. Joint planning bodies included the Combined Chiefs of Staff and liaison between personalities like Eisenhower, Bernard Montgomery, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Omar Bradley, and Georgy Zhukov. Resource allocation debates involved the Lend-Lease Act recipients, Convoy system escorts involving the Royal Navy and United States Navy, and logistics hubs like Gibraltar, Suez Canal, and Murmansk. Conferences at Casablanca, Tehran Conference, and Quebec Conference set timetables culminating in operations like Operation Torch and Operation Overlord.
Major campaigns reflecting the strategy included the North African Campaign, Italian Campaign, the Normandy landings, and the Western Allied invasion of Germany. Key operations included Operation Torch, Operation Husky, Operation Avalanche, Operation Overlord, Operation Market Garden, and the Battle of the Bulge. Naval and air campaigns such as the Battle of the Atlantic, Allied bombing offensive including the Combined Bomber Offensive, and interdiction efforts like the Ardennes Counteroffensive supported the main continental thrusts. Coordination with the Soviet Union produced simultaneous engagements on the Eastern Front including battles like Stalingrad and Kursk that fixed German forces.
Politically, the strategy shaped relations among United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union leaders and influenced postwar settlement discussions at Yalta Conference and Potsdam Conference. It affected the fate of occupied states including Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, and raised tensions over spheres of influence that later contributed to the Cold War rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union. Diplomatic instruments included summitry at Tehran Conference, Quebec Conference, and arrangements such as the Lend-Lease Act and the Atlantic Charter.
Critics—ranging from proponents of a Germany First variant to advocates for intensified operations in the Pacific Theater like island hopping supporters and commanders such as Chester W. Nimitz—argued the emphasis prolonged suffering in areas under Imperial Japan and delayed decisive action against Japan's holdings captured at Pearl Harbor. Some historians and military leaders promoted alternatives like a more aggressive early cross-Channel invasion in 1942 or prioritizing the China Burma India Theater under leaders including Joseph Stilwell and Claire Lee Chennault. Debates also engaged figures such as Charles de Gaulle and King George VI about liberation timing for France and colonial adjustments.
Historians have assessed the strategy's success in the context of Allied victory in Europe and the subsequent order shaped by the United Nations, NATO, and institutions born from wartime diplomacy. Scholarly work considers archives from British War Cabinet, United States National Archives, and Russian State Archive and analyses by historians such as A.J.P. Taylor, William L. Shirer, John Keegan, Richard Overy, and Gerhard Weinberg. Debates continue over causation and contingency, with reinterpretations focusing on logistics, intelligence from Ultra (cryptanalysis), industrial mobilization in the United States, and Soviet contributions on the Eastern Front. The strategy's imprint persists in studies of coalition warfare, grand strategy, and 20th-century international order.
Category:Strategies of World War II