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| US Army II Field Force, Vietnam | |
|---|---|
| Unit name | II Field Force, Vietnam |
| Caption | Shoulder sleeve insignia |
| Dates | 1966–1971 |
| Country | United States |
| Branch | United States Army |
| Type | Field corps |
| Role | Corps-level command in Vietnam War |
| Garrison | Long Binh Post |
| Notable commanders | William R. Peers, Frederick C. Weyand |
US Army II Field Force, Vietnam II Field Force, Vietnam served as a corps-level headquarters of the United States Army during the Vietnam War, responsible for large-scale operations in III Corps Tactical Zone and portions of III Corps. Established to coordinate multiple divisions, brigades, and allied formations, II Field Force provided operational control, logistics, and intelligence for campaigns around Saigon, Long Binh, and the Central Highlands. It functioned alongside other corps-level and theater commands such as Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), U.S. Army Vietnam (USARV), and corps equivalents like I Corps and III Corps.
II Field Force, Vietnam was created to streamline command and control of U.S. combat power in III Corps Tactical Zone and adjacent areas, integrating units from the 101st Airborne Division, 1st Infantry Division, 9th Infantry Division, and other formations. It coordinated joint and combined operations with allied formations including the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, Australian Army, and Republic of Korea Armed Forces. Under the broader direction of MACV, II Field Force managed operational planning, logistics at Long Binh, and the conduct of large-scale offensives such as the Tet Offensive counteroperations and later pacification efforts.
Activated in 1966 at Long Binh Post as II Field Force, Vietnam, the headquarters consolidated command previously exercised by various provisional and field commands. Its establishment followed expansions of U.S. ground presence after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident escalation and administrative reorganizations influenced by commanders such as William Westmoreland. The organization mirrored a corps headquarters in structure, with sections for G-1 through G-4 staff functions, an operations center, an intelligence cell liaising with Central Intelligence Agency assets and Defense Intelligence Agency detachments, and integrated artillery, aviation, and sustainment elements. II Field Force also hosted subordinate logistical nodes tied to Long Binh Depot and coordinated with theater-level assets including U.S. Army Pacific lines of communication.
II Field Force directed operations from mid-1966 through early 1971, supervising multi-division maneuvers, search-and-destroy missions, and security operations for critical lines of communication into Saigon. The headquarters planned and executed operations such as Operation Junction City, counterinsurgency actions during the Tet Offensive, and later mobile operations responding to the Easter Offensive precursors. II Field Force coordinated with aviation brigades like the 1st Aviation Brigade (United States) and artillery groups including 54th Artillery Group to provide fire support and air mobility for maneuver formations. Intelligence cooperation occurred with units such as MACV-SOG and with allied liaison teams from Australian Army Training Team Vietnam.
II Field Force elements participated in or supported principal campaigns including Operation Harvest Moon, Operation Masher/White Wing, Operation Attleboro, and the previously mentioned Operation Junction City, one of the largest airborne and airmobile operations of the war. During the Tet Offensive of 1968, II Field Force units fought in defense of Saigon, coordinated with III Marine Amphibious Force elements and helped retake urban areas seized by Viet Cong and People's Army of Vietnam units. In 1969–1970, II Field Force oversaw units involved in counteroffensive operations including Operation Toan Thang I and follow-on operations aimed at interdicting enemy logistics along the Ho Chi Minh Trail branches feeding III Corps. It also supported civil-military operations and pacification programs tied to Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support efforts.
Notable commanders included Lieutenant General Frederick C. Weyand, who later became Chief of Staff of the United States Army, and Lieutenant General William R. Peers, known for conducting the Peers Commission investigation into My Lai Massacre. Other commanders and senior staff officers rotated through the headquarters, linking II Field Force to senior theater leadership such as General Creighton Abrams and subordinate division commanders drawn from formations like the 25th Infantry Division (United States).
Throughout its existence II Field Force exercised operational control over a shifting order of battle that frequently included: - Divisions: 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 1st Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division (United States), 9th Infantry Division (United States), 101st Airborne Division (elements), and other corps-assigned divisions. - Brigades and separate units: 199th Light Infantry Brigade (United States), 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, aviation units such as the 11th Aerial Rocket Artillery, and artillery groups like the 108th Artillery Group. - Support and specialized formations: 1st Logistics Command, medical units from 44th Medical Brigade, military police companies, and signal units providing communications to bases including Bien Hoa Air Base and Long Binh Post. Allied and ARVN units routinely operated in conjunction with II Field Force, including ARVN III Corps elements, Republic of Korea Tiger Division, and Australian/New Zealander units under combined operational arrangements.
II Field Force was inactivated in 1971 as part of the U.S. drawdown under Vietnamization policies and the reduction of U.S. ground forces directed by successive administrations and agreements such as the Paris Peace Accords. Its deactivation reflected the transfer of responsibilities to ARVN III Corps and the restructuring of U.S. command relationships in Southeast Asia. Historians and participants evaluate II Field Force's legacy in terms of operational innovation in airmobile warfare, coordination of combined arms in counterinsurgency, and its role in major engagements that influenced U.S. military doctrine, including lessons adopted by United States Army Training and Doctrine Command and reflected in postwar analyses by institutions such as the Center of Military History (United States Army). The dissolution also marked the closure of major U.S. logistical hubs like Long Binh Post and reshaped regional security dynamics in South Vietnam.
Category:United States Army units and formations in the Vietnam War