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| Town of Greece v. Galloway | |
|---|---|
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| Case name | Town of Greece v. Galloway |
| Litigants | Town of Greece; Mary E. Galloway et al. |
| Decided | May 5, 2014 |
| Citations | 572 U.S. 565 (2014) |
| Docket | 12-696 |
| Holding | Legislative prayer practice in town meetings did not violate the Establishment Clause where prayers were noncoercive and practices tolerated nonsectarian and sectarian references. |
| Majority | Kennedy |
| Joinmajority | Roberts, Scalia, Alito, Kagan |
| Dissent | Kagan (in part), Breyer (in part), Sotomayor, Ginsburg (dissent) |
| Laws applied | First Amendment, Establishment Clause |
Town of Greece v. Galloway
Town of Greece v. Galloway is a 2014 United States Supreme Court decision addressing legislative prayer practices under the First Amendment First Amendment and the Establishment Clause. The Court held that prayer at local legislative meetings is permissible when it follows historical practices traceable to Founding Fathers and conforms with precedents such as Marsh v. Chambers and Lynch v. Donnelly. The case prompted debate among scholars, legislators, civil liberties groups, and faith organizations including the American Civil Liberties Union, Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Alliance Defending Freedom, and American Humanist Association.
In 1999 the Town of Greece began inviting local clergy to deliver invocations before town board meetings, a practice that continued into the early 2010s and included ministers from Catholic parishes, Protestant churches, evangelical congregations, and occasional representatives from other traditions. Plaintiffs Mary E. Galloway and others, associated with secular groups and private citizens, challenged the practice under the First Amendment citing precedents including Engel v. Vitale and Lee v. Weisman. The dispute reflected tensions evident in controversies such as the Pledge of Allegiance litigations and disputes over prayer in legislative bodies from the United States Senate to state legislatures like the New York State Assembly.
The United States District Court for the Western District of New York ruled for the Town, applying the historical test from Marsh v. Chambers and emphasizing tradition. The case proceeded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which reversed, finding the town's practice impermissibly sectarian and coercive under precedents including Lee v. Weisman and invoking concerns raised in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter. Prominent amici supporting the Town included the National Conference of State Legislatures and the Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty, while amici supporting the challengers included the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Humanist Association.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard arguments involving advocates such as attorneys from the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty and Solicitor General of the United States amicus briefs referencing cases like Oral Arguments and academic commentary from scholars at Harvard Law School and Yale Law School. In a 5–4 opinion authored by Anthony Kennedy, the Court reversed the Second Circuit, holding that the Town’s practice did not violate the Establishment Clause because legislative prayer is part of the Nation’s fabric and consistent with Marsh v. Chambers. The plurality addressed coercion and cited standards discussed in Lee v. Weisman and County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, while concurrences and dissents involved Justices Antonin Scalia, John Roberts, Samuel Alito, Elena Kagan, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Stephen Breyer.
The majority relied on historical practice traced to the First Continental Congress and legislative prayer at the federal level, invoking the precedent of Marsh v. Chambers which upheld Nebraska Legislature chaplaincies. The Court applied a two-part focus: history and coercion, examining whether invocations coerced participation or denigrated minorities, drawing on coercion analysis from Lee v. Weisman and endorsement tests articulated in Lynch v. Donnelly and County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter. The majority emphasized that neither sectarian references nor promotion of particular creeds automatically rendered practices unconstitutional, distinguishing cases such as Engel v. Vitale and Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe where coercion in school contexts produced different outcomes. Justice Kagan wrote a concurring opinion noting historical grounding, while Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor dissented arguing that the Town’s pattern effectively excluded non-Christians and imposed religious observance incompatible with Establishment Clause protections.
Scholars at institutions including Stanford Law School, Columbia Law School, University of Chicago Law School, and think tanks such as the Brookings Institution and Heritage Foundation circulated analyses interpreting the opinion’s implications for state and local bodies. Religious organizations including the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops and National Association of Evangelicals praised the decision, while civil liberties organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union and Americans United for Separation of Church and State criticized it. Legislatures and municipal councils in jurisdictions from California to Texas reviewed invocation practices, and subsequent litigation in circuits such as the Ninth Circuit and Fourth Circuit invoked the Town of Greece precedent when adjudicating similar disputes involving bodies like the City of Granite City and county boards.
The decision reaffirmed the role of history in Establishment Clause jurisprudence alongside coercion and endorsement considerations, influencing later cases addressing prayer, religious displays, and government accommodation, and shaping scholarship at Georgetown University Law Center and New York University School of Law. It has been cited in lower court opinions on legislative chaplaincies, city council invocations, and county board practices, and remains a touchstone in debates over the boundaries between religious liberty and secular protections exemplified by controversies like the Pledge of Allegiance and disputes over religious symbols such as those in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District litigation. Critics argue it permits exclusionary practices, while proponents contend it preserves historical traditions of public prayer.