Third Battle of Gaza

Third Battle of Gaza
Conflict	Third Battle of Gaza
Partof	Sinai and Palestine Campaign
Date	1–7 November 1917
Place	Gaza and environs, Palestine
Result	British Empire victory; Ottoman withdrawal to Beersheba
Combatant1	United Kingdom; Egyptian Expeditionary Force; British Empire
Combatant2	Ottoman Empire; Yildirim Army Group
Commander1	Edward Bulfin; Archibald Murray; Philip Chetwode; Henry Wilson; Edmund Allenby
Commander2	Fakhri Pasha; Kress von Kressenstein; Jevdet Bey
Strength1	70,000–100,000
Strength2	30,000–50,000

Third Battle of Gaza The Third Battle of Gaza (1–7 November 1917) was a decisive action in the Sinai and Palestine Campaign during World War I that broke the Ottoman defensive line at Gaza and led to the British occupation of Beersheba and the advance into southern Palestine. The operation featured coordinated assaults by elements of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, including the Anzac Mounted Division, Desert Mounted Corps, and multiple infantry divisions, and was contemporaneous with strategic maneuvers involving the Yildirim Army Group and the wider Imperial efforts in the Middle Eastern theatre.

Background

By mid-1917 the strategic stalemate at Gaza followed earlier engagements including the First Battle of Gaza and Second Battle of Gaza, both involving commanders such as Sir Archibald Murray and formations like the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade. The Ottoman Empire under commanders including Kress von Kressenstein and political authority from Istanbul had fortified the Gaza–Beersheba line with entrenched positions, redoubts, and artillery supplied via the Hejaz Railway and lines running from Jerusalem and the Sinai Peninsula. British strategic aims linked to broader operations against the Central Powers and coordination with allies such as the French Third Republic and ententes in the Caucasus campaign placed pressure on forces under commanders like Fakhri Pasha and staff of the Yildirim Army Group.

Prelude and Preparations

In October 1917, command changes in the Egyptian Expeditionary Force and the arrival of reinforcements prompted renewed offensive planning influenced by lessons from the Battle of Romani and consolidation after the Sinai campaign. Logistics were organized through bases at El Arish and Deir al-Balah, with rail and camel transport aiding supply lines from Port Said and Alexandria. Intelligence from patrols, aerial reconnaissance by units similar to Royal Flying Corps, and signals interception informed assault timings. Commanders including Edmund Allenby and corps leaders such as Philip Chetwode planned combined infantry and cavalry operations, coordinating the Anzac Mounted Division with the Yeomanry Mounted Division and the XXI Corps (British) to outflank Ottoman positions held by troops under officers like Jevdet Bey.

Order of Battle

British forces comprised divisions and formations including the 52nd (Lowland) Division, 54th (East Anglian) Division, Yeomanry Mounted Division, Anzac Mounted Division, and elements of the Desert Mounted Corps, supported by artillery brigades and engineers drawn from the Royal Engineers and logistics from Royal Army Service Corps. Ottoman formations included the 3rd Army elements, corps of the Yildirim Army Group, regional garrisons from Aleppo contingents, and units led by staff under Kress von Kressenstein and local commanders such as Fakhri Pasha. Naval and aerial assets provided reconnaissance and artillery spotting, with liaison between higher echelons in Cairo and the Mediterranean command structure.

The Battle

The operation opened with a feint and artillery bombardment designed to fix Ottoman attention on fortified positions around Gaza while mounted forces executed wide maneuvers to threaten flanks and supply lines leading to Beersheba and Khalasa. Infantry of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force assaulted trenches, redoubts, and defensive belts, while the Anzac Mounted Division and Desert Mounted Corps exploited mobility to penetrate rear areas, interdicting retreat and communications toward Hebron and Jerusalem. The combined-arms use of artillery, infantry storming parties, cavalry charges, and engineering parties breaching barbed wire overcame defensive works that had resisted earlier assaults at Gaza during 1917. Ottoman counterattacks were repulsed; coordination failures, stretched logistics, and attrition forced withdrawals to prepared positions near Beersheba and along routes toward the Judean Hills.

Aftermath and Casualties

Following the breakthrough, British forces occupied Gaza and advanced to seize Beersheba, enabling subsequent operations that culminated in the capture of Jerusalem months later. Casualty figures reflect several thousand killed and wounded on both sides, with Ottoman losses compounded by prisoners taken and material abandoned during the retreat. Command shifts in Ottoman command and reassignment of units from sectors including Aleppo and the Hejaz followed the operation, while the Egyptian Expeditionary Force consolidated gains and extended supply lines to support further offensives.

Strategic Significance and Analysis

The Third Battle of Gaza altered the balance in the Sinai and Palestine Campaign by breaking a defensive line that had stalled British Empire ambitions, facilitating the Jerusalem campaign and affecting Ottoman strategic posture in the Levant. Analysis highlights effective use of deception, combined-arms tactics, and operational mobility by commanders such as Edmund Allenby and corps leaders including Philip Chetwode, contrasted with Ottoman difficulties under pressures from the Yildirim Army Group command structure and supply constraints linked to the Hejaz Railway. The battle influenced subsequent campaigns across the Middle Eastern theatre, intersecting with diplomatic and military developments involving actors like the Allied Powers and regional authorities.

Category:Battles of World War I Category:Conflicts in 1917 Category:Sinai and Palestine Campaign