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| Tentative Manual for Landing Operations | |
|---|---|
| Name | Tentative Manual for Landing Operations |
| Type | Field manual |
| Country | United States |
| Language | English |
| Subject | Airborne and amphibious landing procedures |
| Published | 1942 (first draft) |
| Publisher | War Department |
Tentative Manual for Landing Operations is a World War II–era United States Army manual outlining doctrine for amphibious and airborne assaults, combined-arms coordination, and tactical logistics for amphibious landings and air assaults. Drafted amid operations such as the Operation Torch, Operation Husky, Guadalcanal Campaign, and planning for Operation Overlord, the manual sought to codify lessons from the Battle of Crete, Dieppe Raid, Battle of the Atlantic, and early Pacific War island campaigns. Its guidance influenced postwar doctrine in institutions like the United States Marine Corps and the United States Army Air Forces.
The manual presents procedures to synchronize units from the United States Navy, United States Marine Corps, United States Army, and allied formations such as the British Army, Royal Navy, and Royal Air Force for combined amphibious assaults, air landings, and logistics over the shore. It provides templates for assault organization used in campaigns like Normandy landings and Battle of Iwo Jima, and it addresses interoperability with commands such as Combined Chiefs of Staff and task forces led by officers comparable to Admiral William H. P. Blandy, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Admiral Ernest King. The purpose includes reducing friction observed in engagements like the Dieppe Raid and improving coordination found effective in the North African Campaign.
The manual assumes contested littoral environments influenced by operations against adversaries like the Imperial Japanese Navy, Kriegsmarine, and coastal defenses comparable to the Atlantic Wall. It presumes availability of assets from organizations such as the United States Naval Reserve, Fleet Marine Force, Eighth Air Force, and convoy escorts modeled after Convoy SC 42 to secure approaches identified in intelligence from units like the Office of Strategic Services and signals from Bletchley Park. Assumptions include tidal and weather considerations familiar from the D-Day weather briefing and logistical constraints similar to those encountered during the Solomon Islands campaign.
Planning sections reference coordination with staffs in structures like the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Amphibious Corps (United States Marine Corps), and combined headquarters employed at Operation Torch and Sicily Campaign. Briefing templates incorporate intelligence from Ultra decrypts, reconnaissance from PBY Catalina and Spitfire patrols, and mapping comparable to charts produced by the Hydrographic Office. Planning addresses loading plans used by convoys such as those in the Arctic convoys to the Soviet Union and embarkation priorities seen during the Salerno landings. It prescribes liaison roles with services including the United States Coast Guard and allied units like the Free French Forces.
Approach guidance integrates navigation techniques taught by services like the Royal Air Force Bomber Command and aviators from units such as the 101st Airborne Division and 82nd Airborne Division, referencing glide path control methods used by pilots in C-47 Skytrain operations and carrier aviators from Aircraft Carrier Task Force. Descent procedures draw on experience from airborne operations in the Battle of Crete and sea-borne approaches employed during the Battle of Leyte Gulf, emphasizing timing coordination with naval gunfire support from ships like USS Texas (BB-35) and carrier-based close air support from USS Enterprise (CV-6).
The manual prescribes establishment of landing zones using markers and techniques coordinated with units such as Pioneer Battalions, Seabees, and Royal Engineers, and illumination controlled by aircraft like the B-17 Flying Fortress or lightships akin to those used in the English Channel. Marking protocols reference lessons from the Sicily airborne landings and the use of visual signals validated during Operation Husky, along with electronic identification methods paralleling developments from signals units at Bletchley Park and radar sets like the SCR-270.
Aircraft and crew roles are delineated for platforms including the C-47 Skytrain, Douglas SBD Dauntless, F4F Wildcat, Grumman TBF Avenger, and larger transports analogous to C-54 Skymaster for strategic lift, with responsibilities assigned to squadrons from organizations such as the United States Army Air Forces, Fleet Air Arm, and Marine Corps Aviation. Crew procedures mirror doctrines taught at institutions like the Naval War College and Air Corps Tactical School, assigning tasks for pilots, navigators, flight engineers, and loadmasters during assault, resupply, and casualty evacuation operations experienced in campaigns including Philippine Campaign (1944–45).
Emergency protocols cover forced-landing responses, ditching procedures, survival and capture contingencies referencing training from Prisoner of War camps and escape guidance akin to manuals used by Special Operations Executive operatives. Contingency planning anticipates countermeasures against threats from units such as U-boat wolfpacks, kamikaze attacks, and shore batteries comparable to those at Pointe du Hoc, and prescribes coordination with rescue elements like Air-Sea Rescue Service and hospital ships modeled on USS Hope (AH-7).
Category:United States Army publications Category:World War II military manuals