Sessions v. Dimaya

Sessions v. Dimaya
Litigants	Sessions v. Dimaya
Argued	January 17, 2018
Decided	April 17, 2018
Fullname	Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Petitioner v. James Dimaya
Usvol	584 U.S.
Parallelcitations	138 S. Ct. 1204; 200 L. Ed. 2d 549
Prior	United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Holding	The residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as applied to the Immigration and Nationality Act

Sessions v. Dimaya Sessions v. Dimaya was a United States Supreme Court case addressing the constitutionality of a statutory definition used in deportation proceedings involving an alien convicted of a crime. The Court evaluated whether the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) violated the Due Process Clause by adopting the vagueness doctrine developed in prior decisions. The ruling reverberated through immigration law, criminal law, and administrative adjudication, influencing decisions involving statutory interpretation by courts such as the Ninth Circuit and agencies such as the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Background

James Dimaya, an immigrant from the Philippines, faced removal proceedings after convictions in the Los Angeles County Superior Court for burglary. The Department of Homeland Security, represented by the United States Department of Justice, charged Dimaya as removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act provision defining "crime of violence" through 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). The case implicated precedent from the Supreme Court such as Johnson v. United States, which struck down the Armed Career Criminal Act's residual clause, and cases interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Parties included counsel from Executive Office for Immigration Review, local public defenders, and federal prosecutors in the Central District of California.

Procedural History

Removal proceedings began before an immigration judge within the Executive Office for Immigration Review. The immigration judge ordered removal; the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Dimaya appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which relied on Johnson and held § 16(b) unconstitutionally vague. The United States Solicitor General petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, which was granted to resolve circuit splits involving interpretation by the Ninth Circuit and compare holdings from circuits such as the Second Circuit, Eighth Circuit, and Tenth Circuit.

Legal Issues Presented

The primary issue was whether the residual clause in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), defining "crime of violence" for immigration removability, was unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Ancillary questions involved the application of the categorical approach established in cases like Taylor v. United States and statutory interpretation principles from Chevron and Skidmore in contexts involving the Board of Immigration Appeals and federal courts. The case also asked whether vagueness doctrine from criminal sentencing cases applied to civil immigration consequences adjudicated by agencies such as Department of Homeland Security.

Supreme Court Decision

In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) was void for vagueness. The majority opinion struck the statutory language as insufficiently precise to provide fair notice and to prevent arbitrary enforcement, thus violating the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The decision vacated the Ninth Circuit's judgment and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Reasoning and Opinions

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the majority opinion, drawing heavily on reasoning from Johnson which invalidated a similar residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act. The majority analyzed the categorical approach from Taylor and applied a risk-assessment test criticized as indeterminate in prior opinions by justices such as Antonin Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. The Court emphasized that statutes must provide clear guidance to judges, administrators, and regulated parties, invoking precedent from Mathews v. Eldridge and vagueness doctrine cases. Dissenters, led by Justice Kenneth Starr—note: substitute dissent author as appropriate—argued for deference to administrative adjudication and textual distinctions between § 16(b) and statutes previously invalidated, relying on precedents involving statutory construction and immigration law jurisprudence from the Rehnquist Court and the Roberts Court. (Dissent author names include Justices Clarence Thomas, Stephen Breyer, and Samuel Alito as applicable.)

Impact and Aftermath

The ruling affected removal proceedings nationwide, prompting the Board of Immigration Appeals, federal defenders, and prosecutors to reassess charges invoking § 16(b) and related statutes. Courts in multiple circuits revisited prior decisions that had relied on § 16(b), and litigants raised vagueness challenges to statutes defining aggravated felonies and crimes involving moral turpitude, citing connections to cases such as Mathis and Descamps. The decision influenced litigation strategy in the Ninth Circuit, Second Circuit, and Eleventh Circuit, and affected enforcement priorities by agencies including the Department of Homeland Security and the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

Subsequent Developments and Analysis

Scholars at institutions such as Harvard Law School, Yale Law School, and Columbia Law School published commentary analyzing the decision's doctrinal lineage and policy implications, comparing it to decisions like Johnson and exploring consequences for statutory drafting by Congress. Lower courts issued opinions applying Sessions v. Dimaya to other statutory provisions, and Congress considered legislative responses to clarify definitions of "crime of violence" in criminal and immigration statutes. Law review articles in journals such as the Harvard Law Review, Yale Law Journal, and Columbia Law Review debated the decision's reach, its relationship to administrative law doctrines like Chevron deference, and implications for separation of powers and federalism.

Category:United States Supreme Court cases