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Second Artillery Corps

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Second Artillery Corps
Second Artillery Corps
漫漫长冬 · Public domain · source
Unit nameSecond Artillery Corps
Dates1966–2015
CountryPeople's Republic of China
TypeStrategic missile forces
RoleDeterrence (nuclear)
Size~100,000 (est.)
GarrisonBeijing
Notable commandersGeneral Jing Zhiyuan, General Wei Fenghe

Second Artillery Corps was the strategic missile force of the People's Liberation Army responsible for China's land-based ballistic missile arsenal and nuclear deterrent from 1966 until its reorganization in 2015. It operated alongside the People's Liberation Army Navy, People's Liberation Army Air Force, and People's Liberation Army Ground Force as a principal element of People's Republic of China strategic posture, shaping regional dynamics involving United States, Russia, India, and Japan through deployments that affected crises such as standoffs over Taiwan Strait and tensions in the South China Sea.

History

The unit traces origins to early missile development programs linked to projects involving Dongfeng weaponization and advisors influenced by exchanges with the Soviet Union during the Sino-Soviet split. During the Cultural Revolution period and into the Reform and Opening-up era under Deng Xiaoping, it expanded with strategic programs paralleling developments in United States Strategic Command concepts and responses to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty dynamics. The 1990s post–Cold War era saw modernization tied to lessons from the Gulf War and shifts in PLA modernization policies, while the 2000s incorporated technologies inspired by global advances exemplified by Minuteman III upgrades and Topol-M developments. In 2015 the corps was restructured into the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force as part of a wider Xi Jinping–led reform of the Central Military Commission.

Organization and Structure

Organizationally, the corps comprised multiple base commands and brigades organized along lines similar to numbered strategic units such as those in Strategic Rocket Forces (Russia), with geographic responsibilities overlapping provinces like Shaanxi, Sichuan, Liaoning, and Hebei. Its command echelon reported to the Central Military Commission while operational control interfaced with theater commands including the Southern Theater Command and Northern Theater Command. Support elements mirrored combined-arms logistics models used by formations such as United States Army Forces Command and incorporated liaison with research institutes like the China Academy of Engineering Physics and defense industry enterprises including China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation and China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation.

Role and Capabilities

The corps provided strategic deterrence, second-strike assurance, and regional precision strike options analogous to missions of the United States Strategic Command and Russian Strategic Missile Troops. Its posture affected strategic stability among nuclear states including United States, Russia, France, United Kingdom, and regional adversaries like India and Japan. Capabilities emphasized survivable mobile brigades and silo forces to complicate adversary targeting as seen in debates between proponents of counterforce and countervalue doctrines. The corps also influenced arms control dialogues involving the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and informal confidence-building exchanges with neighboring states.

Weapons and Equipment

Inventory included road-mobile and silo-based systems in the Dongfeng family such as variants comparable in function to DF-3, DF-4, DF-5, DF-21, DF-31, and DF-41 designations, fielding both single-warhead and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle concepts analogous to the MIRV technologies of Minuteman III and Topol-M. Delivery platforms integrated inertial navigation systems, satellite guidance akin to BeiDou constellation integration, and solid- and liquid-propellant technologies reflecting advances in designs like Strela and R-36M. Support equipment encompassed transporter erector launchers, silo infrastructure, command-and-control nodes, and hardened communications interoperable with strategic C4ISR frameworks used by entities such as North American Aerospace Defense Command.

Training and Doctrine

Training regimes drew from combined influences of strategic studies linked to institutions such as the National Defense University (China) and historical lessons from crises like the Cuban Missile Crisis and Yom Kippur War. Exercises stressed survivability, rapid launch procedures, and wartime command resilience, with routine drills compared to exercises by Strategic Rocket Forces and tabletop war-gaming used at CENTCOM and NATO headquarters. Doctrine evolved from assured retaliation to flexible response concepts, incorporating lessons on precision strike, counterforce targeting, and escalation management debated in academic circles at the Institute of Strategic Studies and within think tanks like the China Institute of International Studies.

Command and Leadership

Leadership included notable commanders who later served on the Central Military Commission and in national security portfolios, such as General Jing Zhiyuan and General Wei Fenghe, both of whom interacted with counterparts from United States Department of Defense and participated in high-level dialogues involving the Ministry of National Defense (China). Command relationships were shaped by political oversight from the Chinese Communist Party leadership and by parallel institutions including the People's Liberation Army General Staff Department before reforms centralized authority under the Central Military Commission reforms of Xi Jinping.

Category:People's Liberation Army