SIDR Working Group
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| SIDR Working Group | |
|---|---|
| Name | SIDR Working Group |
| Formation | 2006 |
| Type | Standards Development |
| Region served | Global |
| Parent organization | IETF |
SIDR Working Group
The SIDR Working Group was an Internet Engineering Task Force effort chartered to develop specifications for Secure Inter-Domain Routing, focusing on mechanisms to secure Border Gateway Protocol routing, protect Autonomous System origin attestations, and mitigate route hijacking. It produced standards and informational documents that influenced operational practices among Internet Service Providers, Tier 1 networks, and content delivery infrastructures, interacting with related efforts such as IETF Working Groups, MANRS, and the Internet Architecture Board.
Background and Purpose
The group aimed to address weaknesses in the routing system exemplified by incidents like the 2008 YouTube Pakistan hijack and the 2005 China Telecom incident, by specifying cryptographic attestations and validation frameworks akin to the goals pursued by Resource Public Key Infrastructure and the Routing Policy Specification Language. Its charter connected concerns of the Regional Internet Registrys—RIPE NCC, ARIN, APNIC, LACNIC, and AFRINIC—with operator communities represented by NANOG and researchers from institutions such as MIT and UC Berkeley. The effort coordinated with cryptographic standards from IETF Standards Committee and aligned with trust model debates involving entities like ICANN and the Internet Society.
Key Specifications and Documents
Major outputs included documents specifying Resource Public Key Infrastructure artifacts, origin validation, and publication protocols. Notable RFCs and drafts addressed formats and procedures for Route Origin Authorization records, certificate profiles for Internet number resources, and manifest formats for distributed publication via repositories used by routing registries such as the RADb and the RIPE Database. The group produced work that interlinked with standards for X.509 profiles, ASN.1 encodings, and operational guidelines promulgated by bodies including IETF RFC editors and the IAB.
Architecture and Protocols
The SIDR architecture defined interactions between cache servers, validators, and repository publication systems, leveraging a hierarchical trust model anchored by resource certificates and signed objects. Protocol components referenced include mechanisms for publishing provenance data compatible with HTTP-based repositories, synchronization models similar to rsync and RESTful APIs, and format bindings informed by XML and JSON practices. The protocol set specified how BGP speakers perform origin validation using cryptographic attestations issued by resource holders and authenticated by trust anchors maintained by Regional Internet Registrys and other designated authorities.
Implementations and Deployments
Implementations emerged from network equipment vendors, open-source projects, and research prototypes developed at universities and companies such as Cisco Systems, Juniper Networks, NLnet Labs, and various Internet Exchange Point operators. Open-source validator and router-integrated modules were contributed by projects in repositories managed by organizations like GitHub and deployed in pilot programs coordinated with NORDUnet, USNET, and large content providers. Deployment experience informed operational guidance embraced by operational fora including IETF OPSAWG and regional forums such as RIPE Meetings and APRICOT.
Security Considerations
Security analysis addressed threats including unauthorized origin announcements, man-in-the-middle attacks on inter-domain routing, and key management challenges exemplified by certificate revocation and compromise scenarios. The group evaluated trust anchor distribution alternatives referencing models used by DNSSEC and considered operational trade-offs similar to debates around Public Key Infrastructure resilience and Certificate Transparency practices. Recommendations considered attack vectors analyzed in academic literature from institutions like Stanford University and ETH Zurich as well as incident case studies publicized by Google and Cloudflare.
History and Working Group Activity
The working group's activity included multiple IETF meetings, interim workshops, and coordinated outreach with registry operators and operator communities at events such as IETF March meetings, IETF Buenos Aires, and regional gatherings hosted by NANOG and RIPE NCC. Contributors included engineers from VeriSign, Akamai Technologies, Hurricane Electric, research labs at Carnegie Mellon University, and staff from ISOC. The group produced a sequence of RFCs and Internet-Drafts over several years, after which follow-on efforts and operational adoption were tracked by successor initiatives within the IETF and by community-driven efforts such as MANRS.