Regulation (EEC) No 659/1999
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| Regulation (EEC) No 659/1999 | |
|---|---|
| Title | Regulation (EEC) No 659/1999 |
| Type | European Community regulation |
| Made by | European Commission |
| Made under | Treaty of Rome |
| Made | 1999 |
| Status | repealed |
Regulation (EEC) No 659/1999 was a Commission regulation that detailed procedures for implementing Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings and for notification of mergers and acquisitions within the European Community. Adopted in 1999, it provided procedural rules, thresholds, forms and time-limits that connected the European Commission with national competition authorities and private parties such as Siemens, General Electric, BP, Shell, and Microsoft. The instrument operated alongside substantive law shaped by actors like Margrethe Vestager, historical frameworks such as the Single European Act, and landmark decisions from the Court of Justice of the European Union.
Background and Legal Context
Regulation 659/1999 was enacted to implement Articles of the Merger Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 following the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and practice developed by the European Commission and member-state authorities including Bundeskartellamt, Autorité de la concurrence (France), Competition and Markets Authority (UK), and Autoriteit Consument & Markt. It responded to institutional developments after the Maastricht Treaty and under the administrative practice influenced by prior cases such as Eurocontrol v Commission and decisions involving corporations like Tetra Laval and GE/Honeywell. The text was shaped by Council instruments and by coordination with agencies like OECD and commitments arising from the World Trade Organization framework.
Scope and Objectives
The regulation aimed to operationalize the notification regime for concentrations affecting the European internal market, defining criteria for jurisdictional thresholds, referral mechanisms involving United Kingdom firms and Deutsche Telekom, and cooperation with national authorities such as Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato and Bundeskartellamt. Its objectives included ensuring legal certainty for merging parties including Nestlé, Kraft Foods, ExxonMobil, and Chevron, facilitating effective enforcement consistent with rulings by the Court of Justice of the European Union and procedural norms embodied in instruments like the Treaty of Amsterdam. It sought to balance the interests of market participants such as Amazon (company), Apple Inc., and Facebook with the public enforcement roles of entities like the European Parliament and European Council.
Key Provisions and Procedures
Regulation 659/1999 prescribed notification forms, time-limits for the European Commission’s Phase I and Phase II investigations, the information duties of parties including conglomerates like Siemens and ABB, and standards for confidentiality akin to practices in cases such as Microsoft v Commission. It specified the use of simplified procedure routes familiar from mergers involving firms like Heinz, Unilever, and T-Mobile, set out rules on market share calculation referenced in precedents such as United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission, and articulated cooperation tools with national authorities including exchange mechanisms used in Dyson-related inquiries. The regulation detailed forms for notifying concentrations between undertakings like BP and ChevronTexaco and procedures for commitments and remedies modeled on decisions involving GlaxoSmithKline.
Implementation and Enforcement
Enforcement relied on the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition, coordination with national authorities such as Autorité de la concurrence (France), Bundeskartellamt, and adjudication by the Court of Justice of the European Union. The regulation supported investigative powers deployed in complex mergers such as GE/Honeywell and Tetra Laval v Commission, enabling interim measures and remedies negotiated with firms like Bayer and Monsanto. It operated in administrative practice alongside enforcement policies advocated by commissioners including Neelie Kroes and Margrethe Vestager, and was applied in merger filings involving multinational groups such as Toyota, Volkswagen, and Samsung Electronics.
Amendments, Repeal and Successor Instruments
Over time, the framework embodied by 659/1999 was updated through subsequent instruments and practice, culminating in repeal and replacement by consolidated procedural rules reflecting the amended Merger Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The successor instruments incorporated lessons from cases like Intel v Commission and policy shifts following the Lisbon Treaty and institutional changes affecting the European Commission and national authorities including Bundeskartellamt and Competition and Markets Authority (UK). The evolution reflected inputs from international organizations such as the OECD and rulings by the General Court (European Union).
Impact and Case Law
Regulation 659/1999 influenced major merger control cases involving firms such as Tetra Laval, GE, Honeywell, Microsoft, Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline, and AstraZeneca. Its procedural detail shaped judicial review by the Court of Justice of the European Union and the General Court (European Union), informed remedies in transactions by Siemens and Alstom, and affected cooperation in cross-border matters involving United States multinationals and Japanese corporations like Sony Corporation. Scholarly and policy debates in venues including Harvard Law School, London School of Economics, and College of Europe examined its role in harmonising merger review, while enforcement practice by agencies such as Bundeskartellamt and Autorité de la concurrence (France) highlighted the regulation’s practical legacy.