Radd-ul-Fasaad

Radd-ul-Fasaad
Name	Radd-ul-Fasaad
Native name	ردد الفساد
Founded	2017
Active	2017–present
Area	Pakistan, Afghanistan
Ideology	Militant Islamist extremism
Leaders	Khalid Mansoor (reported)
Predecessors	Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
Allies	Jamaat-ud-Dawa, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
Opponents	Pakistan Armed Forces, United States, India, Afghanistan

Radd-ul-Fasaad is a militant Islamist campaign that emerged in 2017 associated with Pakistani jihadi networks and offshoots of organizations active in South Asia and Central Asia. It was announced as a countrywide effort encompassing insurgent, terrorist, and sabotage activities with cross-border implications involving actors from Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, United States, China and transnational groups. Analysts connected it to networks including Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Al-Qaeda, and Islamic State affiliates, drawing attention from regional capitals such as Islamabad, New Delhi, Kabul, Beijing, and international bodies like the United Nations and NATO.

Background and Formation

The campaign was declared amid tensions following events like the 2016 Uri attack, the 2017 Pulwama attack, and escalating rivalry between India and Pakistan tied to the disputed territory of Kashmir. Historic antecedents include the evolution of Mujahideen networks from the Soviet–Afghan War, linkages to groups such as Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, and splintering within Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan after operations by the Pakistan Army and Inter-Services Intelligence. The formation occurred alongside diplomatic incidents involving the United States Department of State, the European Union, and sanctions lists maintained by the Financial Action Task Force.

Objectives and Declared Goals

Public statements framed objectives as protection of Muslim populations, retaliation for perceived offenses like the 2016 Indian surgical strikes (2016) and the 2019 Balakot airstrike, and opposition to policies by Pakistan's rivals. It purportedly aimed to conduct attacks against targets associated with India, Afghanistan, and western interests including United States assets, while seeking to influence political actors in Islamabad and Islamabad High Court-era adjudication. Observers compared rhetoric to manifestos from Al-Qaeda leadership, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and slogans used by Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan commanders like Mullah Fazlullah.

Key Operations and Tactics

Reported operations attributed to the campaign included bombings, improvised explosive device attacks, targeted assassinations, and sabotage of infrastructure such as railways, pipelines, and communication networks linking Gwadar Port and transnational corridors like the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. Tactics mirrored methods used in notable incidents: suicide attacks reminiscent of 2007 Karachi bombing, coordinated assaults similar to the 2008 Mumbai attacks attributed to Lashkar-e-Taiba, and guerrilla-style ambushes like those seen during the Afghan Civil War (1996–2001). Security analysts noted use of encrypted communications linked to platforms scrutinized by Interpol, exploitation of border corridors near the Durand Line, and fundraising methods comparable to schemes sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council committees.

Organizational Structure and Leadership

Reporting suggested a fractal network rather than a single hierarchical command, involving commanders with pedigrees in Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, and foreign fighters from Uzbekistan, Chechnya, and Arabian Peninsula contingents. Leadership figures cited in open-source reporting included individuals formerly associated with Hafiz Saeed-linked organizations and mid-level commanders with combat experience in Afghan Taliban campaigns and Al-Qaeda operations. Coordination reportedly occurred via intermediaries in urban centers such as Karachi, Rawalpindi, Peshawar, and Quetta, with logistical links to funding channels historically used by groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed and Jamaat-ud-Dawa.

Impact and Casualties

Analysts attributed dozens to hundreds of fatalities and injuries in incidents linked to the campaign across Pakistan and border areas, affecting civilians, security personnel from the Pakistan Army, Frontier Corps, and law enforcement agencies including the Police Service of Pakistan. Critical infrastructure disruption impacted projects tied to China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, commercial hubs like Gwadar, and transit routes to Karachi Port Trust. The human toll evoked comparisons with casualty patterns from earlier campaigns such as the 1998 US embassy bombings and the 2009 Lahore police academy attack in scale and urban targeting.

Domestic and International Reactions

Domestic responses included condemnations from political parties like the Pakistan Muslim League (N) and Pakistan Peoples Party, increased operations by the Pakistan Army and paramilitary Rangers, and judicial scrutiny from institutions including the Supreme Court of Pakistan. International reactions ranged from India's diplomatic protests to United States Department of State statements urging counterterrorism cooperation, and expressions of concern by United Nations envoys. Regional actors such as China and Afghanistan engaged diplomatically, while multilateral organizations including NATO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation monitored security implications.

Legal and Security Responses

Authorities pursued countermeasures including intelligence-driven operations by the Inter-Services Intelligence, coordinated policing by provincial governments in Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan, and legal actions invoking Pakistan's anti-terrorism statutes and ordinances reviewed by the Attorney General of Pakistan. International law enforcement coordination involved Interpol notices, sanctions lists maintained by the United Nations Security Council, and financial countermeasures aligned with Financial Action Task Force guidance. Efforts emphasized disruption of financing, de-radicalization programs modeled on initiatives evaluated by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and cross-border security arrangements discussed with Afghanistan and China.

Category:Insurgent groups in Pakistan Category:Terrorism in Pakistan Category:Militant Islamist groups