R v A (No 2)

R v A (No 2)
Name	R v A (No 2)
Court	House of Lords
Citation	[1999] UKHL 25; [2001] 1 AC 45
Judges	Lord Steyn, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Hutton, Lord Clyde
Date decided	17 June 2001
Prior	Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)
Keywords	Sexual Offences Act 1956, European Convention on Human Rights, Human Rights Act 1998, right to silence

R v A (No 2). R v A (No 2) is a landmark decision of the House of Lords concerning the interpretation of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 and the Human Rights Act 1998 in light of the European Convention on Human Rights. The case addressed statutory provisions restricting evidence in sexual offence trials and the compatibility of those provisions with the rights secured by the European Convention on Human Rights as incorporated by the Human Rights Act. The judgment is notable for its approach to statutory interpretation under section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 and for its effect on criminal procedure in the United Kingdom.

Background

The litigation arose against the backdrop of debates over the treatment of complainant credibility in prosecutions for sexual offences and the historical development of evidence law in the United Kingdom. Important antecedents included decisions from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), the European Court of Human Rights, and legislative reforms responding to public concern about sexual violence. The common law tradition of witness protection and a statutory scheme limiting cross-examination of complainants under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 intersected with the newly enacted Human Rights Act 1998, creating a legal tension requiring resolution by the nation's highest appellate tribunal, the House of Lords.

Facts and procedural history

The appellant, charged with a sexual offence, sought to cross-examine the complainant about prior sexual history and conduct. Under the evidentiary rules derived from the Sexual Offences Act 1956 and longstanding common-law principles, such questions were generally excluded unless specific exceptions were met. The trial judge limited defence counsel's questioning; the defendant was convicted. On appeal, the defendant argued that the restrictions infringed his rights under articles of the European Convention on Human Rights, particularly the right to a fair trial and to examine witnesses. The case progressed through the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), which rejected the challenge, and ultimately the defendant obtained leave to appeal to the House of Lords.

Legal issues and arguments

Central legal issues included whether the statutory and common-law restrictions on questioning about a complainant's sexual history were compatible with the rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights as incorporated by the Human Rights Act 1998, and if not, whether courts should read primary legislation in a way that conforms with those rights pursuant to section 3 of the Human Rights Act. Defence counsel relied upon jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights and argued for a broad right of confrontation akin to protections under article 6. Prosecution and interveners urged respect for statutory safeguards designed to protect complainants and to promote the reporting of sexual offences, invoking precedents from the Crown Prosecution Service and policy rationales advanced in legislative debates in the Parliament of the United Kingdom.

Judgment

The House of Lords allowed the appeal. The leading speeches, notably by Lord Steyn and Lord Hoffmann, held that where possible primary legislation should be read and given effect in a manner compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights under section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998. Applying that principle, the Lords adopted a purposive and contextual interpretation of the statutory provisions governing admissibility of prior sexual history, permitting certain lines of questioning that had been excluded under a literal reading. The judgment balanced the defendant's rights under the European Convention on Human Rights—in particular the right to a fair trial—against statutory protections for complainants, and elaborated principles for trial judges exercising discretion under the reinterpreted provisions.

Significance and impact

R v A (No 2) is significant for several reasons. It is a leading authority on the interpretative obligation imposed by section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 and illustrates the willingness of the House of Lords to read statutes compatibly with the European Convention on Human Rights where a coherent reading is available. The decision affected practice in criminal courts, influencing approaches to cross-examination in sexual offence trials and the handling of evidence by the Crown Prosecution Service and defence counsel. The ruling sparked scholarly debate and commentary from figures associated with the Bar Council, the Law Society of England and Wales, and academic institutions such as Oxford University and Cambridge University, about the proper balance between rights of accused persons and protections for complainants.

Subsequent developments and commentary

Following the decision, Parliament and judicial bodies considered legislative and procedural responses. The case influenced later appellate decisions and was discussed in the context of statutory reform proposals considered in committees of the House of Commons and the House of Lords. Commentary appeared in legal periodicals associated with institutions such as the British Institute of International and Comparative Law and the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies. Academics referenced the judgment in analyses comparing domestic interpretation under the Human Rights Act 1998 with jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights and subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom—which replaced the House of Lords—addressing the same interpretative issues.

Category:United Kingdom criminal case law Category:House of Lords cases Category:Human Rights Act 1998 cases