R (Evans) v Attorney General

R (Evans) v Attorney General
Case	R (Evans) v Attorney General
Court	Supreme Court of the United Kingdom
Citations	[2015] UKSC 21
Decided	26 March 2015
Judges	Lords Neuberger, Mance, Clarke, Wilson, Reed
Keywords	Freedom of Information Act 2000, royal prerogative, judicial review

R (Evans) v Attorney General was a seminal United Kingdom constitutional case concerning the interaction of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, the royal prerogative, and judicial review of ministerial advice. The Supreme Court resolved a dispute that engaged institutions including the Cabinet Office, the Attorney General for England and Wales, and the House of Commons, and implicated personalities such as Prince Charles, Prince of Wales and officials in the Privy Council. The decision clarified limits on executive claims to absolute privilege and established principles for disclosure of ministerial documents.

Background

The dispute arose against the backdrop of public interest in letters exchanged between Charles III (then Prince of Wales) and ministers in the Blair ministry and subsequent administrations. Requests under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 were made to the Cabinet Office for correspondence between the Prince and ministers including those from the Prime Minister's Office. Contested issues invoked doctrines associated with the royal prerogative of mercy, Crown immunity, and the scope of legal instruments such as the Data Protection Act 1998 and statutory exemptions under the Freedom of Information Act 2000#Section_36.

Facts and Procedural History

An initial request for letters from the Prince of Wales' private office to various ministers led to disclosure refusals by the Cabinet Office citing exemptions and public interest considerations under the Freedom of Information Act 2000#Section_36 and claims about confidential ministerial communications protected by the doctrine of collective ministerial responsibility. The Information Commissioner's Office ordered disclosure, prompting appeals to the First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights), the Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber), and ultimately the Court of Appeal of England and Wales. The Attorney General for England and Wales intervened by certifying that disclosure would be contrary to the public interest and that publication was prevented by absolute privilege, invoking authorities such as the Attorney-General v. Jonathan Cape Ltd principle. The case reached the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom after contested interlocutory and substantive proceedings.

Legal Issues

The Supreme Court was asked to resolve whether the Attorney General for England and Wales could issue a certificate under section 53 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000#Section_53 certifying that disclosure would be against the public interest and whether that certificate had effect notwithstanding judicial scrutiny. Central legal issues included the extent of any absolute privilege attaching to communications with members of the Royal Household, the justiciability of ministerial advice, and the proper construction of statutory exemptions such as Freedom of Information Act 2000#Section_36 for effective government. The court considered precedents including A-G v Jonathan Cape Ltd, principles from R (on the application of Corner House Research) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office, and constitutional doctrines involving separation of powers adjudicated in cases like R (on the application of Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union.

Judgment

By a majority, the Supreme Court held that the Attorney General for England and Wales's certificate did not have the effect of ousting judicial review and that absolute privilege could not be invoked to prevent disclosure in the circumstances. The court ordered disclosure of the requested correspondence subject to any applicable exemptions under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and reaffirmed that statutory schemes such as the Freedom of Information Act displace claims to absolute, non-justiciable executive immunity where Parliament's intention is clear. The decision overturned aspects of earlier rulings by the Court of Appeal of England and Wales and aligned with constitutional judgments from the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom emphasizing legal accountability.

Reasoning and Legal Principles

The majority applied statutory interpretation, constitutional principle, and precedent to conclude that section 53 did not place ministerial certificates beyond judicial review, relying on established rules from cases like Entick v Carrington and modern authority such as R (on the application of Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. The court distinguished instances of absolute privilege recognized in Attorney-General v Jonathan Cape Ltd from the present statutory context and emphasized parliamentary sovereignty as articulated in R (Jackson) v Attorney General and judicial oversight endorsed in R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union. The reasoning balanced public interest in candid ministerial advice against democratic accountability under statutes enacted by Parliament of the United Kingdom.

Significance and Impact

The decision had wide implications for transparency involving the Royal Family, executive accountability in the United Kingdom, and the operation of the Freedom of Information Act 2000. It influenced subsequent litigation on disclosure involving the Cabinet Office, guidance by the Information Commissioner's Office, and debates in the House of Commons and House of Lords about reforming access to official records. Legal scholars compared the ruling with constitutional developments post-Human Rights Act 1998 and discussed its effects on doctrines concerning the royal prerogative and separation of powers as considered in jurisprudence from courts such as the European Court of Human Rights and the Privy Council.

Category:United Kingdom constitutional case law