National Risk Register (United Kingdom)
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| National Risk Register (United Kingdom) | |
|---|---|
| Name | National Risk Register (United Kingdom) |
| Country | United Kingdom |
| Publisher | Cabinet Office |
| First | 2008 |
| Latest | 2020 |
National Risk Register (United Kingdom) is a public document published by the Cabinet Office that outlines cross‑cutting assessments of civil contingencies, national emergencies, and large‑scale hazards affecting the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Its purpose is to inform resilience planning by institutions such as the Department for Transport, National Health Service, Met Office, Environment Agency, and devolved administrations like the Scottish Government, Welsh Government, and Northern Ireland Executive. The Register is used alongside frameworks including the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, Emergency Planning College, and interagency mechanisms such as COBR.
Overview
The Register provides scenario‑based risk assessments drawing on data from bodies such as the Public Health England, Ministry of Defence, National Cyber Security Centre, Health and Safety Executive, Office for National Statistics, and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. It summarises likelihood, impact, and preparedness for perils including pandemics like COVID‑19 pandemic, technological incidents resembling the WannaCry incident, natural hazards comparable to the 2013–14 floods, and transport disasters analogous to the Potters Bar rail crash. The document sits alongside risk registers used by Local Resilience Forums and international counterparts such as the European Union Civil Protection Mechanism and United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction.
Historical development and editions
First published in 2008 under a mandate from the Home Office and Prime Minister, the Register evolved through successive editions in 2010, 2012, 2013, 2015, 2017 and 2020. Each edition incorporated lessons from events including the Fires of London, the Aberfan disaster (as a historical governance lesson), the Grenfell fire, the 2011 England riots, and international crises such as the 2010 Haiti earthquake and the Tōhoku tsunami. Contributors have included officials from the Scottish Resilience, NHS Scotland, Metropolitan Police Service, and the London Resilience Partnership. The format shift in later editions reflected influences from publications such as the World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report and standards like ISO 31000.
Risk assessment methodology
The Register applies a qualitative and semi‑quantitative methodology influenced by frameworks like ISO 31010 and principles used by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat. Analysts draw on hazard modelling from the Met Office, epidemiological curves informed by the Royal Society and Academy of Medical Sciences, infrastructure vulnerability studies from Network Rail and the National Grid, and threat intelligence from the MI5 and GCHQ. Scenarios are scored for probability and consequence using matrices comparable to those in HM Treasury guidance, and treatments consider continuity arrangements used by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and Department of Health and Social Care. Peer review has involved academics from institutions such as Imperial College London, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, and University of Oxford.
Major identified risks and categories
The Register organises hazards into themes: natural hazards (flooding like the Somerset Levels, heatwaves akin to the 2018 heatwave), biological threats (influenza pandemics paralleled by 2009 H1N1 and COVID‑19 pandemic), severe industrial accidents (chemical incidents such as the Buncefield fire), transport accidents referencing incidents like the Great Heck crash, cyber incidents similar to WannaCry, and space weather events comparable to the Carrington Event. Infrastructure resilience topics span blackouts reminiscent of the 2019 power cuts, supply chain disruption illustrated by the Iceland volcanic ash disruption, and critical lifeline failures observed after Hurricane Katrina–style impacts. Each category links to stakeholders such as the Police Service of Northern Ireland, Fire and Rescue Services, Public Health Wales, and private sector operators including BT Group.
Government roles and response frameworks
The Cabinet Office coordinates national preparedness through mechanisms like COBR and the National Protective Security Authority. Legal instruments include the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and statutory guidance from the Home Office. Operational response draws on multi‑agency structures involving the Ministry of Defence, NHS England, Local Resilience Forums, and specialist units such as the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Regiment. Recovery planning references guidance from the National Preparedness Commission and case studies from events like the Aberfan disaster and the 7/7 bombings. International cooperation involves treaties and mechanisms including the NATO Civil Emergency Planning and Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction.
Criticism, reception, and updates
Scholars and practitioners have critiqued the Register’s transparency, probabilistic assumptions, and public‑facing clarity in analyses by groups such as Chatham House, Institute for Government, and academics at King's College London. Reviews after events like the COVID‑19 pandemic and the 2013–14 floods prompted calls from members of Parliament of the United Kingdom and select committees to improve horizon scanning, integrate private sector data from firms like Sainsbury's and Tesco plc, and enhance local‑level engagement with entities such as Local Enterprise Partnerships. Subsequent updates sought to incorporate lessons from WannaCry and modelling advances from Imperial College London and University of Cambridge while aligning with international standards such as Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and ISO 31000.