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| National Council of the Revolution | |
|---|---|
| Name | National Council of the Revolution |
| Formation | 1968 |
| Dissolution | 1979 |
| Type | Revolutionary council |
| Headquarters | Ouagadougou |
| Leader title | Chairman |
| Leader name | Sangoulé Lamizana |
| Region served | Upper Volta |
National Council of the Revolution The National Council of the Revolution was the ruling junta that governed Upper Volta after the 1966–1970 period of political unrest, presiding over transitional administration, policy reform, and international alignment. Its tenure overlapped with interactions involving regional actors such as France, Mali, Ghana, and international organizations including the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity. The council's composition and decisions affected relations with institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and influential figures like Sangoulé Lamizana and Thomas Sankara.
The council emerged following tensions that involved the presidency of Maurice Yaméogo, the role of the Voltaic Democratic Union and the aftermath of the 1966 protests linked to labor unions such as the General Confederation of Labour (CGT) and movements inspired by decolonization across West Africa, including uprisings in Algeria, Guinea, and Benin (Dahomey). Influences on its formation included ideologies from leaders such as Gamal Abdel Nasser, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, and Ahmed Sékou Touré, and the strategic context of the Cold War with interest from United States, Soviet Union, and non-aligned actors like India. Regional security concerns invoked precedents from the Haut-Volta administrative legacy and constitutional crises resembling events in Nigeria and Senegal.
The council comprised military officers and civilian technocrats drawn from units influenced by training at institutions like the École Militaire and contacts with missions from France, Belgium, and United States Armed Forces. Key personalities included Sangoulé Lamizana as chairman, alongside officers comparable to figures such as Thomas Sankara, Noël Kambou, and administrators who later interacted with politicians like Blaise Compaoré and diplomats tied to OAU summits. The internal hierarchy resembled other juntas such as the Provisional Revolutionary Government of different states and adopted committees akin to the Council of State, Supreme Revolutionary Council, and consultative bodies modeled after councils in Ghana and Burkina Faso.
The council exercised executive authority, legislative suspension, and administrative control over provinces including Bobo-Dioulasso and districts surrounding Ouagadougou. Powers encompassed reorganization of ministries such as the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Defense, affecting relations with multilateral lenders like the World Bank and bilateral partners such as France and China. The council implemented public policy interventions that referenced legal frameworks from colonial statutes, the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic insofar as administrative practice, and international norms discussed at meetings of the United Nations General Assembly and the Economic Community of West African States.
The council undertook nationalization-like measures, agricultural reforms in millet and sorghum-producing regions, and infrastructure projects including road links between Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso, drawing on technical aid from Soviet Union, France, China, and development agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organization. It negotiated treaties and accords similar in significance to the Lomé Convention framework and engaged with donor conferences involving the International Monetary Fund and European Economic Community. The council also addressed security matters referencing counterinsurgency experiences from Algeria and professionalization initiatives influenced by training exchanges with Morocco, Egypt, and Portugal.
Relations with the armed forces involved balancing rival factions analogous to those seen in Sierra Leone and Gambia, while managing interactions with political parties such as the Voltaic Progressive Union and trade organizations akin to Confédération générale du travail du Faso in later years. The council negotiated power with regional leaders including Houphouët-Boigny, Leopold Sédar Senghor, and Gnassingbé Eyadéma, and faced scrutiny from international actors like the United States Department of State, Kremlin-aligned diplomacy, and representatives from the European Economic Community. These dynamics influenced appointments, coups, and attempted reforms paralleling events in Chad and Central African Republic.
The council's authority waned amid economic pressures, factionalism, and demands for constitutional restoration that echoed transitions elsewhere in Africa during the 1970s and 1980s, leading to eventual handover processes reminiscent of transitions in Benin and Ghana and later political evolutions involving figures like Thomas Sankara and Blaise Compaoré. Consequent institutional legacies affected civil institutions such as universities in Ouagadougou, public administrations, and alignment within organizations including the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and continued engagement with financial institutions such as the African Development Bank. The period remains referenced in studies comparing military regimes with transitional councils across Africa, including analyses involving scholars who have compared outcomes to those in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe.
Category:Politics of Burkina Faso